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PREFACE
My purpose in this study is to show the development 
of British historiography of the Munich Crisis of 1938. To 
accomplish this, I trace British historians, diplomats, 
journalists, and politicians' interpretations of Munich 
through successive phases of British history from 1938 to 
1965» Emphasis is placed on the forces which have influenced 
British writing and speech-making on Munich: personal polit­
ical opinions, Britain's social and political structure, 
Britain's world position, and the British traditions of 
Munich historiography. I attempt to show that these fac­
tors are different in Britain than in either Europe or Amer­
ica and that British writers' conclusions are largely deter­
mined by such influences. Thus, hopefully I establish the 
existence of a unique historiography of Munich in Britain.
The main body of the study is primarily concerned with two 
products of this uniqueness; the rise of a revisionary 
treatment of the origins of the Second World War, and the 
tendency to see Munich as an historical model for present 
policy.
I first became interested in the British writing 
on Munich in I963. At that time I did a Master's thesis
iii
on British foreign policy in the spring of 1938, and part 
of the background research included a review of the better 
known British works on Munich. Several things struck my 
attention. I found that British policy-makers in 1938 
did not believe Czechoslovakia important to British se­
curity. Also, they seemed more impressed with the Sudeten 
Germans' right to self-determination than with Czech claims 
to democratic solidarity. The point of view of most later 
British writers seemed exactly the opposite, and I was 
interested to find out why Britons frequently ignored or 
seemed unaware of the difference betweeen their own values 
and those of 1938. Further, I was curious to know why 
British historians, whom I then considered models of de­
tachment, were still so emotional about Munich. These 
motives provided the original impetus to study British 
historiography as a dissertation topic.
As my research progressed in 1964-63, American 
involvement in Viet Nam intensified, and the Johnson Admin­
istration increasingly justified its policy by historical 
analogies between the present situation in Southeast Asia 
and Europe at the time of Munich. I had finished my own 
military service and was too involved with graduate school 
to have strong feelings about the Government's course of 
action. I was, however, interested to discover how Amer­
ican leaders had become so sure of the validity of parallels 
which seemed dubious to me. Also, I knew that British 
leaders on an earlier occasion, during the Suez Crisis of
iv
1956, had had a similar preoccupation. The answer in both 
cases, I suspected, lay in British writing on Munich, if 
for no other reason than the sheer volume of British writ­
ing on the subject, which was greater than that of any 
other nation.
I was able to satisfy my own curiosity on these 
matters, and I hope that I have been able to communicate 
my findings with clarity. In my attempt to do so, I have 
had the invaluable direction of Dr. William H. Maehl, Jr. 
Dr. Maehl gave me kindness, helpful criticism, and en­






I. INTRODUCTION.................  1
II. MUNICH TO WAR, THE FIRST PHASE: THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE.................... 19
III. MUNICH TO WAR, THE LATER PHASES: OCTOBER
7, 1938-SEPTEMBER 3, 1939.................. 51
October and November 1938 
December to March 
Prague to War
IV. WAR TO DUNKIRK: SEPTEMBER 3, 1939-
MAY 10, 1940................................  82
The Apologists for Munich: Carr,
Henderson, and Medlicott 
The Critics of Munich: Dell, Keith,
and Nicolson
V. DUNKIRK TO THE GENERAL ELECTION; 1940-5......  114
The Summer and Fall of 1940 
The Wartime Pamphlets
VI. THE DOMINATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE
CRITICS: 1945-61............................  139
VII. A.J.P. TAYLOR. A MUNICH REVISION AND ITS
IMPACT: 1961-65.............................  169
APPENDIX.................................................  205
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................   211
VI
A HISTORY OF BRITISH HISTORIOGRAPHY 
OF THE MUNICH CRISIS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
British and American statesmen have at various times 
since 19^5 accepted Munich as an historical model for present 
policy, and they have made foreign policy decisions on the 
basis of the supposed lessons of Munich. In the years after 
the end of the Second World War, British and American lead­
ers determined Western policy towards Soviet Russia partly 
on the basis of the apparent parallels between Nazi and Soviet 
actions. Such analogical thinking also influenced British 
policy in the Middle East in the late 1950's. The present 
United States Government justifies American intervention in 
Viet Nam on similar grounds. The common element is aggres­
sion, Secretary of State Dean Rusk has said.^ Critics of 
the policies so based have rejected the validity of such 
analogies. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has emphasized the
^Rusk in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "On the Inscruta­
bility of History," Encounter, XXVII (November, I966), 14.
2
dissimilarities between Europe in 1938 and Southeast Asia
Oin 1967. A. J. P. Taylor once called the seeming resem­
blance of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia "twaddling scraps 
of history."^
Yet, the reference to even remote parallels seems 
an inevitable part of twentieth century decision-making. 
British and American statesmen have repeatedly faced terri­
fying situations for which their personal experience was no 
guide. Consequently, they have looked to history for direc­
tion in making the unfamiliar somehow familiar. Munich is 
only the latest historical guide. In 1938 at least one 
politician and historian judged Munich in terms of his view
Ij.of the origins of World War I.
Munich has acquired special significance as such an 
analogue. A British magazine in 1958 complained that British 
statesmen had a "Munich complex."^ The same charge could 
be made against American political leaders even before Viet 
Nam. In 1955 Vice-President Nixon ordered that officials 
not bring umbrellas to the airport when President Eisenhower 
returned from the Geneva Conference. The day was rainy, but
^Ibid., 13-4.
^A. J. P. Taylor, "Munich Ten Years After," New 
Statesman, XXXVI (October 2, 1948), 279.
^Great Britian, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
CCCXXXIX (1937-38), 31. Referred to hereafter as Pari. Deb.
^(anon.), "The Fallacy of Slogans," Spectator, CCI 
(October 3, 1958), 424.
Nixon did not want anyone to be reminded of the umbrella- 
carrying Neville Chamberlain coming back from Munich.^
This concern with Munich is not the result of the Agreement's 
continued importance. The Treaty was signed nearly thirty 
years ago, on September 30, 1938. Since then we have had 
World War II and the Cold War. The Great Powers who signed 
the Treaty--Britain, France, Germany, and Italy--are great 
no more. The Treaty terms, the cession of Czechoslovakia's 
German-speaking border districts to Nazi Germany, were thrown 
over in 19^5*
Rather, the preoccupation rests on a sequence of 
conclusions about Munich. Historians have looked at Munich 
solely in terms of its common characteristic with their own 
experience. They have seen Munich as the confrontation of 
democracies with totalitarian dictatorships. In effect they 
have seen Munich as the first event of the modern age. They 
have concluded that on this occasion Western leaders had a 
choice of policies and that World War II came from the wrong 
decision. From these conclusions about Munich, historians 
and politicians have reasoned that all concessions to dic­
tators are surrenders, which they have called "appeasement," 
Appeasement always whets the appetites of dictators. Thus 
appeasement always makes wars. These generalizations have
^Keith Eubank, Munich (Norman: University of Okla­
homa Press, 1963), 298.
k
been persuasive. They have created for many Britons and 
Americans a new way of looking at the world.
The responsibility for such analogical thinking be­
longs to British writers. During the years 19^5-8 a small 
group of British Conservative politicians and historians 
pointed to the parallels between Munich and the present in 
support of Western resistance to the Soviet Union. Their 
action involved a choice. These men disliked Munich. They 
believed that Britain should have resisted Germany in 1938 
and that she had the strength to do so successfully. Part 
of their belief rested on confidence in the Soviet Union as 
a 1938 ally. However, in 1943-8 the Soviets seemed to aim 
at conquering the West. In this light some American histor­
ians began to question Soviet sincerity in the Munich crisis. 
They wrote that perhaps British leaders had been right to 
mistrust Russia and conciliate Germany in 1938. The British 
Conservatives, all former critics of the 1938 British Govern­
ment, wanted to resist Russia. At the same time they did 
not want to admit that they had been wrong about Munich.
They resolved their dilemma by keeping their old opinions 
about Munich and generalizing from them about the present. 
Their decision was paradoxical in two ways. The Conserva­
tive critics offered a legend about Munich as a guide for 
British action against the Soviets, but one element of the 
legend was an earlier Soviet fidelity to Britain. Further, 
the Conservatives' analogies influenced Western Cold War 
policy, but apparently they wrote of analogies because
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Munich was more important to them than the Cold War.
The rather odd British choice in 19^5-8 was the pro­
duct of the distinctive conditions of British historiography 
of Munich. Unlike that of any other country, British nation­
al debate of the event has always had a highly emotional 
quality involving large numbers of people outside the aca­
demic community. This is because Britons have considered 
Munich the most controversial and the most important event 
in recent British history. In contrast, although the French 
have not agreed on Munich, Frenchmen have mainly argued 
about the debacle of 19%0. For Germans Munich has been 
only one part of a larger question of Nazism. Most Ameri­
cans have accepted the British critical interpretation of 
Munich. Those who. have disagreed have not been emotional 
about it. Russian and Czech historians have been emotional 
about Munich. However, Russians and Czechs do not publicly 
engage in controversy about even less recent affairs of state.
Samuel M. Osgood (ed.). The Fall of France, 19^0: 
Causes and Responsibilities in Problems in European Civili­
zation, Ralph W. Greenlaw and Dwight E. Lee (ed.) (Boston:
B.C. Heath, I965), 10-24, 30-42, 47-57, 61-77; John L. Snell 
(ed.), The Outbreak of the Second World War; Design or 
Blunder? in Problems in European Civilization, Ralph W. Green­
law and Dwight E. Lee (ed.) (Boston: D. C. Heath, I962),
1-45, 62-75; Snell (ed.). The Nazi Revolution; Germany's 
Guilt or Germany's Fate? in Problems in European Civiliza­
tion, Ralph W. Greenlaw and Dwight E. Lee (ed.) (Boston:
D. C. Heath, 1959), 35-7, 46-62, 73-84; Robert L. G. Waite 
(ed.). Hitler and Nazi Germany in European Problems Studies, 
Henry Bertram Hill (ed.) (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1965), 38-41, 46-51, 65-75, 84-92.
D
The peculiar English social and political structure 
explains why it has been possible for Munich to be a subject 
of national debate. In Britain the schooling of academicians, 
diplomats, higher ranking journalists, and politicians is 
frequently the same. Most attend public schools and then 
one of the two older universities. Also men in the four 
fields tend to be more socially homogenous than in other 
countries. Most are drawn from the upper-middle class. The 
similarity of education and social background has several 
effects. Men from different professions read the same qual­
ity periodicals, newspapers, and books more than is probably 
true in the United States. Further, translation from one 
occupation to another is relatively easy. Diplomats like 
Harold Nicolson have gone into both politics and letters. 
University teachers such as R. H. S. Crossman have gone into 
politics. Similarly, Oxbridge-trained Britons have frequent­
ly had an avocational interest or skill in a field other than 
their own. Professors have engaged in political journalism. 
British politicians have generally shown a greater literary 
flair than have American politicians, who are generally law­
yers. The late Sir Winston Churchill was only one example.
As a result of these qualities of British social and politi­
cal life, when an issue gains sufficient public interest, 
articulate diplomats, journalists, and professors as well 
as politicians can usually find influential audiences for 
their printed thoughts on a subject. Thus, they can also 
reasonably hope that their opinions will change policies.
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Throughout the years Munich has strongly engaged the 
thoughts and emotions of such men. It has done so because 
of an interaction between British historical experience and 
the traditions of British historiography of Munich. Britons 
have seen their history from 1938 to the 1960's as a succes­
sion of defeats and Pyrrhic victories culminating in national 
decline. "The main fact governing English life...is the loss
g
of power," Anthony Hartley has written. Many educated 
Britons have been unhappy with this loss of grandeur. They 
have been unable to find any satisfactory new economic and 
political role either for themselves or the nation. They 
have been emotional about Munich because British writers 
since 1938 have connected each stage of Britain's decline 
with the Agreement. This connection has kept Munich almost 
a current event. It has also kept Munich historiography 
from ever becoming a discussion among historians. Journal­
ists, diplomats, politicians, and others have continued to 
write about the Agreement. The large number of highly emo­
tional commentators has given the Munich writing in Britain 
characteristics which it might not otherwise have had.
Writers have never been content simply to reconstruct the 
decision-making process. They have made value judgments 
about the decisions in the light of subsequent events, and
g
Anthony Hartley, A State of England (New York: 
Hareourt Brace and World, 19^3 ) , 58.
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they have described with some heat desirable alternative 
courses of action. For years such retrospective conclu­
sions suggested current policies. In the years 1939 to 
19^5 various critics of Munich demanded that the large num­
ber of Cabinet ministers identified with the Agreement be 
barred from public office. The "Men of Munich," as the 
critics called them, rejected this demand.^ Since 19^5 
they have shown an understandable reluctance to take all 
the blame for all of Britain's reverses. Their protesta­
tions have made Munich historiography in Britain what it is 
not in other countries--a continuing national debate.
The debate on Munich up to the time of the creation 
of the Munich Legend divided into six stages. The first stage 
lasted from the signing of Munich till the end of the spec­
ial House of Commons debate in eeirly October 1938. During 
this brief time Munich was tremendously popular in Britain. 
Most people apparently accepted unqualifiedly the Govern­
ment's three basic reasons for the admitted capitulation:
(1 ) morality was on Germany's side; (2) Germany was a per­
manent European problem; and (3) modern war was too horrible 
to try solving the German problem temporarily by fighting. 
Both Labourite and Conservative critics were more impressed 
by different parts of these arguments than they liked after­
wards to remember.
qA. L. Rowse, "End of an Epoch," Political Quarterly, 
XI (July, 1940), 248-60.
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The jubilation over Munich died out quickly in later 
October and November. German actions compromised the moral 
aspect of Munich, It also seemed that Hitler might use his 
new power and prestige in Eastern Europe to limit British 
freedom of speech. The small group of Conservative critics 
gained a large audience in British periodicals. Many other 
writers came to accept their view that the morality of Munich 
was a sham and that the Chamberlain Government had endangered 
British security. During this time large numbers of writers 
began an important tradition. They declared Munich solely 
responsible for a great downward turning point in British 
history.
The writers in periodicals saw Munich as such a tre­
mendous blow to British power that the nation could probably 
do nothing to reverse German hegemony, whatever sinister 
form it might take. Thus, when it began to appear by Decem­
ber that German expansion was going to be peaceful and mainly 
economic, Britons of all political beliefs apparently stopped 
talking about Munich much. At this same time, however, from 
December to the following March a small number of ardently 
pro-Czech writers were preparing books which would have an 
immense future impact on Munich historiography. These writers 
continued the nascent custom of regarding Munich as the cause 
of many ills. More important, they stated dogmatically that 
Munich was both wrong and unnecessary. Germany was weak. 
Czechoslovakia was strong and entitled to the same decent 
treatment as any other democratic sovereign state. These
10
views were atypical of British opinion of the period. Ger­
man power had frightened most Britons, and the Czech cause 
had shared the opprobium of the Versailles Treaty which most 
Britons had assumed to be the creator of Czechoslovakia.
But the pro-Czech writers' opinions were to be the ones read 
by the researchers of the many wartime polemics against 
Munich. Thus, the pro-Czech works would perpetuate the retro­
spective fantasy that most Britons had favored resistance to 
Germany in 1938.
In the months from the German occupation of Prague 
on March 15, 1939 till the declaration of war on September 
3, 1939, the British Government began hesitantly to resist 
Nazi Germany. During this time, a few writers disliked the 
Government's conduct of the new course. They continued the 
history of attributing set-backs to Munich, and they insisted 
that the British Government had thrown away the best condi­
tions for opposing Germany at Munich. But apparently most 
Britons were confident that the Government would be able to 
stop Hitler's aggression merely by threatening him with war. 
Those who wrote about Munich in this mood showed an unwonted 
tolerance for the British Government's actions.
This tolerance ended abruptly with the war. The war 
began badly. Britain entered it without a Russian alliance, 
and some blamed Munich for this. The Poles, whom many con­
sidered in retrospect a much more unsatisfactory ally than 
the Czechs would have been, were quickly beaten. The Western
11
Front settled down to the nine months of the "Phoney War."
This was a dismal time in Britain. There was discomfort 
without idealism. The Government seemed only to be waiting 
for the chance of a negotiated settlement with Germany.
During this period, critics of the Chamberlain Government 
increasingly saw the origins of the present difficulties in 
the Government's Munich policy. If the Government had acted 
correctly in 1938, critics claimed, Britain, France, Czecho­
slovakia, and Soviet Russia would have given Hitler the 
crushing defeat which his actions merited and which was now 
impossible. This by now traditional view of Munich continued 
after the defeat at Dunkirk. Then large sections of the 
British public were openly furious with Chamberlain and his 
followers. Yet, the Chamberlainites clung to important 
offices. It even seemed to some that the new Prime Minister 
Churchill might simply be a front for continued Chamberlainite 
domination. Men of all parties demanded the purge of the 
Chamberlainites from office. They did so as much for Munich 
as for Dunkirk, for the critics continued to ascribe the pres­
ent difficulties to Munich. Chance played a part in the 
continuation of this intellectual habit. Many of the German 
tanks in France came from the Skoda Works of Czechoslovakia. 
Probably more important was the tenure of the Chamberlainites 
in office from 1938-40. Britain suffered many defeats in 
this time. It was human for critics to see a cause and 
effect relationship between Munich and the Prime Minister's 
later failures.
12
After 1940, pamphleteers in both parties made Munich 
a partisan political issue. Even though the most bitter 1938 
critic of Munich now led the Conservative Party, Labour pam­
phleteers branded the whole Conservative Party as the party 
of Munich. Their efforts increased as military victory and 
the resumption of normal party conflict came closer. Labour's 
reason for first emphasizing Munich and other prewar topics 
as possible postwar election issues probably lay in their 
anxiety that the Conservatives were exploiting the wartime 
Coalition for future electoral benefit. Also, Collective 
Cabinet responsibility for Coalition decisions made it impos­
sible to use wartime questions as issues. The Labourite worth 
was disingenuous. The pamphleteers ignored the extent to 
which Labour had been influenced in 1938 by the Conserva­
tives' arguments for revisionism.
Their writing also showed how in the perspective of 
wartime the 1938 reasons for conciliating Germany probably 
seemed incomprehensible. Germany was no longer the victim 
of Versailles. She was now a barbaric conqueror. Czecho­
slovakia was no longer a "far away country" which the New 
Statesman did not think worth a war. She was contributing 
a gallant army-in-exile, and it was widely known that in 
1938 the Czechs had been strong in the weapon the allies
^^(anon.), "Comments, " New Statesman, XVI ( Augp.st
27, 1938), 301-2.
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seemed so conspicuously to lack in 1940--tanks. The Soviets, 
whose sincerity and strength British leaders had doubted in 
1938, proved the most successful of all the Allied armies 
in fighting Germany. Churchill, who had had almost no fol­
lowers in his 1938 denunciation of Munich, had become the 
venerated wartime leader. Finally, in the light of Dunkirk, 
it was apparently difficult for many Britons to believe that 
Britain could possibly have fought on worse possible terms 
than in 1939-40. The factors which had made Munich seem 
desirable now belonged to a different world.
After 1945, British writers continued to be influenced 
by the wartime perspective. In the years 1945-8 the Conser­
vative critics shared many of the wartime Labourite views 
even though they resented the Labourite intellectuals' attempt 
to make Munich an election issue. Their connection of the 
Agreement with subsequent disasters kept them bitter about 
the Agreement and its apparent cost. They described Munich 
as "a cynical act of cold-blooded butchery" and as "the 
agreement reached by friends holding down the victim for 
the executioner."^^ The defection of the Soviet Union from 
the wartime alliance was not enough to change these feelings. 
The Conservative critics wrote of Munich as a time of choice, 
when the wrong decision brought later defeats. As a conces­
sion to the times, they generalized from these conclusions
Duff Cooper, Viscount Norwich, "A Cynical Act of 
Cold-blooded Butchery," Listener. XL (November I8, 1948), 
757; Sir Robert Vansittart Lord Vansittart, "A Morally Inde­
fensible Argument," Listener, XL (November 4, 1948), 675.
Ik
and wrote that concessions to any dictators, especially the 
Soviets, were wrong. Other writers accepted the Conserva­
tive critics' conclusions and their analogies. Also, some 
of them grasped what the Conservative critics apparently 
failed to understand. Britain's power was permanently re­
duced. Following established tradition, they related the 
decline to Munich. The "men of Munich," A. L. Rowse wrote
in i960, "ruined their country." "The real decisions," he
12went on, "are made elsewhere." Thus the widely noted 
dissatisfaction with Britain's straitened postwar circum­
stances was translated into dissatisfaction with Munich.
Despite the barrage of criticism, Munich has always 
had defenders. These men have at different times produced 
quite different justifications of Munich. In the House of 
Commons debate just after Munich, defenders of the Agree­
ment pointed out the justice of Germany's claims in Czecho- 
lovakia, the permanence of the German problem, and the horror 
of modern war. In October and November 1938 supporters of 
Chamberlain admitted that Hitler had much more extensive 
ambitions than uniting all Germans in the Reich. But Germany, 
they emphasized, had no claims against Britain, which was, 
in any event, not really a European power. After the deter­
ioration in Anglo-German relations following Prague and until 
the declaration of war, Munich apologists for the most part
12A. L. Rowse, All Souls and Appeasement (London: 
Macmillan, I96I), 56, 87-Ü, k .
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maintained that British unpreparedness dictated Munich. In 
the years from Dunkirk until the 19^5 General Election, Con­
servative pamphleteers made the same defense, and this re­
mained the apologetic explanation of Munich after 1945.
After the Conservative critics' presentation of 
Munich as an historical model, a new voice was added to the 
defenders of Munich, This was the historian A. J. P. Taylor. 
Taylor disliked the Munich Legend's call for resistance to 
the Soviet Union. Consequently, from 1948 onwards, he began 
to look critically at his own conclusions about Munich, 
which had been the same as those from which the Conserva­
tive critics made their generalizations. The culmination
of Taylor's reexamination was his 196I work, The Origins of
13the Second World War. In this book, Taylor presented an 
interpretation of Munich which was a revision of both post­
war criticisms and defenses. Taylor's most startling point 
was his revised picture of Hitler. Taylor presented the 
German dictator as a shrewd diplomatist who used brilliantly 
timed complaints of mistreatment to secure immediate success, 
both for its own sake and for German domination in Eastern 
Europe. In contrast, the Conservative critics had used the 
postwar document publications to portray Hitler as a mad 
arch-criminal with a blue-print for world conquest, and the 
defenders of Munich had agreed with them. Hitler, Taylor
^^A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World 
War (London: Hamish Hamilton^ 1961/.
16
continued, had no time table for Czechoslovakia and no real 
intention of fighting her~-the war of nerves was the only 
war he liked fighting. Therefore, Taylor reasoned, Chamber­
lain's misdirected zeal was responsible for Munich. Cham­
berlain hurried the French and the Czechs along to Munich 
in order to prevent a German invasion which Hitler never 
intended to start. Also whereas critics stressed Chamber­
lain's ignorance and insularity, Taylor emphasized that 
the thinking of 1938 judged Chamberlain's action as morally
right. Munich, Taylor wrote in subsequently famous passage,
1 L"was a triumph for all that is best in British life."
In the uproar that followed the appearance of Taylor's
13"astonishing and deplorable reconstruction," most of the 
almost unanimously critical reviewers failed to notice the 
similarity between Taylor's 1961 views and those of three 
earlier writers. In 1939-40, during the wartime months 
remembered as the "Phoney War," E. H. Carr, Nevile Henderson, 
and W. N. Medlicott described Munich in much the same terms 
as Taylor. They saw no German plan for world dominance, and 
they insisted, as did Taylor, that Hitler had no aggressive 
intentions toward Britain. Rather, mutual misunderstandings 
and accidents brought Munich. The attitudes created by 
Munich in both Britain and Germany brought war. In effect
l^Ibid., 189.
^^Times Literary Supplement, May 21, I96I, 325.
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Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott presented a picture of war 
origins to complement their goal of a negotiated settlement 
of the war. Critics of Taylor did not recognize that in 
many ways Taylor stood in the same relation to Carr, Hander- 
son, and Medlicott as had the revisionist historians of the 
interwar years to the wartime Union of Democratic Control 
pamphleteers. Like the earlier revisionists, Taylor was 
dissatisfied with the course of postwar foreign policy, and 
took up the views of a wartime dissenting minority in order 
to get the policy changed.
However, the parallel was imperfect. Taylor's critics 
still felt too strongly about the weir and Britain's decline, 
both of which they connected with Munich, to agree with 
Taylor's conclusions. Thus, Taylor was unable to gain for 
Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott the same belated acceptance 
that the revisionists won for the U. D. C. pamphleteers.
Even Medlicott criticized Taylor's presentation of his own 
earlier views. Also, Taylor himself felt too strongly about 
the war and Britain's decline to follow the Phoney War 
writers consistently. He did describe Munich as a moral 
" t r i u m p h . A t  the same time he also wrote that the Brit­
ish pressure on President Benes of Czechoslovakia was a 
"demand that Benes commit suicide in order to secure ^British 




Both the critics' reaction to Taylor's work and 
Taylor's own ambivalent attitude towards Munich suggest 
that the emotional British debate on Munich will continue. 
It may well go on until the British find a new, more satis­
factory world role for themselves. Then perhaps Britons 
will be able to look back on their last decisions as a 
Great Power without anger and without regret.
CHAPTER II
MUNICH TO WAR. THE FIRST PHASE:
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE
Munich to War 
The period from Munich to the beginning of World 
War II, from September 30, 1938 to September 3, 19391 forms 
perhaps the most important single twelve months in British 
history. During this time the British Government and people 
debated among themselves the proper British action towards 
the extension of German territory and influence taking place 
on the continent of Europe. German expansion, it was fin­
ally decided, was criminal aggression and a threat to Bri­
tain. As a result the British chose to declare war on Ger­
many after that country's attack on Poland. Thus, they 
transformed a regional conflict into a general European war 
and finally a world war. The world war greatly changed the 
British position in world affairs. Afterwards, the nation 
which had claimed the status of a first class world power 
since the reign of Elizabeth I found herself impoverished 
by her efforts of wartime and dwarfed in size by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The freedom of choice and 




British historians have generally divided the year 
into two parts: from the Munich Agreement to the German
occupation of Prague on March 15, 1939; and from Prague to 
the declaration of war. They have made this division accord­
ing to the two stages of British foreign policy in 1938-9 
and also, more generally, the tenor of British political 
life:debate on appeasement of Germany until Prague; agree­
ment on resistance to Germany afterwards.
The first of these stages has received somewhat more 
attention. Eight then Members of Parliament subsequently 
wrote memoirs of the special House of Commons debate of Octo­
ber 3-6, 1938.^ A number of British historians have examined
in some detail the speeches, writings, and events of these 
2six months. Most of the writers--both during and since
Leo Amery, My Political Life; Vol III: The Unfor­
giving Years, 1929-40 (London: Hutchinson, 1955 ) " i  283-8 ; .
Cooper, Old Men Forget (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1954), 243-
57; Winston Churchill, The Second World War; Vol. I: The
Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948) 324-39;
Hugh Dalton, Memoirs ; Vol. II: The Fateful Yeys, Memoirs,
1931-45 (London: Frederick Mueller 1957), 198-203 ; Sir
Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, The Reckoning (London: Cassell,
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World War II*--have looked at the time in terms of its common 
element with their own experience, the confrontation between 
democracy and totalitarian dictatorships. They have mainly 
disliked the appeasement of dictators and have found the 
1938-9 arguments in its favor incomprehensible. Thus, they 
have tended to depict the October-March period as a furious, 
uninterrupted debate between opponents of appeasement--elo- 
quently led by Winston Churchill--and the deluded supporters 
of the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. They have stressed 
the former's remarks on Hitler's ambitions, the bestiality of 
Nazism, and the strategic disadvantage caused by the loss of 
the Czech ally. In effect, they have credited Chamberlain's 
1938 critics with the gift of prophecy. Conversely, they 
have treated the Chamberlainites' arguments as rationaliza­
tions of cowardice or--at best--dubious expediency.
After Prague, although the actions of the British 
leadership continue to be a matter of dispute, historians 
have almost unanimously agreed that the British people de­
termined at this time to resist Hitler--even at the cost of 
3war.
Munich was one point of argument in the year-long 
British preoccupation with foreign policy, and, in terms 
of the Munich debate, discussion falls into four rather than 
two phases: The House of Commons debate of early October
1938; the writing in periodicals during the rest of October
^Wheeler-Bennett, 349-428; Gilbert and Gott, 223- 
300; Rock, 203-320.
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and all of November 1938; the books prepared by pro-Czech 
journalists and historians from December to the next March; 
and the renewed interest in Munich from Prague to the coming 
of the war. The British attitude towards Munich in each of 
these phases has distinctive elements. All the writing has 
made an important contribution to the traditions of the 
voluminous British historical writing on Munich,
In the first phase, in the House of Commons debate, 
the Prime Minister's Munich achievement was wildly popular. 
One competent, critical observer later estimated that ninety 
per cent of the British people initially approved of the 
Agreement. Most of them were won over by the National Gov­
ernment's insistence that war had been the only alternative 
to Munich. Apparently, they also accepted the three Govern­
ment explanations for Britain's not going to war or even 
threatening to go to war with Germany over Czechoslovakia; 
the morality of Germany's revisionist claims, the perma­
nence of the German problem, and the horror of modern war.
It is difficult to determine the popular response to the 
Chamberlainites' further request that the British people 
trust Hitler not to abuse the power given him in Eastern 
Europe at Munich. Most subsequent historians, writing in 
the light of World War II, have been contemptuous of the 
Chamberlainite arguments. They have concentrated on the
liR. H. Bruce Lockhart, "September Crisis and After," 
The Listener, XL (October 28,1948), 636.
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admonitions of the small number of Labour, Liberal, and Con­
servative critics about Hitler's ambitions and the dangers 
of losing Czechoslovakia. The Parliamentary critics' insis­
tence that Chamberlain should have threatened Hitler with 
war in the Czech Crisis is, historians have implied, evidence 
of contemporary knowledge of what has often seemed the right 
policy in retrospect. For the most part historians have not 
mentioned that the Chamberlainite arguments, far from being 
discreditable, impressed the Parliamentary critics. Labour­
ites and Liberals hated Nazi aggression, but they also ac­
cepted German claims for self-determination for the Sudeten 
Germans of Czechoslovakia. Conservative critics called for 
threatening Hitler with war to prevent Munich. But they 
frequently and somewhat inconsistently combined their stand 
with an awareness of the limiting effect of British arms 
weakness on foreign policy actions.
In the second phase, which lasted through the rest 
of October and all of November, the House critics' opinion 
that Hitler's actions in the Munich Crisis proved him untrust­
worthy seemed justified. Hitler's speeches in this time 
suggested that he might use his new strength to limit Brit­
ish liberties. Also, German actions on the commission 
drawing a new Czech-German frontier undermined the moral 
basis of Munich. The anti-Semitic pogroms in Germany inten­
sified British hatred of Nazism. In view of these circumstances.
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and with the memory of gratitude to Chamberlain as a peace­
maker apparently dimming, the attitude of the House of 
Commons critics gained a much wider popular acceptance.
Dislike of Munich also became much more unequivocal because 
self-determination had lost so much of its force. Authors 
in periodicals wrote bitterly in retrospect of Chamberlain's 
handling of the Crisis. Also, they continued the Commons 
tendency to describe Munich as a great downward turning 
point in British history, for the periodical writers agreed 
that little could be done to reverse the bad effect of Munich. 
Supporters of the Prime Minister recognized the new public 
temper. They reiterated, though now in defensive tones, the 
morality of Munich. But they also admitted that Hitler wanted 
much more than a union of German speaking peoples in the Reich. 
They justified their admission by claiming that Hitler did 
not want to conquer Britain and that Britain was not a Euro­
pean power.
Public speculation on Munich stopped in December.
The prospect that Germany would expand economically and the 
absence of new territorial crises apparently made most Bri­
tons believe that, for better or worse, Munich would be the 
basis for a permanent and peaceful European settlement. How­
ever, at the same time, other Britons with close personal 
ties to Czechoslovakia were preparing books which would state 
more uncompromisingly than any Commons or magazine critic 
that Munich was both wrong and unnecessary. It had already
25
brought disasters to Britain and would bring still others.
In the works of the Czechophils, which were to be the main 
source for many future writers on Munich, and in the writ­
ings and speeches of the Commons and magazine critics an 
idea was appearing in nascent form: Munich alone caused 
Britain's decline and a different British Government could 
have avoided Munich. This notion was to be the assumption 
behind much future British critical writing on Munich. It 
was to be the source of the intense emotionalism which re­
mains today one of the two important traditions of British 
writing on the Agreement.
However, concern with Britain's decline was not the 
dominant theme, when the public discussion of Munich revived 
after Prague and the revolution in British diplomacy which 
soon followed. Some critics were quick to point out that 
Prague proved the bankruptcy of Chamberlain's Munich policy. 
They related such failures of the new course as the lack of 
success in getting an alliance with the Soviet Union back to 
Munich. Supporters of the National Government refuted such 
charges by presenting a new explanation for the September 
capitulation to Hitler. They now explicity justified it by 
British unpreparedness. Not many such defenses were neces­
sary. Apparently, most critics of Munich now came to support 
the Prime Minister and were confident of the success of his 
new policy in bluffing Hitler. Those who still wrote about 
Munich in this mood left off recriminations about the past.
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Instead, they showed in retrospect an unwonted tolerance of 
Chamberlain's Czech policy. This tolerance would not long 
survive the frustrations of the Phoney War.
The House of Commons Debate: October 3-6, 1938
The first extensive British discussion of Munich 
came when the House of Commons met in one of the most dra­
matic sittings in its history on October 3, 1938.^ Parlia­
ment had not originally been scheduled to meet again until 
November. A special session was called, however,to debate 
a motion of confidence in the National Government's foreign 
policy in the Munich Crisis. The recently concluded events 
of that Crisis made the meeting dramatic. The episode had 
begun with a speech by Hitler on September 12 at the Nazi 
Party Rally in Nuremberg. In the speech Hitler had demanded 
"self-determination" for the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslo­
vakia.^ His tone had convinced Western statesmen that the 
alternative to immediate concessions was war. The Munich 
Agreement, an Anglo-French-German-ltalian treaty ceding the 
Sudetenland to Germany and thus ending the Crisis, had only 
been signed in the early hours of September 30 after the 
Prime Minister's third flight to Germany in a period of
5parl. Deb., CCCXXXIX (1937-38), 25-552.
^Adolph Hitler, The Speeches of Adolph Hitler, April 
1922-August 1939, II) Norman H. Baines, ed. and trans., 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 1487-99»
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a little over two weeks, actions then unprecedented in
7diplomacy.
In the days from September 12 until Chamberlain's 
final Munich effort to conciliate Hitler, Britons had 
lived under the threat of imminent European war. The Fleet 
had mobilized. The Home Office had issued 38,000,000 gas
g
masks. Many had seen the slit trenches dug for air raid
protection in Hyde Park or watched the handling of London's
9forty-four anti-aircraft guns. Rumours had been heard 
that Hitler had gone mad, had actually chewed the carpet in 
a seizure after meeting Chamberlain at Godesberg;^^ or that 
the German generals would overthrow Hitler if only Britain 
would stand firm.^^ Apparently one of the most frequently 
heard rumours had concerned Charles Lindbergh, the American 
aviator then visiting Britain. The German Luftwaffe, Lindbergh
7The text of the Agreement with a copy of the offi­
cial appended map of ceded territory is found Wheeler-Bennett,
465-67. Q
Taylor, English History, 1914-1945; Vol. XV of The 
Oxford History of England, ed. Sir George Clark (London;
Oxford University Press, 1936-65). 427.
^Ibid.
^^William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary, The Journal of a 
Foreign Correspondent, 1934-^1 (New York: Alfred A, Knopf,
1942)7 110.
^^Thomas Jones to Gwendolyn Davies, September 29, 1938, 
Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters, 1931-4o (London: Oxford
University Press, 1954), 4ll, See also the diary entries 
for September 20 and September 26 respectively in Harold 
Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, 1930-9 (London: Collins,
1966), 362; Amery, 275.
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12was said to claim, could destroy London from the air.
A British Expert writing after the Crisis admitted expect­
ing as many as 250,000 air raid casualties in the first
13week of the war. In view of such circumstances, Chamber­
lain's September 28 surprise announcement of his Munich 
trip to a House anxiously expecting a declaration of war
had set off a joyful demonstration which a Member afterwards
l4described as a "Welsh Rivivalist Meeting."
The hysteric atmosphere continued through the week 
of the debate, and the popularity of Chamberlain as the 
savior of peace seemed almost unchallengeable. All but one 
of the major newspapers of Britain congratulated the Prime 
M i n i s t e r . I n  Parliament such diverse groups as the right- 
wing Anglo-German Fellowship and the members of the left- 
wing, pacifist Independent Labour Party applauded Chamberlain 
and each other for Munich. The Parliamentary Labour Party 
and the Liberals criticized Munich, but together the two had 
won only 174 seats at the last General E l e c t i o n . T h e
^^Jones, 4lO, 4ll; Nicolson, 343*
^^Basil Liddell Hart, The Defense of Britain (New 
York: Random House, 1939), 153-54.
^^Nicolaon, Diaries and Letters. 372.
^^William Waite Hadley, Munich, Before and After 
(London: Cassell, 1944), 93-110. The one paper to criti­
cize Munich was Reynold's News.
^^In the General Election of 1935, the National 
Governraent--a Conservative-dominated coalition which in­
cluded the "National Liberals" under Sir John Simon and
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approximately thirty Conservative critics of Munich, whose
writings were later to dominate Munich interpretation, were
at this time despised by other Tories in Parliament and in
17trouble with their Constituents. One of their number in
the House of Lords, the Marquess of Salisbury, was given a
bloody nose in the Lobbies of the Commons at this time for
X 8criticizing Chamberlain. When Churchill described Munich
as "a total and unmitigated defeat" for Britain and France,
Tory back-benchers booed him so loudly that he had to stop
19speaking for a few moments. Similarly, Duff Cooper, who 
had resigned as First Lord of the Admiralty in protest over 
Munich and who therefore by custom opened the debate, remem­
bered years later that the Conservative benches were bored
and inattentive during his afterwards famous speech; most
20Tories only wanted to hear Chamberlain. The dissident 
Conservatives and the Labourites expected an immediate
"National Labour" under Malcolm MacDonald--returned 432 
supporters. The Labourites returned 154 Members. The Lib­
erals won only twenty seats. Taylor, English History 383-4. 
Bye-elections did not greatly alter these figures in the 
years 1935-8.
17They were also divided among themselves. The "Eden 
Group" hoped for a reconciliation with Chamberlain. The few 
men around Churchill, who seemed "more bitter than determined 
and more out for a fight than reform," were apparently eager 
to ally Labour and try to break Chamberlain. Harold Nicolson 
to V. Sackville-West, November 9, 1938, Nicolson, 378. See 
also Dalton, 198-203»
1 OEden, 32.
^^Churchill, 326. ^^Cooper, 246.
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general election, an "inverted Khaki Election," as Churchill 
21called it. In the week of the debate they tried negotiating
a coalition against Chamberlain and Munich. But they held
little hope for such a coalition in the face of the Prime
22Minister's claim of "peace in our time."
Although the public enthusiasm for Munich and prob­
ably their own relief did affect their speeches. Labourites, 
Liberals, and Tory Rebels were still vocal in finding fault 
with the Agreement. Almost all critics except Churchill 
began by complimenting Chamberlain for trying to save peace, 
but they frequently followed by complaining of the strate­
gic consequences of Munich,complaints that were to be heard 
again and again up to the present day. The Czech Army and 
the Czech strategic defenses were destroyed. The Soviets, 
it was feared even at this early date, were perhaps perma­
nently alienated as a result of Chamberlain's treatment of 
them during the Crisis. Indeed, the whole French Eastern 
alliance system was in ruins. Britain and France were iso­
lated. They were robbed of their most effective potential
2 3weapon: the blockade.
Such changes were dangerous because Hitler's actions 
in the Czech crisis suggested that his ambitions made his 
word worthless. Hitler's statement at the time of the 
Anschluss with Austria that he had no claims against
PI P PPari. Deb., 371. Dalton, 198-203.
^^Parl. Deb., 36, 51, 6?, 78, 110, IA3, I8O-81, I70, 
206, 242-43, 3697^ 26-7, 5-7, 524, 538.
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Czechoslovakia was brought up as an example of the German
2 kdictator's lying. His September 12 Nuremberg speech 
purposely set the stage for an uprising intended to give a 
pretext for the invasion and annexation of Czechoslovakia.
When the Prime Minister then intervened, the Tory Leo Amery 
pointed out that Chamberlain had thought he was going to 
Berchtesgaden to negotiate with Hitler, but he had become 
merely "the transmitter of an ultimatum," which he then 
had to force on the Czechs "with indecent haste and ruth­
lessness" in the form of the Anglo-French Plan of September 
l8.^^ The Labourite Arthur Greenwood contended that once 
the Czechs had accepted the Anglo-French Plan, Hitler, con­
tinuing his lying, had increased his demands again at Godes-
27berg on September 23. Hitler's subsequent claim just before 
Munich that he wanted none but Germans in his empire had been 
proven a lie, a Liberal critic insisted, by his almost simul­
taneous admission that he had offered the Czechs a quite dif­
ferent frontier at Godesberg than he had intended to take
, ,28 by conquest.
The conclusion of this criticism was clear : the
National Government had handed an immense strategic gain to
a man who could not be trusted. By so doing it had purchased
^^Ibid. , 39. 2̂ Ibid. , 200.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., 353-5 .
oftIbid., 75.
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a "breathing space," several critics noted, but at the pres­
ent cost of German hegemony in Europe and perhaps the future
29cost of German conquest of the British Empire.
Along with a distrust of Hitler, the critical speeches
also showed hatred for the ideology of Nazi Germany and a
sense of democratic solidarity with the Czechs, a point of
view from which the later criticism of Munich was to be made.
The Labour, Liberal, and Conservative critics of Munich knew
the accounts of Nazi brutality in Austria after the Anschluss,
and reports were already coming from Czechoslovakia of roads
jammed with refugees fleeing Gestapo persecution. The critics
spoke of the Czechs as "the gallant torchbearers of democracy
30amid the surrounding darkness of dictatorships." The Nazis
represented "the most cruel, the most inhuman tyranny the
31world has ever known." Because of their identification
of the Czech and British systems of government the critics
considered Munich a deep national humiliation for Britain.
They were angry at the Government's connivance with "these
devils to whom you have handed over these decent innocent
32people without giving them any guarantee or protection."
The ideological differences between Britain and Germany also 
made the strategic changes of Munich seem worse. Churchill
^^Ibid., 74, 76, 114, l4o, 205-6 , 257-8, 505. 
3°Ibid., 137. ^^Ibid., II3.
^^Ibid., 387.
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worried that the leaders of "that barbarous paganism which
vaunts the spirit of aggression and conquest," would turn on
33Western Europe when they are sated in the east. Churchill 
and others also expressed fears that the Nazis were already 
reaching a position in which they could demand limitations 
on British free speech. Labourites accused Chamberlain of 
wanting to become a dictator himself.
In answering these charges, Cabinet ministers and 
other supporters of Chamberlain conceded the preemptoriness 
of German behavior in the crisis. The Germans were so deter­
mined to have their own way quickly, the Chamberlainites 
maintained, that the alternative to giving in to their de­
mands was a European war. The Government had to do all in 
its power to prevent the war and inevitable British involve­
ment because morality was on Germany's side. Even a war 
victory could not solve the German problem, and war itself 
had become almost too horrible to contemplate. The Chamber­
lainites, just as the Labourites, Liberals, and Tory Rebels, 
were concerned with the future. Many of them contended that 
Munich began a new and peaceful era in international affairs. 
But their vision of the future was for the most part ob­
scured by the past: deliverance from war in the recent
past; and, more remotely, Britain's experiences since 19l4.
Dislike of the Versailles Treaty, the "unclean 
peace" which ended the First World War, influenced the
33lbid., 370.
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3 4Chamberlainite view of Munich. The Versailles Treaty-
created Czechoslovakia, "a polygot...of five different 
35races." The Czechs who dominated the new state tyran­
nized the Sudeten Germans in all areas of Czechoslovakian 
life while denying them the chance to fulfill their own 
national aspirations. The British and especially the French, 
the Chamberlainites said, had abetted the Czechs until 1938. 
They had shown no sympathy for the Sudeten Germans. There­
fore, the Nazi German policies of annexing the Sudetenland 
were "reasonable national aims."
Sympathy with German goals and guilt feelings about 
the past made the Chamberlainites much more tolerant of Nazi 
tactics in the Czech Crisis than the critics. Sir John 
Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated that Hitler's 
determination to go to war for the Sudetenland was not evi­
dence of aggressiveness. Hitler's raising of his demands on 
Czechoslovakia at Godesberg did not show perfidy. Rather, 
Hitler's actions indicated a distrust of both Western and
37Czech intent ions--amply justified by past German experience. 
The German haste, other Chamberlainites said, should be 
judged against the twenty years delay in the Sudeten German 
union with the Reich. More positively, the Chamberlainites 
claimed that the methods of Munich offered hope for Hitler .
3̂ Tbid., 421. ^^Ibid., 419,
^^Ibid. , 107. ^'^Ibid., 340-47.
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future good behavior. During the course of the Crisis Hitler 
had accepted Anglo-French peaceful intervention. Also he 
had greatly modified his Godesberg demands in the interests 
of a negotiated settlement at Munich. Most importantly, the 
Anglo-German consultative machinery also agreed upon at Munich 
made possible the peaceful adjustment of inequitable fron­
tiers, an urgent problem which another Versailles creation,
38the League of Nations, had failed to solve.
Acceptance of the morality of Germany's claims made 
the Chamberlainites reject the critics' views on ideology 
and strategy. Czechoslovakia, they implied, was not a demo­
cracy. Seeing Germany as right and Czechoslovakia as wrong, 
the Chamberlainites disclaimed any identification between 
Czech and British interests, Britain, they said, had been 
a mediator in the recent dispute, not an ally of Czechoslo­
vakia. Thus, Munich was not really a humiliation. In any 
event, any impression of humiliation the haste of Munich 
might seem to bring Britain, any suffering it caused the 
Czechs, was atonement for past sins of British delay and 
Czech persecution. Besides rejecting the relevance of ideo­
logy to the Czech Crisis, the Chamberlainites also rejected 
ideology as the basis for British foreign policy. Such a 
foreign policy, they said, would be automatically hostile 
to Germany, and would judge proposed solutions to all European 
problems according to their effect on the equilibrium of power
^®Ibid.
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between Britain and Germany» It would resist on strategic 
grounds German efforts to unite all German speaking peoples 
in the Reich. Thus, it would be immoral, and the National 
Government wanted no part of it. Sir Samuel Hoare, the Home 
Secretary, told the House bluntly that if Britain had acci­
dentally gone to war with Germany while disputing methods 
of transferring territory--and indeed this had been the only
issue--the British Government would still have given the
39Sudetenland to Germany at the end of the war.
A policy emphasizing strategy, even if it were cloaked
in the rhetoric of "collective security," would be a return
4oto the "power politics" of the years before 19I4. Just as
surely as the old, the new balance of power politics would
lead to war. It would bring victory, but only another Pyrrhic
victory, because Germany, whatever her system of government,
was a permanent problem for Europe, As the Conservative Lt„
Col. Arthur Lambert-Vard pointed out:
Twenty years ago Germany was completely defeated 
and in the dust; to-day she is more powerful 
than ever; and there is no guarantee that if 
we succeeded in defeating Germany again in the 
next two years, the situation would not, in 
another twenty years' time be exactly as it is 
to-day. After all, we have got this great 
block of 70,000,000 Germans living almost at 
our doors. Even if we defeat them we cannot 
kill them all--it is impossible as well as un­
thinkable. That being so, it seems to me that 
the only thing we can do is to learn to live 
with them.^l
39lbid., 154. 4^1bid., 3?8-79.
4l^^Ibid., 135.
37
Lambert-Ward's remarks on the futility of resisting 
Germany and the emphasis of other Chamberlainite M.P.'s on 
the morality of Germany's case both reflected British revul­
sion with the results of World War I. The promises of "a 
land fit for heroes" and "a world safe for democracy" had 
not been realized. Britain had never seemed to regain her 
old strength. Germany had all too quickly become "more 
powerful than ever." Under such circumstances, Britons, 
first on the Left and then in all parties, violently reacted 
against what they came to consider wartime illusions. The 
pacifism implied in Lambert-Ward's view that another war 
would not solve the German problem represented one frequent 
reaction. The rejection of wartime beliefs also found ex­
pression in the public acceptance of the writings of the 
Versailles-revision publicists. These revisionist writers, 
taking up the wartime dissent of the Union of Democratic 
Control pamphleteers, told the British people that the 
"power politics" of the Entente powers, not the ambitions 
of the German Kaiser, started the war. Therefore, they 
argued, the Versailles Treaty was unjust. The treaty makers 
unfairly humiliated the German people and tried to impoverish 
them. Worst of all, according to the revisionists, they 
denied self-determination to Germans. Large numbers of 
Germans found themselves in bondage in largely Slavic and 
thus culturally inferior successor states, perhaps the most 
oppressive of which was Czechoslovakia. The sum of these 
injustices, the revisionists wrote after 1933, drove the
38
Germans to the madness of Nazism. Until the British and
the French rectified the wrong done to Germany, the Germans
42even though Nazis were victims deserving sympathy.
The intellectual climate which produced the atti­
tudes of Lambert-Ward and in which morality was on the side 
of Germany now seems incredibly remote. Although conviction 
of the pointlessness of seeking a military victory did remain 
with some Conservatives for another two years, such calcula­
tions became irrelevant after Dunkirk when the British saw 
themselves fighting for survival. After 194$, the Cold War 
solved the German question by dividing the country in two. 
Whatever crises the two Germanies have caused since 1945, 
Europeans have not had the problem of facing alone a solid 
block of 70,000,000 restless and energetic people located 
in the very center of the continent. As the problem has dis­
appeared so has an appreciation of it disappeared in the
analyses of those writing on Munich. Similarly, the idea
of the morality of German claims found less and less accep­
tance even before Prague, and also largely died out after 
Dunkirk. At the end of the war, with evidence of the cre­
matoria and other tools of genocide at hand, it was never 
revived. However, in 1938 both the seeming permanence of the 
German problem and the German demand for Versailles revision 
had a great influence on the Chamberlainites.
42Taylor, The Troublemakers, Dissent over Foreign 
Policy, 1789-1939 (London; Hamish Hamilton, 1957), 167-200.
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Throughout the House debate the Chamberlainites also 
dwelt on the horror of modern war. Brigadier Sir Henry Croft 
recalled the wretched stalemate of trench warfare in 1914 
which finally cost a million Empire dead. He noted that sub­
sequent technology favored the defense even more, and accused 
the critics of Munich of wanting to ’’fight to the last French­
man, " as Britain had no immediately available expeditionary 
43force. Apparently many Members had also heard Lindbergh's
reports, remembered a former Prime Ministers remark that
bombers would always be successful, and knew what were then
44thought to be the lessons of the Spanish Civil War. Thus, 
they dreaded aerial bombardment even more than a repetition 
of World War 1. Members talked of expecting the immediate
45obliteration of London, of men living "underground as rats,"
46of 10,000,000 United Kingdom deaths from bombing. The 
likelihood of such carnage, speakers maintained, completely 
changed the role of war in national policy. Men could no 
longer fight over ideological differences nor over the bal­
ance of power. Chamberlain said that Britain could not go 
to war for the Czechs, and he emphasized the support of
^^Parl. Deb., 380. ^^Taylor, English History,
389-92.
^^Parl. Deb., 194.
^^Ibid., 260. In an article written shortly after 
the House debate Harold Nicolson wrote : "in this country
the fear of aerial bombardment has become an obsession. A 
certain amount of panic, with its electoral consequences, 
was assuredly created." Harold Nicolson, "After Munich,"
The Nineteenth Century and After, CXXIV (November 1938),
513-24.
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Dominion and English public opinion for his view. The Czech
47cause was not worth the sacrifice of so many British lives. 
Moreover, the worst tortures the Czechs might face at the 
hands of the Gestapo were as nothing compared to the extinc­
tion of their national life by aerial bombardment. Such 
slaughter would have come, regardless of the ultimate allied 
victory, if the Czechs had been made "pawns in a preventive 
war."^®
These arguments partly, though by no means entirely, 
convinced the Government's critics. A genuine note of relief 
at escape from war was evident in the opening remarks of many 
who went on to criticize the terms of Munich. Under ques­
tioning, Clement Attlee, the Labourite leader, tacitly ad­
mitted that war finally became the alternative to the Munich
concessions at the end of the September Crisis and that under
4gsuch circumstances Chamberlain had acted correctly. The 
Tory Rebel Leo Amery made a similar a d m i s s i o n . M a n y  critics, 
including Amery and Attlee, however, did dispute the Govern­
ment's contention that the Munich terms were the only alter­
native to war. Critics of all parties contended that a policy 
of bluffing Hitler by threatening him with war either in late 
August or early September might at least have salvaged "a 
trifle from the wreck though no one claimed that it would
^^Ibid., 545. ^®Ibid., 379.
4^Ibid. , 5 2. 5®Ibid. , 204.
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have kept Czechoslovakia completely i n t a c t . T h i s  convic­
tion had several sources. Duff Cooper brought up an his­
torical analogy--ironically considering the subsequent use 
of Munich as a model for action--between 1938 and 1914.
Cooper suggested that a clear warning of British intent in 
1914 would have kept Germany from invading Belgium. A 
similar warning, he reasoned, before the Nazi Party rally
52actually began on September 5, would have intimidated Hitler.
Attlee, voicing a popular misconception of more recent events,
was sure that, just as Czech and Western solidarity had
stopped Hitler in the May Crisis earlier in 1938, bluffing,
if used soon enough, would have brought a more favorable out-
5 3come in September. Others noted that Hitler only retreated 
in September after the Foreign Office Declaration of Septem­
ber 26 and the Fleet mobilization of the next day. Conse­
quently, they maintained, more pressure on Germany earlier
54would have brought better results.
The most intriguing reason for belief in bluffing 
Hitler was one that could only be hinted at, the German 
Generals' Plot to overthrow Hitler. High-ranking German 
officers conspired in August and early September to depose 
Hitler if he insisted on going to war. Those of the group
^^Ibid. See also Ibid., 30-31, 33, 57, 69, 148,





who were still alive after 19^5 claimed with great publicity
that only Chamberlain’s trip to Berchtesgaden on September
5 515 kept them from carrying out their plan. The British 
Government knew of the plans through an emissary of the gen­
erals. Chamberlain refused the requested cooperation of 
threatening Hitler with war at least partly because he was 
dubious of the conspiracy’s chances of s u c c e s s . S o m e
critics also knew of the generals’ plans. Churchill talked
5 7personally to the generals' London emissary. Others gained 
their knowledge from a German officer’s remark to one of the 
British journalists accompanying the Chamberlain party to 
Berchtesgaden.^^ The critics who heard of the plot were 
apparently much more favorably impressed with its chances 
than was Chamberlain. The generals had not yet revealed 
themselves as continuous and verbose schemers whose plans 
always went awry. Thus, at the time of the September Crisis 
the spectacle of defeatism and treason in the awesome German 
military machine may well have seemed an irresistible tempta­
tion to the critics. Churchill and five other critics hinted
55Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, The German 
Army in Politics, 1918-1945 (London; Macmillan, 1953), 395-426
^^Unofficial German Approaches, Great Britain, E.L. 
Woodward and Rohan Butler (ed.), Documents of British Foreign 
Policy, 1919-1939, 3rd Ser., II (London: Her Majesty's Sta­
tionery Office, 1949), 686. Referred to hereafter as D.B.F.P.
5?Ibid., 686-87.
^^Nicolson, 362. The journalist was Vernon Bartlett.
43
59strongly of their knowledge and approval of the plot. An 
even more widespread awareness would account for the sureness 
of so many other members that a bluff would have worked 
against Hitler. It would also account for the critics lack 
of response to the Chamberlainites' remarks on the permanence 
of the German, and implicitly the Hitler, problem.
Later Labourites liked to remember their calls to 
stand up to Hitler and their deploring the strategic results 
of Munich, especially when they thought that Munich might be 
an election issue in 1945. They forgot that in 193Ô their 
thinking on Germany was quite confused. They were torn by 
the contradictory moralities of resisting Nazi oppression 
and considering German revisionist claims. Like the Chamber­
lainites their thinking was influenced by revisionism; they 
had in fact supported revisionism long before the Conserva­
tives. Thus, while they complained of the sufferings caused 
the Czechs, no Labourite questioned the moral right of the 
Sudeten Germans to join the Reich. Rather, they seemed up­
set that the Czechs had not gotten better terms and that 
the transaction had not been carried out through the League 
of Nations. They maintained that Britain, France, and the 
Soviet Union should have threatened Hitler with war in order 
to secure "justice for the Sudeten Germans /%nd7 justice for 
the Czechs," a policy they called "collective security.
59parl. Deb., 33, 69, 203, 363, 430, 5P7.
G°ibid., 501, 358. See also Ibid., 548,
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At the same time they deplored Chamberlain's promises of 
increased arms expenditure as a return to "power politics. 
Further, while they objected to the strategic advantage given 
Germany, Labourites did not rule out further territorial 
concessions. Indeed, Attlee proposed bigger and better ap­
peasement in a world conference which would deal with Germany's 
territorial demands but would mainly concentrate on guaran-
62teeing her access to raw materials and markets. Another 
Labour M. P. promised that a Labour Government would outdo 
Chamberlain's appeasement by sending the King and Queen to 
Berlin.
Confusion about the conflicting ethics of resisting 
Nazism and accepting Germany's revisionist claims did not 
greatly trouble the Tory Rebels. The Rebels' thinking rep­
resented an older, pre-19l4 tradition in British foreign 
policy. To them, the balance of power--a term which the
revisionists had decried and which the Labourites were still
64uneasy about using--was a "law of nature." Their remarks 
in the Munich debate indicated that they would have wanted 
to resist the expansionism of any German government. They 
were just as concerned about the extension of German economic 
hegemony as about the expansion of Nazism; Harold Nicolson
^^Ibid., 355. See also Ibid., 102, 227, 500-01.
^^Ibid., 65-66. ^^Ibid., 263.
^^Ibid., 434.
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spoke of the dangers of cheap German transport dominating 
the Danube in terms reminiscent of Eyre Crow, perhaps even 
of Pitt the E l d e r . U n l i k e  the Labourites they had never 
been touched by what had in fact been the idealism of revi­
sionism. Consequently, they dismissed "self-determination” 
in their own minds as "a slogan of singularly repulsive 
hypocrisy.
They did recognize the moral force of the concept 
with world opinion. Many argued, somewhat defensively, that 
Munich was not really self-determination.^^ Duff Cooper, 
who criticized Munich on strategic grounds, admitted that 
he had accepted the September l8 Anglo-French Plan, which 
involved the cession of Czechoslovakia's strategic frontiers, 
because "it would be hard to have it said that we were 
fighting against self-determination."^^
The Tory Rebels' speeches differed from those of 
Labourites in another way. Whereas Labourites kept quiet 
on the question, the Tory Rebels' frequently criticized the 
Government's defense preparations. Churchill compared the 
Government's incompetence in air defense and air craft
6 9production to the fecklessness of Ethelred the Unready.
Duff Cooper pointed to the complete absence of a British
70expeditionary force available for foreign service. Sidney
G^ibid., 431-32. See also Ibid., 435.
G^Ibid., 112. ^^Ibid., 82-83, 234, 365
G^ibid., 35. ^^Ibid., 367.
7°Ibid., 38-39.
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Herbert remarked: "I was led to suppose the locusts had
stopped nibbling about two years ago, but I can hear their
71little jowls creaking yet under the Front Bench."
This issue, however, faced the Tory Rebels with a
dilemma: did the obvious arms deficiencies justify the
Munich terms? In a later controversy three of the four
Rebels who discussed the point agreed that the Government
should have threatened to fight and then gone to war if the
72Generals' Plot failed. In the House of Commons debate,
the views of the Tory Rebels were not so clear. Churchill
seemed to have absolute faith in the success of the Generals'
Plot, and his optimism was only slightly qualified in his
71memoirs published in 1948. Nicolson alone of all the
critics in the House agreed with the Government that war was
the alternative to Munich; he went on to imply Britain should
74have gone to war. The speeches of Amery, Cooper, and 
Anthony Eden somewhat inconsistently combined criticism of 
the Sudetenland cession, advocacy of bluffing, and recogni­
tion of the limiting effect of the arms situation on foreign 
75policy actions. The other Rebels were even less consis­
tent: they criticized the arms weakness and the Munich terms
T^Ibid., 244-45. Amery, 275, 208-90.
^^Churchill, 279-339.
^^Parl. Deb., 431. Nicolson's diary at this time 
confirms his House statement which is not entirely clear. 
Nicolson, 365.
^^Parl. Deb., 34, 38-39, 85-87, 204.
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apparently without any awareness of a possible relationship 
between the two.
Government supporters in the House of Commons debate 
did not explicitly acknowledge that armaments weakness had 
determined policy. They mainly defended Munich on the grounds 
of the morality of Germany's case in Czechoslovakia, the fu­
tility of seeking military victory, and the insignificance 
of all causes in the face of modern war. At the same time 
both Chamberlain and Hoare made oblique admissions that the 
recent mobilization had shown serious deficiencies in Brit­
ain's defense preparations, a fact that most Britons knew 
already. They promised extensive changes and increased
s p e n d i n g , T w o  Tory back-benchers hinted that Britain
77would be better prepared to fight in one or two years.
Such remarks support the subsequent contention of many Munich 
apologists, including Chamberlain himself in 1940, that un­
preparedness was the real reason for Munich. Certainly the 
number of Conservative references to increased armaments 
seems odd at the moment of achieving "peace in our time :"
a paradox which critics pointed out so many times that
7 8Chamberlain finally disavowed the remark. Yet, Chamberlain's 
numerous private remarks at this time and his advertisement
^^Ibid., 50, 160, 551-52.
7?Ibid., 119-20, 297-98. 
^®Ibid., 551.
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of his Munich accomplishment in his 1938 Christmas cards
suggest that the reasons he and his supporters emphasized
79in public were genuine. The truth of this is substantiated 
by the Chamberlainites' contention in the House debate that, 
while war over Czechoslovakia would have been pointless,
8oBritain would undoubtedly have won such a war.
The Chamberlainites recognized in part that their 
eirguments, just as those of the Labourites and the Tory 
Rebels, were not entirely consistent. Their basic defense 
against criticism of the Munich terms was that the alterna­
tive to these terms was war. They also asked the British 
people to trust Hitler not to use the strategic advantage 
gained by these terms against Britain. Critics replied by 
asking why the British people should trust a man who was 
willing to plunge Europe into a war over the timetable of 
a territorial transfer. The Government had no sure answer 
to this question. Sir John Simon contended that Hitler's 
past behavior was unimportant because the generosity of the 
Munich terms and the consultative machinery of the Anglo- 
German Declaration created a whole new climate in international
79Douglas Reed, Disgrace Abounding (London: Cape,
1939), 428; Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain 
(London: Macmillan, 1946), 386 ; Eden, 37, Lockhart, Comes
The Reckoning (London: Putnam, 194?), 82; Ian Colvin, Van-
sittart in Office: Origins of World Wetr II (London; Gollancz,
19Ô5), 276.
fin^Parl. Deb., 378-79- 40?.
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81relations. A Tory back-bencher, apparently still somewhat 
hysterical from the events of the week before, declared that 
God had called the English people to an act of faith in
82Hitler. But another back-bencher, William Marbane, prob­
ably more accurately expressed the prevailing Tory view when 
he said that the division in the House was "between those 
who do not believe in the sincerity of German promises and
Q o
those who reserve judgment on the matter."
What then if the critics' distrust proved well-founded? 
It is entirely possible that, just as the Labourites and Tory 
Rebels were impressed by parts of the Chamberlainites' argu­
ments, the Chamberlainites themselves were impressed with the 
possibilities of bluffing Hitler when re-armament was com­
pleted. Chamberlain himself had believed bluffing had worked
84in the May Crisis. Bluffing was essentially the policy 
attempted by the British Government after March 1939* The 
Government then did not want war with Germany, and they did 
not aim to prevent Hitler from achieving his goals in Poland. 
They thought a judicious threat would make Hitler orderly.
They were wrong. However, it may well have been that Sir 
Thomas Inskip was anticipating a bluffing policy when he 
told the House that the contemplated armaments increases
G^Ibid., 347. ^^Ibid,, 422,
G^Ibid. , 222. . ^Veiling, 354.
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would "make our diplomacy and defense march hand in hand
O g
as we desire." Chamberlain may also have been thinking
this when in the closing speech of debate on October 6th,
he spoke of increased preparations "making our diplomacy
86more effective."
®^Parl. Deb., 308. 
G^Ibid. , 50.
CHAPTER III
MUNICH TO WAR. THE LATER PHASES:
OCTOBER 7, 1938-SEPTEMBER 3, 1939
Chamberlain in his final speech in the House debate
had given a qualified pledge not to hold a general election
on Munich.^ This decision did not end Parliament's part in
the Munich debate. For after the House gave Chamberlain a
2366 to l44 vote of confidence and adjourned, Members con­
tinued to use the machinery of representative government to 
discuss Munich and its effects on the future. When the 
Commons met again on November 1, the Tory Rebels spoke out 
in debates on defense against the inadequacy of British arms 
in the Czech Crisis. Their actions moved an exasperated 
Chamberlain to liken the Rebels to "a bird fouling its own 
n e s t . H e  and the Conservative Central Office retaliated 
by encouraging the constituents of Rebels to harass their 
Members. Consequently, Paul Emrys-Evans, J. R. L. Thomas,
Iparl. Deb., CCCXXXIX, (1937-38), 548. 
^Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, 189.
3parl. Deb., CCCXL (1937-38), 74.
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Ronald Cartland, Sir Derrick Gnnston, Lord Cranbonrne,
Harold Nicolson, and Winston Churchill were bitterly attacked
in their local associations. Churchill was only able to stop
such attacks by threatening to resign and fight a bye-elec-
tion if the Epping Conservative Association carried a motion
kof censure against him.
A number of bye-elections did take place in the 
months just after Munich. In October Quintin Hogg entered 
Parliament as a Chamberlainite after his victory in the 
Oxford City Division, but his majority was smaller than that 
of the Conservative candidate in the last General Election. 
November bye-elections in Walsall, West Lewisham, and the 
Fylde Division (Lancashire) showed a similar result. By 
contrast, in November Labour won a formerly Conservative 
seat at Dartford, and increased its majority at Doncaster.
A bigger reversal for the Government came at Bridgewater 
(Somerset). There the journalist Vernon Bartlett, running 
as an Independent on a platform which criticized Munich's 
effect on British security, reversed a previous 10,000 
vote Conservative majority, and won by 2,000 votes. Because 
of the ambiguous Labour stand on Munich, the October and 
November results could not be interpreted as a consistent 
public repudiation of Munich. They did, however, indicate
4Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, 5? Churchill, 330; Eden,
32; Cooper, Old Men Forget, 252.
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some reaction to the hysteric adulation of Chamberlain in 
the days just after Munich. This trend of decreasing support 
for the Prime Minister ended in December. Then the Duchess 
of Atholl resigned the Kinross and Perthshire seat which she 
had held as a Conservative, and ran in the subsequent bye- 
election there as an anti-Munich Independent. She lost.
No further evidence appeared of strong public dissatisfaction 
with Munich.^
The pattern of bye-election results and also the 
selection of articles in quality periodicals reflect an im­
portant movement in British public opinion. In October and 
November 193& many Britons were deeply worried about the 
impact of the Munich changes on Britain's safety; but from 
December to March public interest in Munich lapsed. In 
magazines prepared for publication before December--in the 
October issues of the weekly New Statesman and Spectator 
and in the November and December issues of the monthly 
Contemporary Review, Fortnightly Review, International 
Affairs, The Nineteenth Century and After, and Round Table-- 
a total of fifty-one articles appeared dealing with Munich 
and Britain's post-Munich future. In the January, February, 
and March issues of the same magazines only five such articles 
appeared. Interest shifted to speculation on future German 
economic penetration in Europe. The apparent reason for the 
change was a growing conviction that Munich would work.^
^Rock, 200-02. ^See Appendix.
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German actions in October and November caused the 
British concern. The Germans immediately exploited their 
own prestige and declining French influence by securing 
highly favorable trade agreements all over Eastern Europe. 
The Germans, it was widely predicted in Britain, would 
soon have economic and political control of Eastern Europe. 
Many writers were unimpressed by the new Chamberlainite 
argument that such control did not matter; Britain was not 
really a European power. Critical writers pointed out that 
Hitler was already abusing his new power, and would probably 
use it against all of Europe. Hitler's representatives on 
the commission drawing a new Czech-German frontier forced 
through a line which ignored ethnic boundaries. Hitler's 
speeches seemed to claim a right to dictate the membership 
of British Cabinets. The November pogroms in Germany under­
lined the brutality of Nazisp. The House of Commons pro­
phecies of the Tory Rebels seemed to be coming true. Con­
sequently, more and more writers came to reject the morality 
of revisionism. Unlike the Tory Rebels, few periodical 
writers said explicitly that Munich was avoidable. However, 
they did tend to see Munich and the German utilization of 
its terms as a disastrous turning point in British history. 
They did not consider that perhaps Munich only revealed an 
existing German supremacy. This attitude was to continue.
It was to be one element of the emotionalism traditional in 
British historiography of Munich.
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In December public discussion of Munich stopped.
The interests of periodical writers shifted to speculation 
on future German economic expansion. Apparently the German 
trade missions which initially made a sinister impression 
finally convinced writers that Germany would achieve domina­
tion of Eastern Europe, perhaps of all Europe, without war. 
While the general public grew disinterested in Munich, a 
small group of Czechophil writers were preparing books on 
Munich. Unlike most Commons and periodical critics, the 
Czechophils stated dogmatically that Munich was both immoral 
and unnecessary. The Czechophil opinions were not typical 
of British judgments in the months before Prague. Yet their 
books were read by many future polemical writers. These 
later writers accepted the Czechophil view that Britain had 
an alternative at Munich. Belief in choice combined with 
the continued view of Munich as a downward turning point 
were the sources of later British emotionalism about Munich.
The British discussion of Munich revived somewhat 
after Prague. Some writers remained bitter despite the change 
in British diplomacy which began with the guarantee of Poland. 
They insisted that the disastrous effects of Munich could 
not be undone. They further insisted that Britain had a 
choice at Munich. These charges stirred Chamberlainites to 
present still a third explanation of Munich: they now em­
phasized that British unpreparedness alone had made Munich 
necessary. Not all appeasement supporters joined the Chamber­
lainites in claiming that the Government had always been
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hostile to Germany. One writer maintained that both Munich 
and the present Anglo-German enmity were the result of mis­
understandings, not irreconcilable conflict. Another ap­
proach to Munich at this time came from those writers who 
were critical of Munich but who now supported Chamberlain's 
foreign policy. Apparently confident of the success of the 
new course, such writers did not see Munich as a irremed­
iable disaster. Consequently, they described Munich with 
an unwonted tolerance of the Government's actions and mo­
tives. Neither their tolerance nor the retrospective belli­
cosity of the Chamberlainites would survive the frustrations 
of the Phoney War.
October and November 1938 
In early October, while the House of Commons was 
still debating Munich, Dr. Walter Funic, the German Minister 
of Economics, began a month long tour of the capitols of 
Southeastern Europe. The tour was publicized in Britain. 
Britons knew of Funk's promise of "great economic construc-
7tion plans" for Germany and Eastern Europe. British writers 
initially interpreted Funk's remarks as evidence of German 
intentions to make Munich a turning point in European his­
tory. A New Statesman leader writer predicted that "in a 
few months the new Germany will dominate a vast economic 
Empire from the North Sea to the Aegean--a block of 1^5,000,000
7Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, 295.
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people with greater resources than any nation the modern
Q
world has ever known." Other writers pointed out that the 
British-French domination of post-war Europe was now des­
troyed. So too was the basic axiom of British foreign policy 
since the Peace of Utrecht that "this country should...pre-
9vent any single Power from obtaining the mastery of Europe." 
All the writers implied that the terms of Munich and German 
exploitation of the terms formed the turning point. None 
conceded that perhaps Munich formalized an existing physical 
reality of British decline and German predominance. This 
attitude was to remain characteristic of British critical 
writing on Munich.
In October and November most British writers in 
periodicals foresaw even further extension of German domi­
nance after the realization of Funk's economic plans. Most 
Government apologists predicted mainly German economic hege­
mony in Eastern Europe on the model of the Funk plan. The 
Government publicist J. A. Spender also admitted that "we 
are not at the end of Treaty r e v i s i o n . O t h e r  more crit­
ical observers forecast political as well as economic domina­
tion of all E u r o p e . A  few of these implied, as had the
g
(anon.), "Policy for a National Opposition," New 
Statesman, XVI (October 22, 1938), 596.
9Nicolson, 521.
A. Spender, "Munich--Before and After," Contem­
porary Review, CLIV (November 1938), 521.
L. Hammond, "British Policy Now," Spectator, CLXI (October l4, 1938), 595; (anon.), "The New Europe," New 
Statesman, XVI (October 8, 1938), 516; (anon.), "Crisis and
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Tory Rebels in the House, that Germany would finally try to 
conquer Britain militarily. However, some of those critical 
of parts of Munich were already sufficiently impressed with 
the peaceful nature of German expansion to foresee accomo­
dation of a dominant Germany without war. The editors of 
the New Statesman, were apparently willing to accept the new 
situation. They took up Attlee's proposal for more appease­
ment in an international conference "to deal with the causes
of war, the wrongs of Versailles and minorities... the colonial
12question and questions of raw materials." Whether optimis­
tic or pessimistic about avoiding war with Germany, writers 
of all political beliefs--ironically considering the course 
of British policy only a few months later--warned against 
British opposition to the all powerful Reich at any time
soon: "we must...make no promises..encourage no resistance,"
13wrote Harold Nicolson. Sir Arthur Salter, an independent
M. P. critical of Munich cautioned: "we shall merely provoke,
and fail alike in either appeasement or resistance if we
prepare a combination that will threaten /^German^7 with 
14encirclement."
Such opinions suited the Chamberlainites who now
the Future," Round Table, XXIX (December 1938), 1; R. W. 
Seton-Watson, "Munich and After," Fortnightly Review, CXLIV 
(November 1938), 526.
12 "The New Europe," New Statesman, 517-
^^Nicolson, 519.
14Sir Arthur Salter, "British Policy Now," Spectator, 
CLXI (October 21, 1938), 643.
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presented a new explanation of Munich. Writing in periodi­
cals, Government apologists--in contrast to Chamberlainite 
speakers in the Commons--admitted the existence of grandiose 
German ambitions. Germany was the strongest nation in 
Europe. She aimed to control Eastern Europe. She might 
eventually fight the U.S.S.R. However, they contended, 
the interests of Britain and Germany should not conflict. 
Britain was still the strongest power in the world outside 
Europe. Nothing in Mein Kampf indicated that Hitler intended 
to challenge this power. He had already renounced rivalry 
on the sea in the Anglo-German Naval agreement of 1935- 
Why then had war almost come over what Spender called the 
"dangerous makeshift" of Czechoslovakia?^^ Because of the 
agitation of a strange alliance of left-wing ideologues in 
the Labour Party, who believed war between despotisms and 
democracies inevitable, and old-fashioned imperialists such 
as Churchill and other Tory Rebels, who wrongly saw every
Spender, "British Policy Now," Spectator, CLXI 
(November l8, 1938), 839. See also John Armitage, "The Peace 
Approach," Fortnightly Review, CXLIV (November 1938), 522- 
25; Lord Elton, "Mr. Chamberlain and His Enemies," Fortnightly 
Review CXLIV (December 1938) 686-92; Lord Esher, "Colonies
for Germany," Fortnightly Review, CXLIV (December 1938), 
641-50; George Glasgow, "Twenty Years of Czechoslovakia," 
Contemporary Review, CLIV (November 1938), 532-43; Glasgow, 
"Foreign Affairs," Contemporary Review, CLIV (December 1938), 
737-48; H. Powys Greenwood, "Germany after Munich," Contem­
porary Review CLIV (November 1938), 523-31; Spender, "Munich-- 
Before and After," 513-22; Sir Arnold Wilson, "British Policy 
Now," Spectator, CLXI (October 28, 1938), 703-04.
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German profit as a British loss. The Prime Minister, the
Chamberlainites pointed out, had resisted the ’’war mongers"
at the time of the September C r i s i s . T h e  British people
should not listen in the future when such agitators tried
"to invoke all the sentiments which have gathered about
ancient States...for the benefit of twenty year old treaty 
17creations." If they did listen to Chamberlain's opponents, 
they would get in the way of Hitler's ambitions in Eastern 
Europe. A terrible war would result. The only one to pro­
fit from the war. Lord Esher wrote in the only public remark
18of its sort, would be "the spreading wave of Bolshevism."
Many critics in October and November rejected these 
publicized reasons for the Government's acquiescence in Ger­
man expansion: they saw such acceptance as a symptom of
either isolationism, decadence, or an abnegation of Great 
Power status; any of these attitudes, they felt, was a por­
tent of disaster. The difference in interpretation was partly 
a matter of perspective. Whereas Chamberlainites emphasized 
British power outside Europe, some critics stressed Britain's 
increasing inability to influence events in Europe itself.
George Glasgow, the foreign affairs writer for 
Contemporary Review, wrote that "the fire-eaters, the war- 
at-any-price people, the Ribbentrop's and the Churchill's 
in every country... are disgruntled. The peace-makers are 
in the ascendant." Glasgow, "Foreign Affairs," 521.
17Spender, "Munich--Before and After" 521.
1 QLord Esher, 644.
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The Government's lack of concern about this was evidenced,
they felt, in the November shift in air production priorities
from attack bombers to defensive fighters. Isolation from
Europe, they contended, was impossible for Britain, "the most
19vulnerable of all the Great Powers." Seemingly aware of 
a discrepancy between the public and private statements of 
Government supporters, other critics believed that the Gov­
ernment no longer really cared if Britain were a Great Power. 
Several periodical writers as well as diarists mentioned 
privately expressed Chamberlainite gratitude to Hitler as 
a barrier against Bolshevism. Such feelings, Arnold Toynbee 
maintained in a Chatham House address, showed a decaying
governing class, "too effete and poor-spirited" to keep
20Britain great or even independent. Toynbee and the Tory 
Rebel M. P. Emrys-Evans also described a private Chamber­
lainite wish to sink to the supposedly safe status of a 
second-rate Power: "if only we could find ourselves in the
position of Holland or Sweden," Toynbee reported the Chamber-
21lainites as saying, "how happy we should be." Such fanta­
sies, Emrys-Evans wrote, could not come true:
Complete military and economic control of 
Europe under one authority would soon reduce 
these islands to a state of vassalage. It 
would, of course, bring peace, but the peace 
of submission and poverty, and the extinction
^^Nicolson, 522.
20Arnold Toynbee, "After Munich: The World Outlook 
with Discussion," International Affairs. XVIII (January 
1939), l8. This article is a reprint of an address given 
by Toynbee at Chatham House, November 15, 1938.
21lbid., 14.
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of all freedom. There is no halfway house.
The existence of small, well governed countries 
such as Sweden and Holland is no guide. They 
exist because the Western democracies are
powerful.22
Many critics believed that such decline was already
well under way and was almost irreversible. As a result of
Hitler's October and November speeches, they felt that they
were about to see the extinction of British liberty. In
these speeches Hitler repeatedly criticized Churchill, Anthony
Eden, and Duff Cooper. At Saarbrucken on October 9th, he
seemed to threaten Britain with immediate war if such men
23ever held office. Kingsley Martin, the New Statesman edi­
tor, interpreted Hitler's statements as "calculation not 
2^bombast." Hugh Dalton, the Labour M. P., saw the Saarbrucken
2Sspeech as a "foretaste" of "surrenders of all kinds." The 
historian J. L. Hammond noted that, "as Hitler turns this 
way or that there falls upon his neighbours the shadow of a 
terrible s i l e n c e . T h e  fears expressed in October and 
November seemed a fulfillment of the prophecies of some 
Labourite and Tory Rebel Members in the House of Commons 
-debate.
22p. V. Emrys-Evans, "Facing the Issues," Fort­
nightly Review, CXLIV (December 1938), 680.
^^Hitler, 1532-37. 
p4Kingsley Martin, "Stock-Taking," New Statesman, 
XVI (October 8, 1938), 556.
^^Hugh Dalton, "The Crisis in Retrospect," New 
Statesman, XVI (October 15, 1938), 562.
Hammond, 595*
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Other events at this time converted many Britons to 
the Tory Rebel view that Nazism made revisionism a sham. 
Germany dominated the International Control Commission char­
ged with drawing a new Czech-German frontier. The line upon 
which the German delegates successfully insisted ignored 
existing ethnic boundaries, and gave Germany even greater 
strategic and economic advantages than had been originally 
envisaged. The result was to put 800,000 Czechs in the Third
27Reich. This was a smaller figure than the number of Sudeten 
Germans formerly in Czechoslovakia. However, Britons were 
becoming less and less impressed with such facts. Also Ger­
many's highly publicized anti-Semitic pogroms on the night 
of November 9-10 convinced many that British connivance in 
putting even one person in Nazi Germany was morally wrong.
Nazi barbarism, a writer in The Nineteenth Century and After
28declared, "stinks in the nostrils of all decent people."
A writer in the normally pro-Government Round Table protested
that, in the light of the fresh Nazi atrocities, calling
Munich, "'self-determination' or 'repairing the blunders of
29Versailles' seems to the ordinary man a mockery." Such 
remarks showed that the emotions favoring Munich were begin­
ning to become unintelligible in retrospect even before the 
change in British policy following Prague.
27Paul Anderson, "The Expansion of Germany," The Nine­
teenth Century and After, CXXIV (November 1938), 550-59.
28Alex Glendinning, "Commentary," The Nineteenth 
Century and After, CXXIV (December 1938), 732.
^^"Crisis and the Future," Round Table, 5.
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These protests were not made with the idea of re­
sisting Germany. Writers continued to emphasize that Britain 
could do nothing as a result of Munich. But Chamberlainite 
writers recognized the force of such feelings. Somewhat 
defensively, in contrast to the tone of such statements in 
the House of Commons debate, they tried to remind their 
readers of the morality of revisionism. Nazi actions, they 
admitted, made the worst possible atmosphere for agreement,
but they did not make either future conciliation or the past
30agreement at Munich any less imperative.
Although the changing popular perspective on Munich 
did not immediately result in a policy change, the anxiety 
and disillusionment were partly responsible for increasingly 
widespread criticism of Chamberlain's handling of the Czech 
crisis. Memory of the gratitude at release from war was 
apparently dimming. Both critics and nominal Government 
supporters in October and November wrote of the Government's 
blundering defense preparations in the September crisis with 
a bitterness as intense as any of the Tory Rebels in the 
Commons and in complete contrast to later critical writers 
who have frequently stressed Chamberlain's rigid competence.
To the writers of October and November 1938, Chamberlain's
31defense policies were "dilatory... incompetent... inadequate."
30Lord Noel-Buxton, "Settlement with Germany," Con­
temporary Review, CLV (January 1939), 1-2; Lord Elton, 686- 
87 ; Spender, "British Policy Now," 839*
31Salter, Is It Peace? The Nettle and the Flower 
(London: Spectator^ 1938),
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Critics pointed out that the Government sent War Office 
observers to Czechoslovakia who could speak neither Czech 
nor German. They sent naval reservists to ports where there 
were no ships and no duties to perform. The Government dis­
patched Home Office instructors to teach citizens to use 
non-existent air raid protection equipment. It also ordered
anti-aircraft gun batteries to guard areas with weapons
32which had not yet been manufactured. The conviction of 
Government ineptness was strengthened by the apparently wide
spread belief--again in contrast to later opinion--that the
3 3Government had large sums of money available for defense.
It led Sir Arthur Salter to call for "a radical reconstruc­
tion of the Government at least on a basis of competence and
34if possible on a national basis."
December to March 
For the time being the discussion of Munich in per­
iodicals ended almost completely after the publication of 
December issues of the monthlies. In the months remaining 
before Hitler's occupation of Prague, only five articles 
appeared in quality magazines dealing with Munich, and at
32 Sir Charles Hobhouse, "The New Deal in Europe," 
Contemporary Review CLIV (December 1938), 656.
^^Dalton, 562; Martin, 556; "Policy for a National 
Opposition," New Statesman, 596; John Shand, "What People 
Are Saying," The Nineteenth Century and After, CXXIV (Decem­
ber 1938), 742.
34Salter, "British Policy Now," 643.
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35least one of these seems to have been written much earlier. 
Instead, the attention of periodical writers on foreign 
affairs turned to speculation on future German economic pen­
etration.^^ This selection of articles suggests that poss­
ibly Britons were coming to,believe that Munich would be 
the basis for a permanent European settlement. Apparently 
the peaceful nature of the Funk mission and the absence of 
any new crises convinced even strong critics of appeasement 
that German expansion would be primarily economic. The Ger­
mans would use their economic power to extort some kind of 
political subservience from the rest of Europe but other 
countries would not be invaded. The fears expressed about 
the future of British freedom and Britain’s status as a first 
class power indicated that many Britons disliked the new 
situation. But, critics felt, Britain lacked the power to 
change it.
Although resignation to Munich's seeming permanence 
sharply curtailed public discussion of the Agreement in
35G. P. Gooch, "Twenty Years of Europe," Contem­
porary Review, CLV (February 1939)i 129-30; Liddell Hart, 
"The European Crisis and Britain's Military Situation," 
Contemporary Review, CLV (January 1939), 26-36; Noel-Buxton, 
1-9; (anon.), "British Commonwealth after Munich," Round 
Table, XXIX (March 1939) 238-5I; J. F. C. Hearnshaw, "The
Franco-Gefman Feud," Contemporary Review, CLV (February 
1939) 160-68. See also Lewis Einstein, "The Munich Agree­
ment: A Retrospect," History, XXIII (March 1939), 331-40.
In a book published in 1939, Liddell Hart noted that his 
article for Contemporary Review had been actually written 
in October 1938. Liddell Hart, The Defense of Britain, 79.
^^See Appendix.
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December and afterwards, a few Britons continued to write 
and think on Munich with unabated interest. These men and 
women had strong personal ties to Czechoslovakia. They 
included foreign correspondents who had been in Czechoslo­
vakia during the crisis: G. E. R. Gedye of the Daily Tele­
graph ; Alexander Henderson of the Daily Herald; Sidney 
Morrell of the Daily Express; and a free lance writing 
couple, Joan and Jonathan Griffin. Also included was the 
distinguished historian R. W. Seton-Watson, who could almost 
claim to be a founding father of the Czech Republic. During
the months from October to March these Czechophils prepared
37books on Munich. The works were hastily written and highly 
emotional. But they remained for years an important part 
of the British literature on Munich. Those of the foreign 
correspondents contained a wealth of primary source material 
on Czechoslovakia during the September Crisis. The best 
known and most accomplished of them, Gedye's Fallen Bastions, 
continued to be the most detailed indictment of Chamberlain 
as a conspirator with Hitler against the Czechs as long as 
such conspiracy theories were popular. The account of Seton- 
Watson, who was unwilling to concede Chamberlain the cleverness
37G.E.R. Gedye, Fallen Bastions (London: Gollancz,
1939); Alexander Henderson, Eyewitness in Czechoslovakia 
(London: Harrap, 1939); Sidney Morrell, I Saw the Cruci­
fixion (London: Peter Davies, 1939); Joan and Jonathan
(àriffin. Lost Liberty: The Ordeal of the Czechs and the
Future of Freedom (London: Chatto and Windus, 1939); "R. W.
Seton-Watson, Munich and the Dictators (2nd ed.; London: 
Methuen, 1939).
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to be a conspirator, remained the standard academic critique 
of Munich for almost ten years. Seton-Watson was able to 
use most of the documentation available before the Nuremberg 
trials of 19^5-6. His interpretation of the pre-Nuremberg 
documentation greatly influenced most British writers on 
Munich until after 19^5» and traces of Seton-Watson's in­
fluence is apparent in the work of A. J. P. Taylor in the 
i960's.
One of the striking characteristics of Seton-Watson 
and Gedye's writing was their assumption of German weakness 
and Allied strength. Gedye underestimated German military 
power. Seton-Watson ignored it. Neither writer mentioned 
the British unpreparedness which so appalled Commons and 
periodical critics. Instead, they lauded Czech and Soviet 
military strength, and insisted that the forces on Britain's 
side were invincible. Hitler knew this, and contrary to ap­
pearances of peremptoriness, he only announced his demands 
when he was sure that Britain would accept them without 
resistance. He launched the May crisis after Chamberlain's 
intimation at a May 10 press conference that Czechoslovakia 
could not survive in its present form. Although prompt 
Czech action, Gedye and Seton-Watson agreed, prevented a 
German invasion in May, Chamberlain's press conference re­
marks encouraged Hitler not to give up hope of subverting
o QCzechoslovakia. When Hitler renewed his efforts in
^^Gedye, 358, 363-70, 4o8; Seton-Watson, Munich and
the Dictators, 23-45, 87-94.
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September, Gedye continued and here he diverges from Seton- 
Watson, the German leader found Chamberlain a willing con­
federate. The two decided at Godesberg to cooperate in 
destroying Czechoslovakia. Hitler then made threats which 
he knew he would not have to carry out. Chamberlain for his 
part bullied the French and frightened the British people 
into agreeing to Hitler's demands. The conspirators were 
successful. Hitler won power in Central Europe which, Gedye 
thought, he might well want to use later to dismember the 
British Empire. By the bogus reputation he gained as a
champion of peace Chamberlain opened the way to becoming a 
39dictator.
In discussing the events from the end of the May 
crisis to the signing of the Munich Agreement, Seton-Watson 
had the advantage of a much greater personal knowledge of 
English politicians than Gedye. Consequently, Seton-Watson 
had a higher, or at least different, opinion of Chamberlain's 
motives and a lower opinion of the Prime Minister's abilities, 
Seton-Watson did not believe Chamberlain to be a cunning 
traitor; he was an incompetent and ignorant old man. Cham­
berlain was not Hitler's co-conspirator. Rather, he was the 
dupe of Hitler's lies. Along with his assistant Sir Horace 
Wilson and The Times editor Geoffrey Dawson, Chamberlain
k oblunderingly sabotaged the good intentions of his Cabinet.
^^Gedye, 38I ,  456, 483, 365-
^^Seton-Watson, Munich and the Dictators, 83, 147-50.
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Seton-Watson saw The Times September 7 editorial as 
the turning point of the crisis. Just prior to it, the 
warning to Germany in Sir John Simon's August 2? Lanark 
speech had sobered the Sudeten German leaders and made them 
negotiate with the Czechs in good faith. Seton-Watson ap­
parently felt that Chamberlain was not responsible for the 
Lanark speech; he implied that The Times editorial was the 
work of Dawson and Chamberlain. The editorial which advo­
cated the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany undid the 
effect of Simon's speech. The Sudeten leaders broke off 
talks with the Czechs. Hitler made his demands for self- 
determination in his Nuremberg speech on September 12.
Despite the many violent phrases of the speech, Seton- 
Watson pointed out in a conclusion which still finds echoes 
in the work of A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler still did not di­
rectly threaten war nor reject further negotiations. How­
ever, Chamberlain paniced and flew to Berchtesgaden. There, 
Seton-Watson admitted, the Prime Minister received an ulti­
matum, though one on which Hitler could now tell he was 
unlikely to have to make good. After Berchtesgaden and 
until Munich, Hitler was again and again able to play upon 
Chamberlain's ignorance of foreign affairs. By so doing, 
he caused Chamberlain to override Cabinet and Foreign Office 
opposition--here Seton-Watson hinted of his inside informa­
tion of the complex maneuverings behind such events as the 
September 26 Foreign Office communique--throw away a position
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of unchallengable strength, and make the ignominous Munich
, k l  surrender.
The conclusions of Seton-Watson and Gedye differed 
from those of the Commons and periodical critics in their 
dogmatic certainty of the moral validity of Czechoslovakia 
and in their assumption of German weakness. Several critics 
in the House qualified their belief in the efficacy of 
bluffing by conceding that Britain's defense weaknesses 
imposed some restraints on British foreign policy. Save 
for Churchill, those who did not make this admission showed 
evident relief that they were not facing the German bombs 
which might have fallen if Chamberlain had acted on their 
suggestions. Magazine critics were angry at Chamberlain's 
incompetence in preparing Britain's defenses, but none of 
them proposed that under such circumstances Britain should 
have threatened Hitler with war. Gedye ignored such consid­
erations. Seton-Watson only discussed what he considered 
the ineptness of Chamberlain's diplomacy, and did not men­
tion defense. Similarly, Labourites both in and out of 
Parliament were confused by the conflicting morality of 
supporting German revisionist claims and resisting Nazi 
aggression. Those Tory Rebels and magazine critics who 
had either never favored revisionism or found it an in­
creasingly hypocritical slogan nevertheless seemed to 
recognize in some measure revisionism's power to delude
^^Ibid., 50-51, 54, 55, 63-4, 73-86, 98-9, 101.
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men. Seton-Watson and Gedye admitted no such ambiguity. To 
them Czechoslovakia was an historic and sovereign state.
Her relatively slight deviation from one principle of inter­
national justice was no ground for her abrupt dismemberment.
koThose who felt otherwise were either ignorant or criminal.
Although Seton-Watson and Gedye’s views were atypical, 
they were the ones read by later writers researching the 
numerous polemical works against Munich in die war years.
By then, Seton-Watson and Gedye’s 1938 view of Czechoslovakia 
was a commonly held opinion of a gallant ally. Their conclu­
sions on the 1938 arms situation were ones that in retrospect 
critics liked to believe true. Seeing them in Seton-Watson 
and Gedye_’s work confirmed the later critics’ illusion that 
a conviction of Western arms superiority was a widely held 
judgment in 1938.
Prague to War 
On March 14, 1939, Monsignor Tiso, the Premier of 
the autonomous province of Slovakia, responded to a request 
made in Berlin, and declared Slovakia’s complete independence 
from the Second Republic of Czecho-Slavakia. On March 15, 
German troops marched into those parts of Bohemia and Moravia 
not already taken at Munich. The Germems announced that 
rump-’’Czechia" was now a protectorate of the Third Reich. 
Although Chamberlain initially accepted the March l4-5 events 
without demur, an "underground explosion" of public and Par­
liamentary opinion soon forced him to change his mind. On
^^Ibid., 23-38; Gedye, 358, 369-70, 399, 409.
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March 1? in a Birmingham speech he raised the question 
whether Hitler's latest action did not reveal an attempt to 
dominate the world by force. On March 31, with great pop­
ular support he announced a British guarantee of Poland.
In April Chamberlain introduced a bill for peacetime con­
scription. This revolution in British diplomacy turned out 
to be more apparent than real. The Government only languidly 
pursued negotiations for a military alliance with the Soviet 
Union. Privately it showed itself eager for Polish conces­
sions to Germany. Apparently Chamberlain hoped that the 
threat of war would make Hitler amenable to orderly discus­
sions. The Prime Minister's hopes were not realized. Hitler 
greatly strengthened his position by concluding a non­
aggression pact with the Soviet Union on Aug us t 23. He 
then invaded Poland on September 1. Chamberlain and the 
French sought every chance to avoid fulfilling the Polish 
guarantee. Parliamentary opinion intervened decisively, 
and on September 3 Chamberlain was obliged to announce a 
British declaration of war on Germany.
Although other events now definitely succeeded Munich 
in the center of public attention, a number of Britons re­
mained interested in the Agreement. The thoughts of some 
were still bitter even in the perspective of British resis­
tance. Two writers, Sheila Grant-Duff and Wickham Steed,
^^Wheeler-Bennett, 3^9-428.
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criticized the slowness in building up the anti-German coa­
lition, and particularly noted the Government's continuing 
failure to secure an alliance with the Soviet Union. They 
also feared that Germany had become too strong to be bluffed 
successfully. Such unfortunate conditions were the result 
of Munich. Other European nations distrusted Chamberlain 
because of Munich, and Germany had built up her strength 
with the resources of Czechoslovakia. In retrospect, Grant- 
Duff and Steed saw Munich as a time when the obviously right 
decision could have saved Britain from her present difficul-
44ties. After Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the New
Statesman immediately attributed his action to fear of
45"another Munich." The New Statesman, Grant-Duff, and 
Steed all continued the tendency of seeing Munich as a cause 
of all contemporary ills. This attitude combined with a 
continuation of Grant-Duff and Steed's retrospective view 
of Munich as a time of choice would become much more wide­
spread when the war with Germany floundered in the "Phoney 
War. "
Chamberlain never replied publicly to such charges. 
Privately he admitted during this time that he "would bear
46the mark of Munich...to the end of his days." However,
44Wickham Steed, "What of British Policy," Contem­
porary Review, CLV (June 1939), 641-50; Sheila Grant-Duff, 
"The Fate of Czechoslovakia," Contemporary Review, CLV 
(May 1939), 552-9.
^^(anon.), "Peace in the Balance," New Statesman, 
XVIII (August 26, 1939), 298.
^^Feiling, 401.
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Chamberlain's admirers did feel that some public defense
was necessary in the light of Prague. Chamberlainites had
once justified Munich by ethics; they now justified it by
expediency. When the House met on the afternoon of March
15, just after the Members had learned the news from Prague,
a Chamberlainite made the first statement of what was to
become the standard defense of Munich. Britain's unprepeired-
k 7ness, Annesley Sommerville said, caused Munich. The Prime
Minister could not afford to try to bluff Hitler. Spender
made a similar apology in Contemporary Review, and completely
reversed his position of November. Previously Spender had
48called Czechoslovakia a "dangerous makeshift." He had advo­
cated British disengagement from Central and Eastern Euro­
pean affairs. He now claimed that lack of preparedness 
dictated Munich. As a result of the Agreement, Chamberlain
obtained a "breathing space" for Britain to make good her
49arms deficiencies.
Other appeasement supporters were more uncertain 
than Spender about the sudden new course in foreign affairs. 
In a book written during this time. Ward Price, the Daily 
Mail Central European correspondent and the representative 
of Lord Rothermere's personal foreign policy, maintained
^^Parl. Deb., CCCXLV (1938-39), 4?9.
48Spender, "British Policy Now," 839; Spender, "The 
Ideal and the Real," Contemporary Review CLV (May 1939),
513-21.
49Spender, "The Ideal and the Real," 520.
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that both the British humiliation at Munich and the present 
hostility in Anglo-German relations were the result of fail­
ures in communications, not irreconcilable c o n f l i c t . T h e  
Germans, Price wrote, wanted to dominate Eastern Europe and 
divide the world into spheres of influence. But accidents 
often created an erroneous impression of much greater Ger­
man ambitions. Also, Price pointed out, as Anglo-German 
contacts only came during crises when prestige was at stake, 
misimpressions could not be corrected.
The Munich Crisis, Price wrote, best illustrated his 
contention. Hitler said in March 1938 that he had no claims 
against the Czechs; the next September he took the Sudetenland. 
Britons reasoned that he had lied in March. They further 
concluded that he was lying when he said that he did not aim 
at worlddominâtion. Such conclusions. Price maintained, 
were false. Hitler had told the truth in March 1938. But 
soon afterwards the hypocritical President Benes of Czecho­
slovakia engineered the May Crisis to bolster weakening 
Western support. The picture the Western press painted 
of the May Crisis as a humiliation of Hitler, Price wrote, 
so infuriated the German dictator that he determined to annex 
the Sudetenland in September even at the cost of war. Only 
in September did Chamberlain really intervene. The timing 
of his intervention meant that he could not talk or negotiate
^^George Ward Price, Year of Reckoning (London: 
Cassell, 1939), 9.
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with Germany. He could either surrender or fight. Chamber- 
lain chose surrender because Britain was unprepared for war. 
However, the shame of Munich, Price went on, made Britons 
want a war in the future. British preparations made Germans 
feel they were being encircled. Consequently, they prepared 
for war themselves. Price resigned himself to the hopeless­
ness of resolving British and German misconceptions. Once 
war did come, and Britons faced the seemingly futile Phoney 
War, other writers, less fatalistic than Price, would elab­
orate on this interpretation of Munich. They would offer 
it as evidence of Anglo-German misunderstanding. They would
offer it in implicit support of an immediate compromise 
51peace.
Price's reservations about resisting Germany and 
those of such critics as Steed about Chamberlain's compe­
tence represented only part of the reaction to the National 
Government's actions. Many critics of Munich now joined 
the Chamberlainites in support of the Prime Minister. They 
did not necessarily accept the new Chamberlainite explana­
tion of Munich, but confidence in the new course in bluffing 
Hitler made them look at the Government's past policies some­
what detachedly. In a work written at this time, Alexander 
Werth, the Manchester Guardian Paris correspondent, tended 
in retrospect, and in complete contrast to his work on later
^ ^ I b i d . , 223, 272-85, 323-4.
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5 2Anglo-French relations, to blame France for Munich. Brit­
ish policy, Werth wrote, had many faults, principally because 
of Chamberlain's insularity. But Czechoslovakia was France's 
ally, not Britain's, and the French did nothing to protect 
Czechoslovakia. They consistently left decisions to the 
British. British provincialism and French passivity, Werth 
believed, combined throughout the Crisis to produce a Western 
diplomacy which repeatedly dropped inadvertent hints to Hit­
ler that he could bid up his requirements without fear of 
retaliation.
Werth emphasized the events of September 12-15 as 
the best example of the peculiar interaction of British, 
French, and German policies and also as the turning point 
of the Crisis. On September 12, Hitler made his Nuremberg 
speech. Behind Hitler's facade of recklessness in the 
speech, Werth agreed with Seton-Watson, the German dictator 
was deliberately cautious in stating such demands as that 
for a plebiscite in the Sudetenland. He and Henlein felt 
encouraged to go much further, first by the continued French
52 Alexander Werth, France and Munich, Before and After 
the Surrender (London; Hamish Hamilton, 1939), 21Ü-9, 222.
This work is reprinted Werth, The Twilight of France (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 19^2), 123-336. In Werth's later work he 
has tended to blame Britain for problems in Anglo-French 
relations. Werth, France, 1940-55 (London: Robert Hale,
1957)> xxiv-xxvi. Other 1939 writing with the same point 
of view as Werth include: (anon.), "The Grand Alliance 
against Aggression," Round Table, XXIX (June 1939), 441-55; 
(anon,), "National Unity," Round Table, XXIX (June 1939),
607-10.
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failure to mobilize and Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden.
This last came as a "pleasant surprise," Werth quoted Hitler 
15 3as saying. Consequently, Hitler and Henlein demanded "for
the first time" on September I k  and 15 the inclusion of the
54Sudetenland in the Reich. A succession of such incidents 
made Munich. Werth did not approve of the Agreement but 
apparently seeing a safe future with the new British policy 
of threatening Hitler he was in retrospect tolerant of the 
Government. Unlike the pre-Prague work of Seton-Watson, whose 
conclusions his own otherwise resembled, Werth was sympathe­
tic to the part played by self-determination in the British 
Government's decisions:
In spite of all the arguments about the Czech 
Maginot Line and the Bohemian Bastion, France 
and Britain (and in large measure, French and 
British opinion) were led by the ethical argu­
ments used with such tremendous effect by 
German propaganda. But it was an ethical argu­
ment the futility of which was terribly diffi­
cult to demonstrate--until the day when the 
Germans demonstrated it themselves by walking 
into Prague. The most that could be said 
against it in September was what Low said.
He hit the nail on the head with his cartoon 
on "Procession of Nightmares"--the Nightmares 
being Germans in Czechoslovakia, Germans in 
Rumania, Germans in Hungary, Germans in Alsace,
German-speaking Swiss, Germans in America, and 
so on. Nevertheless the case for defending 
the integrity of Czechoslovakia was, if not 
exactly an unconvincing one, at least not 
sufficiently clear.55
^^Werth, France and Munich, 219. 
s4Ibid., Italics the author's.
55Ibid., 223-4.
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After Prague, Seton-Watson himself came to back the 
National Government. He did not qualify or revise his ear­
lier conclusions about Munich--perhaps because of lack of 
time. But in an appendix to his Munich account written in 
late August 1939 for a later edition of the work, he wrote 
that the present was "no time for controversy and still less 
for recrimination." No government, he went on, "has ever 
faced imminent danger with so unanimous a country behind
it."56
The tolerance of Seton-Watson, Werth, and others 
for the Chamberlain Government's past performance proved 
temporary. It did not survive the frustrations of the Phoney 
War and the disaster of Dunkirk. In the light of first one 
and then the other of these two events, writers unhappy with 
the present increasingly saw Munich as a time of choice in 
British foreign policy, a time in which the obviously right 
decisions would have averted future troubles. Other writers 
in the time of the Phoney war, equally unhappy with the 
present, would see Munich as Price had, a symbol of the
Seton-Watson, From Munich to Danzig (3rd. revised 
ed.; London: Methuen, 1939), 277-Ü• The two previous edi­
tions of this work were Seton-Watson, Britain and the Dicta­
tors (London: Cambridge University Press, 1938)--which was
published just before the German occupation of Austria--and 
Seton-Watson, Munich and the Dictators, which is discussed 
in this chapter. The third edition includes all the mater­
ial from the second with only one footnote changed plus 
material bringing the narrative up to the summer of 1939» 
Presumably with more time Seton-Watson would have written 
the material on Munich differently, because the new mater­
ial in the third edition is much more sympathetic to the 
Government's actions. Seton-Watson, From Munich to Danzig,
180-278.
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misunderstandings in Anglo-German relations which led to 
an unnecessary and futile war.
CHAPTER IV
WAR TO DUNKIRK: SEPTEMBER 3,
1939-May 10, 19^0
The months from the declaration of war to the German 
attack in the West form a distinct period in British history, 
that of the "Phoney” or "Great Bore" War.^ Militarily, it 
is remembered as a time when, except for the unsuccessful 
British expedition to Norway, the British Army sat in the 
Gort Line trenches in France, and the Royal Air Force bombed 
Germany with propaganda leaflets» However, the period was 
more than simply an inactive phase in military operations. 
Rather, the modest scale of operations, by design, corres­
ponded to equally modest war aims» The Government, as well 
as could be determined, did not seek to defeat Germany tot­
ally, to reverse the Pan-German part of German expansion.
The phrase "Phoney War" was coined by the late Sena­
tor Borah of Idaho, and is the usual name for the period in 
Great Britain today. The phrase "Great Bore War" came from 
a contemporary British joke that Britain in the twentieth 
century had first had the Boer War, then the Great War, and 
now the Gireat Bore War. It seems to have been an equally 
popular title at the time. E. S. Turner, The Phoney War on 
the Home Front (London: Michael Joseph, 1961), 180; Evelyn




or to destroy the Nazi ideology. Instead, it expected limited
operations and an economic blockade to force Germany to nego-
2tiate a compromise peace. The impact of the Government's 
efforts gave a peculiar quality to life in Britain from 
September to May. The long predicted air attacks on British 
cities did not take place. There were no new Paschendaeles 
on the Western Front. But Poland, whose protection was the 
ostensible cause for Britain's going to weir, disappeared 
as a national state at the end of September, and the Govern­
ment's other war aims and its method of presenting them 
were not inspiring. Without the compensation of either 
aroused idealism or anger at destruction, the war-time domes­
tic policies, the population evacuations, the black-out, the 
gasoline and, eventually, food rationing, seem on the basis 
of social history, to have caused mixed feelings of relief,
3annoyance, and defeatism.
Munich during this period could be seen as one of
2The Chamberlain Government's precise war aims re­
main a subject of conjecture, for they were never stated. 
However, on the basis of subsequently published diaries and 
letters, the above seems an accurate statement. Felling, 
4l8, 424-27; Templewood, 405-06.
3Turner, l80-201. Demands for an immediate negotia­
ted peace with German became frequent after the defeat of 
Poland. Lloyd George made such a proposal in the House of 
Commons on October 3, 1939» The Prime Minister received a 
large correspondence on the subject. The topic was appar­
ently discussed so widely in private that Harold Nicolson 
wrote one book discussed in this chapter to combat such 
talk. Pari. Deb. CCCLI (1939), I87O-6 ; Felling, 424; 
Nicolson, Why Britain Is at War (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penquin Books Ltd., 1939), 126-41.
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a definite sequence of events, those leading up to war. His­
torians and other analysts now had the task of determining 
exactly what caused the war and what was Munich's relative 
importance as a cause. Six well-known writers took up these 
questions from September to May: their answers fell into
two categories. In the first category were E. H. Carr, Sir 
Nevile Henderson, and ¥. N. Medlicott, who wrote the first
lengthy apologia for the Government's foreign policy up to
Zj.the outbreak of the war. These writers favored the then 
limited war, and saw appropriately modest causes for it.
The second category of writing, represented in works by 
Robert Dell, A. B. Keith, and Harold Nicolson, exemplified 
the other main political trend of the period, the growing 
opposition to Chamberlain and his conduct of the war.^
Dell, Keith, and Nicolson's present dissatisfaction appar­
ently colored their examination of the war's origins, for 
they emphasized the responsibility of Chamberlain's pre-war
LEdward Hallett Carr, Britain: A Study of Foreign
Policy from, the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of the War 
(London: Longmans, 1939), and Carr, International Relations
since the Peace Treaties (2nd ed; London : Macmillan, 1940);
Sir Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission, Berlin 1937-1939 
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Smns. 1940); William Norton Medli-
cott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles (London: 
MethueinJ 1940) , and Medlicott, The Origins of the Second 
Great War (London: Bell and Sons for the Historical Asso­
ciation, 1940).
^Robert Dell, The Geneva Racket, 1920-1939 (London: 
Robert Hale, 194l); Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Causes of 
the War (London: Nelson, 1940); Nicolson, Why Britain is
at War, and Nicolson, "The Diplomatic Background," The Back­
ground and Issues of the War, H. A. L. Fisher (ed.) (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1940).
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policies for what they considered the unsatisfactory present 
conditions. Both groups of writers treated Munich as a 
turning point in the inter-war period. The conclusions of 
both showed the influence of the muted billigerency of the 
war effort and the unique tempo of contemporary British life.
The Apologists for Munich: Carr,
Henderson, and Medlicott
Except for a common apologetic tone, Carr and Medli­
cott 's studies do not at first glance seem to have much in 
common with Henderson's work. Carr and Medlicott, from the 
respective viewpoints of the Foreign Office and academic 
life, examined what was now a separate segment of British 
history--the years, 1919-39--in order to trace Germany and 
the West's drift into war. Henderson, a very social diplo­
mat who equated foreign affairs with personal relationships, 
depicted the war's coming in relation to the failure of his 
1937-39 Berlin embassy. However, the three writers' con­
tinued support of Munich separated their work from the re­
newed criticism of the Agreement. More important the anal­
ysis of all three was affected by one common reaction to 
the Phoney War. At a time when there were no air raids in 
Britain and the casualties from traffic accidents at home 
exceeded those from war in France, none of them wrote with 
any great resentment towards Germany. During a limited war 
which was expected to end with a negotiated settlement, they 
all three ascribed Munich and the war to the irrational.
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irrelevant, but not irreversible actions and attitudes of 
both Britain and Germany. Their conclusions were in effect 
a 'revision' of exclusive German war guilt in the first 
months of conflict.^
Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott's discussion of the 
background to the Czech crisis reflected, or perhaps ex­
plained, the prevailing official attitude towards Anglo- 
German relations. Carr believed that Britain did not need 
to stop completely German revision of Versailles after 1933» 
She was not, he claimed primarily a European trading power, 
and her one continental strategic interest--the requirement 
since the advent of air power that France's eastern frontier
7remain defensible--only involved Germany by implication.
More important for policy purposes, all three insisted, 
Britain lacked the power to arrest German expansion. Hen­
derson was convinced that Pan-German unification was inexor­
able. Britain would exhaust herself by fruitlessly trying
to stop complete German reunion simply because it represented
ga "hypothetical danger" and a different ideology. Carr and 
Medlicott were more blunt. Britain was declining. Her re­
sources were fewer, and the Italian and Japanese threats
^Medlicott at least seemed to be aware of the aptness 
of this description. He introduced his topic with a revi­
sionary view of the origins of World War I which closely re­
sembled his interpretation of the causes of World War II. 





prevented her from committing all available resources in
9Europe. Nevertheless, all agreed, limited interests and 
limited means could not permit isolation from Europe.
Germany, Carr pointed out, was in an ugly mood because of 
the injustices of Versailles. The passive British following 
of former French harrassment made Britain partly the object 
of Germany's a n g e r . U n d e r  such circumstances the task of 
British diplomacy was to placate Germany. With friendly 
relations German expansion could be kept orderly and well 
within the elastic requirements of Britain's continental 
interests. The British Government, they were sure, saw in 
a satisfactory settlement of the Czech question an opportunity 
for a necessary Anglo-German detente.
The Government's Czech policy, they agreed, failed 
to bring an improvement on Anglo-German relations. Indeed, 
partly as a result of what soon became a Czech crisis, Bri­
tain and Germany were at war by the fall of 1939» In ex­
plaining why this happened, Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott 
all emphasized the influence of irrational human attitudes 
and of accidents. To Carr, British public and parliamentary 
opinion hampered the consistent application of a Czech policy 
in the national interest, and then brought war by misinterpreting
^Carr, Britain, 26, $8 , 133> Medlicott, British 
Foreign Policy,1-2, 218-19.
^^Carr, Britain, 15 9.
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the Government's eventual limited success as a disastrous
f a i l u r e . M e d l i c o t t ' s  conclusions somewhat resembled those
of Carr. The British Government and public, Medlicott wrote,
equated certain kinds of behavior with threats to Britain.
For quite different reasons than aggressive intent towards
Britain, Hitler's actions in the Czech Crisis conformed
perfectly to the British idea of how a menace to Britain
should behave, and determined that Britain should resist 
12him. Henderson saw the immediate pre-war years as a Greek 
tragedy with Hitler, despite questions in Henderson's own 
mind, as the fatally flawed hero. Hitler's admiration for 
England struggled with his resentment for her. His original 
selfless desire to serve Germany struggled with his increas­
ing megalomania, and his upright advisers struggled with
sycophants and extremists. In this conflict, Henderson
13felt, chance brought the triumph of evil and war. Carr
and Medlicott agreed with Henderson that one particular
accident, the crisis that followed a false rumor of a German
mobilization in May, 1938, played a large part in influencing
the outcome of the Czech crisis and, consequently, was in
l4some measure responsible for the war.
^^Ibid., 172-3.
12Medlicott, British Foreign Policy, 222. 
^^Henderson, ix, 22, 56, 279.
^^Carr, Britain, I7O; Henderson, 136-47; Medlicott, 
Origins, 12.
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Carr--Morality and the national interest, Carr 
believed, clearly indicated the correct 1938 policy for 
B r i t a i n . T h e  nation required peace, and "in interna­
tional politics you cannot keep the status quo and keep the 
p e a c e . C o n s e q u e n t l y  in the Czech question, the British 
Government had to obtain wide concessions for Germany by
satisfying the 3>250,000 Germans cut off from the Reich in 
17Czechoslovakia. However, Chamberlain lacked the bi­
partisan support necessary for quick implementation of such 
a policy. His opponents showed no awareness of the weak­
nesses dictating the British course of action. Instead, in
a highly emotional atmosphere, the product of a "legacy
l8of excitability" from the Great War, the opposition
Edward Hallett Carr, ed. Merchant Taylors', Trinity 
Cambridge; Foreign Office, I916-36. After leaving the For­
eign Office, Carr went into academic life, where he has re­
mained. His publications to this time included a study of 
Alexander Herzen's life in exile, a biography of Michael 
Bakunin, and a 1937 history of international relations;
Carr's best known work to this time, one completed just 
before the war, was Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London: 
Macmillan, 1939)> an introduction to the study of inter­
national relations. Carr had not yet fully developed his 
later reputation for uncritical admiration of the Soviet 
Union. Instead, his work which expresses great annoyance 
at the harrassment of diplomats in a democracy, reflects 
Carr's twenty years in the Foreign Office rather than his 
then recent translation into academic life. Carr's Foreign 
Office background and the admiring introduction by Lord 
Halifax make his Britain a semi-official account of inter­
war foreign policy.
^^Carr, Britain, 100.
'̂̂ Ibid., 174-75. l^Ibid., 19.
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demanded that Britain play the role of world policeman and 
resist Germany. The emotionalism at home, he was convinced, 
created Chamberlain's problem with Germany over Czechoslo­
vakia. In May, after unfounded rumours of a German mobiliza­
tion against Czechoslovakia, the British Government repeated 
to Hitler the March 24, 1938 formula of British involvement. 
Then, as Hitler did not invade Czechoslovakia, the British 
press noisily connected the absence of German invasion and 
the British warning. They claimed that Britain had made 
Hitler retreat. With his prestige threatened. Hitler deter­
mined on May 28 to settle the Czech question by force. From 
this point, the situation deteriorated. Britain tried to 
get both Germany and Czechoslovakia to accept a large meas­
ure of autonomy for the Sudeten Germans, but, when it became 
apparent in September that only a Czech cession of the Sude­
tenland could save peace, Chamberlain at Munich accepted the 
partition of Czechoslovakia.
Munich, Carr believed, was a settlement in Britain's 
national interest. The Prime Minister, rightly, he felt, 
wanted a peaceful solution. He obtained one though "people
were shocked afterwards that a peaceful solution where some
19other power is first means pleasing the stronger." The
territorial grant to Germany was one "no serious British
20statesman would have threatened war to prevent." Moreover,
^^Ibid., 172. ^°Ibid., 1?4.
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at the time of Munich no British strategic interest was 
threatened. Yet, paradoxically, Carr believed, Munich did 
cause the war. Attitudes were created in Britain and Ger­
many about it which made war inevitable :
The Munich Agreement was not only the high 
water mark of...conciliation, but its death 
blow. Germany could hardly fail to perceive 
that substantial concessions had been made only 
when Germany had become strong enough to 
threaten.... British public opinion, once the 
first relief was over, reacted in the inevit­
able way by seeing in...Munich...both a defeat 
and a threat. A general demand arose for re­
armament on a scale which would discourage 
any repetition of the threat. British rearma­
ment was treated by Herr Hitler as a provoca­
tion; and recriminations soon began in the press 
and on political platforms. In the first weeks 
of 193/5 there seemed some relaxation in the 
tension. But any prospect of renewed under­
standing between Britain and Germany vanished 
with the disruption of Czechoslovakia and the 
incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia in March, 
1939» From this moment preparations went for­
ward on both sides for the war which broke out 
almost exactly six months later.
Medlicott--Medlicott's conclusions about Munich
22somewhat resembled Carr's. Like Carr, Medlicott des­
cribed the drift into war not as a gradual revelation of 
conflicting interests but as a creation of conflict in a 
series of emotional experiences. In this progression, 
Medlicott emphasized two of the same episodes as Carr--
^^Ibid., 172-3-
22William Norton Medlicott, now Stevenson Professor 
of International History at London University, had at this 
time only published his study of the Congress of Berlin.
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the May crisis of 1938 and the Munich Agreement itself. Both 
episodes created attitudes which were irrational in that 
they had little relation to either nation's interest or to 
the events' actual meaning. Nevertheless, the attitude's 
cumulative effect was to bring an Anglo-German war. However, 
Medlicott did not share Carr's Foreign Office background. 
Consequently, the tolerance Carr reserved for Germany, Med­
licott extended to both the Germans and the British public.
In the inter-war period, Medlicott believed. Hitler's 
ambitions were difficult to determine, especially for the 
British people. Hitler had a German's mania for theories
about foreign affairs, and his theorizing supplied a "pro-
2 3fusion of ambitions--many of them mutually exclusive."
2 kFrom Hitler's "moonshine" as Medlicott called it, two not 
entirely compatible goals emerged. Hitler wanted all Germans 
united in one state plus some further enlargement of Germany 
at Russia's expense. Another more important aim of Hitler 
expressed the morbid psychology of inter-war Germany. He 
wished for "some half-mystical, ill-defined, stroke of poli­
tics which could produce tremendous glory for Germany and 
25her Führer." Possibly, Hitler's aims would finally become 
Napoleonic. No one really knew; "perhaps," Medlicott




wrote, ’’not even Hitler h i m s e l f . W h a t e v e r  Hitler's ulti­
mate ambition, Medlicott was sure that throughout the years 
before the war, he wanted an alliance with Britain. Such 
an understanding would have required British acceptance of 
German expansion in Central Europe. The British attitude 
towards this remained confused until after Munich. Britain 
had no real tradition of resisting Germany and she recog­
nized that the Germans had legitimate grievances over Ver­
sailles. On the other hand. Hitler had the same diplomatic 
heavy-handedness which had made William II so misleadingly 
sinister in Britain. The British people feared that satis­
fying Hitler's immediate demands would simple create others, 
Also between the wars vague feelings of responsibility for 
the succession states of Central and Eastern Europe rein­
forced the long tradition of sympathy for small nations.
The British always identified aggression towards small
27countries as ultimately aimed at Britain.
In contrast to the public's confusion about Germany 
in 1938, the Government, Medlicott thought, clearly wanted 
to satisfy Germany on the Czech question and link a Czech 
settlement to a general Anglo-German detente. However, any 
British hope for improving relations could not survive the 
May crisis. Then the tone of the foreign press gave Hitler
^^Medlicott, British Foreign Policy, I65.
^^Ibid., 222-23.
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28the "brainstorm" of using force against Czechoslovakia.
The humiliation of his opponents became more important than 
the practical gains in territory and population he could 
achieve by more peaceful means. Unfortunately, as a result 
of the May crisis and, slightly later, of the Runciman mis­
sion, Britain appeared more and more as Germany's primary 
opponent in the eyes of the world. Through August Germany 
made extensive and conspicuous military preparations. The 
British Government, correctly Medlicott felt, realized that 
war or capitulation had become Britain's alternatives. In 
some circumstances, the Government decided, Britain would 
go to war over Czechoslovakia. Such a possibility, Medlicott 
was sure, did not affect Hitler. In his September 12, 1938
speech at Nuremberg, Hitler showed that he again wanted the
29"half mystical, ill-defined...glory" for Germany and him­
self at the expense of others' prestige--in this case Bri­
tain's. Britain now had to choose war or humiliation. Over 
Czechoslovakia she chose loss of face. After September 12, 
at Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich, Hitler underlined
his success with typically teutonic humorlessness and heavy- 
30handedness.
The events culminating in Munich, Medlicott believed, 
created the attitudes that led to war. Chamberlain initially
28Medlicott, Origins, 12.
2̂ Ibid. , 23.
^^Medlicott, British Foreign Policy, 227-52.
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tried to put a good face on the Munich transaction. However, 
British public opinion, despite the impression of timidity 
given by the post-Munich rejoicing, had decided that Nazi 
Germany challenged British courage and standards of inter­
national conduct. The public now decided to resist Germany.
As a measure of Anglo-German mutual incomprehension, Medli­
cott pointed out. Hitler misinterpreted British actions immed­
iately after Munich as evidence of limitless tolerance for 
his behavior. He still wanted an Anglo-German alliance, and 
after March 15, 1939 "was genuinely bewildered at the ten­
dency of the British public to discover in his Central Euro-
31pean policy a German threat to Great Britain." Indeed, 
his actions, Medlicott believed, were not a menace, but 
merely gave the appearance of one in Britain. Actually, 
Hitler's decision for a triumph by a show of force in the 
Munich Crisis had been emotional and unreflective. He had 
aimed at damaging Britain only to the extent that the German 
glory would be at the expense of British prestige. His 
enunciation of the policy of Lebensraum at the time of the 
occupation of Prague was, Medlicott thought, equally inno- 
cuous--it was simply a German's insistence on theorizing 
about any step in foreign policy. Hitler considered his 
demands on Poland moderate. In August, 1939 he would have 
happily allied himself with Britain at the same time he made
^^Ibid., 222.
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a settlement with Russia. British democracy could not change 
policies so quickly. Therefore, Britain went to war with 
Germany. The ostensible cause was Poland. The real cause 
was German mismanagement of power policy at the time of 
Munich.
Henderson--The lack of animosity towards Germany 
which made possible Medlicott's portrait of Hitler was char­
acteristic of the Phoney War period. Such physical and emo­
tional remoteness from the war ended with Dunkirk, and it 
was not until I96I that another British historian, A. J. P,
Taylor, described Hitler and Munich with assumptions similar 
3 3to Medlicott's. However, even during this earlier time 
one analyst, Sir Nevile Henderson, was already somewhat con­
fused in his interpretation of the events of Munich, which
34proposed modest causes for a modest war. A supporter of
^^Ibid., 302.
^^Taylor, Origins, 151-86,
Henderson (1882-1942), G. C . M. G., P. C., was edu­
cated at Eton, and was with the Foreign Service from I905 to 
1939. His avidity for cultivating leaders in the countries 
to vMch he was posted earned him the sobriquet, "the un­
crowned king of Yugoslovia," when he was at Belgrade; a 
similar enthusiasm during his 1937-9 Berlin embassy ended 
his career after September, 1939, three years short of re­
tirement and despite his own request for further assignment. 
Consequently, his work was mainly a defense of his embassy. 
His efforts were not entirely successful. Henderson's book 
was criticized at the time (see Keith, ix, 503), and after 
the British documents appeared and historians realized the 
extent of his influence on British diplomatic tactics (see 
footnote 37 for one example), Henderson received even heav­
ier criticism. Sir Lewis Namier described him as "conceited, 
vain, self-opinionated.... obtuse enough to be a menace and
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appeasement and of Chamberlain's war policies, Henderson 
generally saw the immediate pre-war years as a Greek tragedy 
in which accidents, or more accurately fate, brought war.
At the same time he wondered in retrospect about the valid­
ity of his tragic theme. War, however limited, had come.
With it had also come failure in his embassy, abrupt ter­
mination of his career, and criticism of his actions while 
in Berlin. Thus, he wondered if Hitler had not planned all
along to turn on Britain and if, on Hitler's part, "the
35tragedy was not accidental but calculated."  ̂ Henderson's 
ambivalence about his central theme strongly affected his 
description of Munich and the origins of the war.
The Czech question, Henderson believed, had offered 
the Government a chance to disprove the German complaint 
that Britain always opposed German expansion. In this in­
stance morality was on the German side, and Britain could 
demonstrate her sympathy with the legitimate German aspirations
not stupid enough to be innocuous." However, more recently, 
A. J. P. Taylor, whose conclusions resembled Henderson's as 
well as Medlicott's, has assessed Henderson's embassy some­
what differently, complimenting Failure of a Mission, Taylor 
accepted the validity of two of the points he believed in­
fluenced Henderson's views: the moral strength of Germany's
case over Czechoslovakia and the problem of Britain's de­
clining power. Sir Lewis Namier, In the Nazi Era (London: 
Macmillan, 1952), 162; and Taylor, 158, 200, 2Ü2. Other 
discussions of Henderson are Felix Gilbert, "Two British 
Ambassadors: Perth and Henderson," The Diplomats, 1919-1939,
Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (ed.) (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 195 3), 537-554; Sir Orme Sargent, Diction­
ary of National Biography; D. C. Watt, "Sir Nevile Henderson 
Reappraised," Contemporary Review CCI (March, 1962), 151-54.
^^Henderson, 110.
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The German reaction to his demarche in early May indicated, 
he felt, recognition and appreciation of active British 
help. The May crisis changed everything. This chance 
event following erroneous reports of a German mobilization 
created the attitudes which led to Munich. First, an acci­
dent made Ribbentrop a bitter enemy of England. A British 
newspaper reported, incorrectly Henderson pointed out, that 
Henderson had questioned the Army about the rumoured mobili­
zation rather than the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von 
Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop's vanity was wounded, and he abused 
Henderson in an interview on May 21, 1938. As a result of 
his behavior, Ribbentrop temporarily lost influence with Hit­
ler. The double blow made him seek revenge on Britain in 
September by telling Hitler that the British would never 
fight. The May crisis had an even worse effect on Hitler.
The British press jeering at his supposed retreat infuriated 
him. Feeling his prestige threatened. Hitler decided to 
settle the Czech question by force. Unhappily, Henderson 
noted, the Czechs, who had been honestly misled by routine 
German troop movements, now faced an impatient Germany with 
a stubbornness caused by false confidence. This combination 
of a newspaper's mistake angering Ribbentrop and the paradox 
of false charges of aggression creating an aggressive intent 
would seem to fit Henderson's theme of tragedy. However, 
the theme was flawed. Looking back, Henderson also wondered 
if the May crisis were not "an excuse for Hitler to come
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down on the side of his extremists and approve a solution 
by force.
In the perspective of subsequent events, Henderson 
doubted that any Czech concessions would have stopped Hitler 
from taking his revenge on Benes after May. At the same time 
Henderson confusedly suggested that Britain should have immed­
iately declcired herself in favor of autonomy in May. This 
would have convinced the Germans of forthcoming definitive 
action. In any case, by August, he recalled, the German Army 
was obviously preparing for war. Hitler was looking for an 
excuse for using force. It was Henderson's job to keep Hit­
ler from having either the mood or the pretext to attack 
the Czechs. Therefore, he followed Hitler and his entourage 
to the Nazi Party Congress at Nuremberg. Apparently aware 
of the criticism of his actions there, Henderson wrote that 
at Nuremberg he emphasized to the various Nazi cliques the 
British intention to resist aggression. He did not warn 
Hitler personally because "the effect would have been to
drive him off the deep end and...made... immediate aggres-
37sion against Czechoslovakia unavoidable," Henderson's
3^Ibid., 143.
^^Ibid., l4g. On September 9, 1938, Lord Halifax 
instructed Henderson to warn Hitler personally that if Ger­
many attacked Czechoslovakia and France then fulfilled her 
obligations to the Czechs, Britain would go to war as well. 
From Nuremberg, Henderson wrote Halifax back advising against 
this course. Halifax accepted Henderson's advice. Duff 
Cooper, as First Lord of the Admiralty, saw this particular 
correspondence. A note in Cooper's diary at the time showed
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approach, he felt, was partially justified by Hitler's Nurem­
berg speech of September 12. Despite his truculent tone. 
Hitler only demanded Sudeten self-determination. Neverthe­
less, this was enough for the Sudetenlanders. Acting inde­
pendently, Henderson seemed to think, they began rioting.
The Czechs replied by declaring martial law.
The Prime Minister at this point, Henderson went 
on, set in motion a plan for meeting Hitler personally.
After the British rejection of the demands Hitler made at 
Godesberg, Sir Horace Wilson warned Hitler on September 27, 
seemingly without effect, of Britain's intentions if war 
came, and war indeed seemed imminent. Then a chance event, 
Henderson thought, helped save peace. Hitler saw the gloom 
with which Berliners watched a mechanized division pass up 
the Wilhelmstrasse, and he hesitated. The next day, Septem­
ber 28, Goring's energetic support of the fresh Anglo-French 
proposals, an action which, Henderson noted, tragically pre­
cluded him from favoring peace again, and Mussolini's call
that he was furious with Henderson for his action; and Cooper, 
without mentioning Henderson's name, spoke of the failure to 
warn Hitler at Nuremberg in Parliament on October 3, 1938- 
Reactions like Cooper's from others are probably the reason 
Henderson made such a point of defending his actions. When 
the record of his action was published with the British docu­
ments, Namier wrote that because Henderson "helped to baulk 
whatever feeble attempts were made to stand up to Hitler," 
he was "one of the chief artificers of Munich." Halifax to 
Kirkpatrick (Berlin), September 9, 1938, D. B. F. P ., 277-78; 
Henderson to Halifax, September 10, 1938,"ibid. , ^3-4;
Halifax to Henderson, September 10, 1938, Ibid., 285; Cooper, 
Old. Men Forget (New York: E. P. Dutton, 195^) , 226; Pari.
Deb., CCCXXXIX (1937-38), 34; Namier, I62.
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for a Four Power meeting appealed to Hitler's hesitant mood.
Q QHe invited Chamberlain to yet a third meeting at Munich.
Henderson, unlike Carr and Medlicott, did not believe 
that war became inevitable after Munich. Rather, Munich 
marked the limit of British acquiescence in German terri­
torial expansion. After Munich, Hitler was more than ever 
of two minds about England. He was grateful to Chamberlain 
for having saved him from a general war. On the other hand, 
his admiration was mixed with resentment for England as an 
obstacle to him. His own impulses and his extremist ad­
visers had told him that he could have had a short war with 
the Czechs without outside interference. He also disliked 
sharing the favorable attention of the German people with 
Chamberlain. In this mood, chance again intervened to make 
him alienate Britain by occupying Prague. Henderson thought 
this might never have happened if the Czechs had not acted 
so clumsily or if the British Government mission for arrang­
ing economic cooperation had come to Berlin earlier. Yet, 
Henderson also wondered if Hitler's basic dishonesty, which 
the British had glimpsed at Godesberg, and the need of main­
taining his tenuous position by even grander coups had not 
made other triumphs by force inevitable. In either event, 
the occupation of Prague destroyed the Munich Agreement and 
broke faith with Chamberlain. Britain now resisted Hitler 
by guaranteeing Poland. Even after the Polish guarantee.
^^Henderson, 148-75.
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chance still played a part in bringing war. Although Hitler 
was set on war, Henderson believed that it still might have 
been averted if the Germans had understood that Britain in­
tended to fight for Poland, if the Poles had been less stub­
born, if Ciano had visited Berlin earlier before the exchange 
of bitter notes with Warsaw in August, or if Ribbentrop's 
influence had not been so great during the last days before 
the conflict.
Henderson, Carr, and Medlicott's writings were a 
distinctive, though not entirely original, contribution to
kothe historiography of Munich. They offered mainly a 
different interpretation of Hitler's actions than did critics 
of Munich. Medlicott emphasized an emotional rather than 
political pattern in Hitler's acts. Hitler's behavior in 
the Czech crisis, Medlicott believed, was not a stage in a 
plan for conquering Czechoslovakia and ultimately Britain. 
Instead, it expressed an emotional need for an exhiliarating 
but politically pointless triumph. To support his assump­
tion, Medlicott pointed out that all Hitler's actions, his 
heavy-handedness, his neurotic yearning for prestige, and
39lbid., 176-301. 
koJ. A. Spender and Lord Elton, in the period between 
Munich and Prague, protested against any connection of Hit­
ler's actions towards Czechoslovakia and his attitudes to­
wards Britain. Czechoslovakia, they insisted, was an arti­
ficial state, and no had no right to the seime usages as 
established nations. Equally, between Prague and the de­
claration of war, Ward Price emphasized the disastrous effect 
of the May crisis on Hitler. Spender, "Munich and After," 
521-22, and Spender, "British Policy Now," 839; Lord Elton, 
686-92; Price, 223.
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his mania for such principles as Lebensraum were typically 
German and, the context of German culture, relatively harm­
less. Similarly, he suggested, the equation of Hitler's 
actions in Czechoslovakia with his disposition towards Bri­
tain voiced a subjective attitude of British culture. Hit­
ler, he wrote, by no means made the same identification. 
Henderson, though with reservations, also explained Hitler's 
behavior differently than critics. It was, he insisted, the 
result of chance. Henderson contended that Hitler had no 
plan for conquest before the May Crisis; and then only an 
accident had caused Hitler to behave as he did in the Munich 
crisis in September. The apologists' descriptions owed part 
of their distinctiveness to the relative detachment about 
Germany, which was possible during the Phoney War. Perhaps 
more important, their distinct emphasis on misunderstanding 
and chance complemented exactly the contemporary hope for a 
negotiated settlement of a limited war.
This connection between the writers' conclusions and 
the politics of the time of their writing raises a question 
of determinism. Certainly, the three men believed, Britain 
could not afford to fight the all-out war which would prob­
ably seem necessary if one believed strongly in German war 
guilt. Their conclusions about Hitler were only slightly
based on substantial evidence; even Henderson had very little
4lcontact with Hitler personally. The three writers'
4l"Except for a few brie^f words at chance meetings," 
Henderson wrote," I never met ^Hitler7 except upon official 
and invariably disagreeable business." Henderson,
10 k
contention about the May crisis was equally unverifiable at
the time. Henderson was in the best position to know that
the reports of a German mobilization were false, but even
k2the Prime Minister had not believed him at the time. Also, 
their connection of the May crisis and Hitler's attitude in 
September rested only on a later statement of the German dic­
tator. Hitler on this occasion seems to have been telling
k'ithe truth, but he was a dubious source. The subsequent 
treatment of their work suggests that their interpretations 
were the product of the Phoney War mood in Britain. The
k kthree writers themselves later described Munich differently. 
Historians for years ignored Carr and Medlicott's works even 
before document publications made them obsolete. Henderson's
46work remained essential reading as a primary source, but
42 nIbid., 137-0. The correctness of Henderson's con­
clusions was proven with the appearance of the German foreign 
policy documents after the war (See Namier, 155)* However, 
in a letter of May 28, 1938, Chamber]^ain wrote, "I have no 
doubt...that the German government /.sic7 made all preparations 
for a coup...^and7 that...they decided after getting our warn­
ings that the risk was too great," Feiling, 354.
^^Hitler, 1530-32.
44Carr, International Relations between the Two World 
Wars, I919-I939 (London: Macmillan, 194?), 267-73 ! Henderson 
Water under the Bridges (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1945),
211-24; Medlicott, "The Coming of the War in 1939," From 
Metternich to Hitler, Aspects of British Foreign Policy, l8l4- 
1939, Medlicott (ed.) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul for
the Historical Association, I963), 231-56.
45Neither of Carr's works written in the Phoney War period have ever appeared in bibliographies on Munich. Med­
licott 's work also went unnoticed by historians until listed 
in Taylor's bibliography in 1961. Taylor, 283.
46Of the seven men usually assumed to be most closely 
associated with the planning and implementation of appeasement.
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was also the basis for harsh criticism of Henderson person­
ally. Indeed, after Dunkirk and until A. J. P. Taylor's 
work in 196I, no British historian described Hitler as 
Medlicott had--as a figure of low comedy--or gave as large 
a part to chance in the Munich Crisis as did Henderson. 
Although one cannot say that after Dunkirk no British 
historian could possibly have regarded Hitler and the ori­
gins of the war as Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott did, it is 
significant that for twenty-one years no British historian 
agreed with them.
The Critics of Munich: Dell,
Keith, and Nicolson
Dell, Keith, and Nicolson's conclusions about Hitler,
Munich, and the war's origins contrasted sharply with those
of Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott, They interpreted the back-
k ?ground of the Czech crisis differently. They also detected
Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
Geoffrey Dawson, Sir Horace Wilson,and Henderson, only Hoare 
(afterwards Viscount Templewood) and Henderson wrote memoirs 
of any value for writers on Munich (see Templewood, 285-326). 
Lord Halifax and Simon (afterwards Lord Simon) did write 
memoirs; "^their7 efforts," Taylor wrote correctly, "are best 
passed over in silence." Earl Halifax, Fulness of Days (Lon­
don: Collins, 1957)5 184-211; Lord Simon^ Retrospect (London:
Hutchinson, 1952), 238-54; Taylor, 282.
4?Dell, the former Manchester Guardian correspondent 
in Geneva, had written several books on German, French, and 
British politics. Keith, a professor of Constitutional Law 
at Edinburgh, was the author of numerous works on the British 
constitution and the British Empire. Nicolson, the son of 
a Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, was him­
self in the Foreign Service for ten years; he was at this 
time a Member of Parliament. In 1939 he was best known for a 
biography of his father, Lord Carnock, and a work on the 
evolution of diplomacy.
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a different relationship between the various episodes of 
the Czech crisis. Whereas Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott 
believed that Munich created irrational forces in both 
Britain and Germany which caused the war, the critics saw 
Munich creating an irrevocable impression of British cow­
ardice in Germany. This and the impression of British bad 
faith in Russia made war inevitable on terms unfavorable 
to Britain.
Dell, Keith, and Nicolson believed that by 1938
Germany had a determination to conquer Czechoslovakia and
all of Europe. This opinion rested on different conclusions
about Hitler's writings, the character of the German people,
and the meaning of Hitler's actions up to 1938. Mein Kampf,
48which Medlicott dismissed as mostly "moonshine," showed
Nicolson that Hitler was an 'almost demented fanatic" whose
limitless ambitions included the conquest of Britain and 
49France. While to Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott Versailles 
only temporeirily soured the German character, the critics 
felt that the Germans had always been brutal and aggressive. 
Also, Hitler's actions from 1933 to 1938, they were sure, 
did not fit Medlicott's picture of spasmodic and otherwise
48Medlicott, British Foreign Policy, l6l.
49Nicolson, Why Britain Is at War, 106, 31-44. 
^*^Dell, 196; Keith, 47-192; Nicolson, "Diplomatic
Background," 96-102.
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meaningless expressions of a craving for prestige. Rather, 
Hitler's behavior demonstrated his limitless greed and deceit. 
In view of such circumstances, the British national interest 
and, Dell and Keith added, Britain's obligations under the 
League Covenant demanded the defense of the Czech democratic 
and strategic fortress. Dell, Keith, and Nicolson did not 
concede any inadequacy of British resources for the necessary 
resistance to Germany. Presumably if they felt that such a 
problem existed, and there is no evidence that they did, 
they believed that the impossibility of accomodating Germany 
made it irrelevant. Possibly as a result of their sureness 
of Russian cooperation with the West, they assumed that the 
anti-German forces were stronger than Germany, and that the 
Germans knew it.^^ Thus, whereas Carr, Henderson, and Medli­
cott considered resistance in 1938 as unnecessary and impos­
sible, the critics deemed it both imperative and tenable.
Dell, Keith, and Nicolson's conception of Hitler and 
their conviction of German weakness made them see quite dif­
ferent relationships between the various events culminating 
in Munich than did Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott. They re­
jected the letter's belief that initial British sympathy 
with Germany gave hope of a peaceful settlement of the Czech 
question. Instead, they contended that Chamberlain's May 
10th hint that the West would not fight for the Czechs en­
couraged Hitler to try seizing Czechoslovakia at the end of
^^Dell, 273; Keith, xii; Nicolson, Why Britain Is at 
War, 88, ll8.
108
May. Then only the promptness of the Czech mobilization
52checked Hitler temporarily. In contrast, Carr, Henderson, 
and Medlicott thought, the press jeering at his supposed 
retreat in the May Crisis drove Hitler to settle the Czech 
question by force. Nicolson argued that Hitler only started 
the Munich crisis after the September 7th Times leader con­
vinced him that he could take Czechoslovakia without a gen- 
5 3eral war. Dell was sure that Hitler only began the Munich
crisis after he and Chamberlain had planned it together.
Chamberlain then scared the British people into accepting
the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Keith and Nicolson
agreed that Hitler skillfully bluffed Chamberlain at Munich,
and beguiled him with lies about self-determination and the
5 5end of German demands in Europe. None of the critics ac­
cepted Medlicott's contention that British prestige and in­
terests were only accidentally and somewhat irrelevantly 
involved at Munich. Rather, they insisted, British honor 
and interests suffered a great defeat.
Dell, Keith, and Nicolson's disapproval of Munich 
was not retrospective and it was not original. All three 
had spoken out against the Agreement in 1938 and their views
^^Dell, 265-6 ; Keith, 3^7; Nicolson, Why Britain Is 
at War, 80.
^^Nicolson, Why Britain Is at War, 81.
^^Dell, 265-79.
^^Keith, 484; Nicolson, Why Britain Is at War, 95.
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had not changed a great deal.5^ Unlike Carr, Henderson, and 
Medlicott, the peculiar perspective of the Phoney War did 
not inspire them to original or striking contributions to 
the historiography of Munich. Keith's account drew almost 
entirely on the Seton-Watson and Werth books ; and as Keith 
did not contribute any equivalent special knowledge or com­
pilation of primary sources, his work is no longer much con-
K 7suited. Similarly, Dell's charges of British collusion 
with Hitler were much like Gedye's, though without primary 
source material comparable to Gedye's descriptions of
c Q
Czechoslovakia. Alone of the three, Nicolson's Why Britain
is at War is still listed in bibliographies in the 1960's.
Two parts of his work were a contribution to the primary
source material. His humorous comparison of Hitler with
59George Smith, the "brides in the bath" murderer, and his
Dell, letter to the editor, 523> a September 30,
1938 article of Keith's in The Scotsman is quoted in Keith, 
362-4; Nicolson, "After Munich," 513-24.
57Seton-Watson, Munich and the Dictators, 23-179;
Werth, France and Munich.
^®Gedye, 356-494.
59Nicolson, Why Britain Is at War, 7-30. Nicolson, 
who was a member of the Versailles committee which drew up 
Czechoslovakia's frontiers, recalled the factors which prompted 
the committee's decisions. Also, as an M.P. present at the 
time Nicolson described Chamberlain's September 28, 1938 
speech in the House of Commons. Nicolson's account contra­
dicted that of Seton-Watson, who was also present. Whereas 
Seton-Watson maintained that Chamberlain was obviously ex­
pecting an invitation from Hitler, and was purposely draw­
ing out his speech until it arrived,Nicolson was sure that 
the invitation to Munich was a complete surprise to Chamber- 
lain. Ibid., 76, 90-91; Seton-Watson, 98-99.
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portrayal of Chamberlain and Sir Horace Wilson inaugurating 
appeasement "with the bright faithfulness of two curates 
entering a pub for the first time" were also memorable. 
However, Nicolson's narrative too resembled Seton-Watson's 
closely, and did not provide any new interpretation to the 
development of the Crisis.
The significance of Dell, Keith, and Nicolson's 
work lay, rather, in their description of Munich's impact 
on subsequent events. They attributed to Chamberlain's 
Munich decision the responsibility for the war itself and 
what they considered Britain's unfavorable wartime position. 
Munich, Dell insisted, made war inevitable because it 
"served to increase Hitler's arrogance and impel him to 
make further d e m a n d s . A l s o ,  as a consequence of Munich, 
Hitler became convinced that Britain lacked the courage ever 
to oppose him: "the disastrous effect of /^Chamberlain's%
action," Keith wrote, "was to be seen in September ^19397 
when Herr Hitler, almost to the last moment could not be­
lieve that Mr. Chamberlain would keep to Poland a pledge 
which he had dishonoured for Czechoslovakia."^^ More 
important, all three agreed, war only became strategically 
possible for the Germans when they exploited the Russian




distrust of the West over Munich, and obtained the Nazi-Soviet
6 ̂Pact. According to Dell, though he admitted there was no
evidence as yet for the story, Ribbentrop in August, 1939
took to Moscow a phonograph record of Hitler and Chamberlain's
Berchtesgaden conversations with which to show the Russians
64how Chamberlain had plotted against them. Munich, Keith 
pointed out, also alienated America from sympathy with Bri­
tain's c a u s e . T h i s  lack of effective allies combined with 
the strengthening of Germany's western fortifications in the 
year between Munich and the war meant, they believed, that 
as a direct result of the Prime Minister's 1938 action,
Britain had to fight isolated and without hope of decisive 
victory on behalf of the Poles, whom Dell and Keith at 
least found militarily inefficient and politically distaste-
ful.GG
Dell, Keith, and Nicolson's depiction of Munich's 
influence betrayed their frustration with Britain's present 
situation. The main source of this frustration seems to have 
been a feeling, not so much that disasters were coming to 
Britain, but that the decisive victory, which their des­
cription of Germany suggested was necessary, was in fact
6 7impossible in the present stalemate. Exactly why they
^^Dell, 273; Keith, xii; Nicolson, Why Britain Is 
at War, 88, ll8.
^^Dell, 273. ^^Keith, 370.
G^Dell, 207; Keith, 387.
6 7None of the critics seemed concerned that Britain's 
position might worsen.
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decided on Munich as the source of their discontent is dif­
ficult to determine. The agreement was then nearly two 
years distant, and had been succeeded by other dramatic 
events. The writings of Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott, 
which saw no strategic effect by Munich on the present 
limited war, indicated that such conclusions as Dell,
Keith, and Nicolson's did not automatically present them­
selves to all analysts. Further, in the light of events 
since Munich, some of the 1938 arguments for bluffing Ger­
many were now challengeable. Henderson contended that the 
Germans would have defeated the Czechs as quickly as they 
did the P o l e s . T h e  Soviet Union's reliability and, after 
the Finish War, efficiency as an ally were at this time de-
69batable. However, to these questions and others with 
which the defenders of Munich did not deal, such as the pos­
sibility that the Western Powers would have mounted an 
offensive in 1938 or that the German generals would have 
deposed Hitler, Dell, Keith, and Nicolson apparently gave 
answers which pointed to disastrous results of a wrong 
British policy over Czechoslovakia. A possible explana­
tion for their doing so is that their present exasperation 
with Chamberlain and the state of the war predisposed them
^^Henderson, 1?0.
69Sir Charles Petrie, "Twenty Years of British 
Foreign Policy," Quarterly Review CCLXXIV (January 1940),
16.
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to emphasize the responsibility of his past acts for the
conditions of the present.
Whatever the reason for their conclusions, many
others agreed with them. Such thinking apparently had some
effect on British politics at the time, and its continuance
was to have enormous impact on the subsequent historiography
of Munich. In the May 7-9, 19^0 House of Commons debate,
several Members brought up Chamberlain's Munich decision
70as an argument for his resignation. On May 10, 19^0, 
Chamberlain, feeling that Munich, not the Norway campaign,
71was the reason for his fall, did resign as Prime Minister.
On the same day, the Phoney War ended with the German in­
vasion of Holland and Belgium. Before the end of May, the 
British Expeditionary Force was fleeing the continent from 
Dunkirk and other ports. Other writers regarded Dunkirk as
Dell, Keith, and Nicolson regarded earlier British defeats,
72They connected it with Munich. Their efforts and the new 
climate of opinion in Britain abruptly ended approaches to 
Munich like those of Medlicott and Henderson. Instead, 
Munich once more became a political issue.
^°Parl. Deb., CCCLX (1940), II78, II80, 1265, I28I- 
83, 1283, 1300-01, 1308, 1324.
7XMargot Asquith to Geoffrey Dawson, May 11, 1940, 
Evelyn Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson and our Times (London: 
Hutchinson, 1955), 4l5.
^^Cato, ^Michael Foot, Peter Howard, and Frank Owen7, 
Guilty Men (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1940), 51-73»
CHAPTER V
DUNKIRK TO THE GENERAL ELECTION:
1940-45
The Slimmer and Fall of 1940 
The German offensive of May 10, 1940 began an unprec­
edented series of disasters for Great Britain. Before the 
month of May was out, the British Expeditionary Force hurr­
iedly evacuated the Continent at Dunkirk and other ports, 
leaving behind almost all Britain's military stores and 
some 60,000 soldiers in German hands. Before the end of 
June, the French surrendered to Hitler. Nearly all of Europe 
up to the Russian frontier came under German domination. In 
the months that followed, Britons could actually watch the 
Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe battle for control of the 
skies over England. Then, without knowing that the R.A.F. 
had won and that the invasion of Britain would not come, the 
British people endured the bombing of British industrial and 
civilian targets which is remembered as the "Blitz." At the 
same time at sea the Royal Navy with the Merchant Marine 
fought for control of the shipping lanes to North America.
In these battles Britain fought alone, without real hope of
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victory over the coalition aligned against her. Britain 
did receive increased American aid in 19^0, but neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union chose to intervene 
militarily.
A number of internal political changes also took 
place at this time. On May 10, a genuine coalition govern­
ment was formed under Winston Churchill. Chamberlain re­
signed as Prime Minister the same day. Soon afterwards,
Sir John Simon resigned as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and Sir Samuel Hoare gave up his position as Secretary of 
State for Air. Only Lord Halifax, the fourth member of the 
1938 Foreign Policy Committee of the Cabinet, stayed on in 
his old job of Foreign Secretary; he too was to quit in 
December 19^0. Replacing these men and other National Gov­
ernment ministers were mainly former Tory Rebels, Labourites, 
and Liberals.
It has often seemed to later writers that the sum 
of these resignations and replacements meant the absolute 
end of the rule of Chamberlain and his "decayed serving 
m e n . C o n t e m p o r a r i e s ,  on the other hand, believed that 
only a few alterations had been made. Chamberlain, after 
all, remained in the Cabinet as Lord President of the 
Council until his final illness in late September 1940.
^Leo Amery in Gilbert and Gott, 350.
ll6
Simon a ls o  stayed  on as Lord C hancellor. Simon's r e p la c e ­
ment at the Exchequer was another Cham berlainite, S ir  
K ingsley  Wood. Although Hoare and H a lifa x  l e f t  the Cabinet, 
they went on to important ambassadorial p o s ts  in  Madrid 
and Washington. A ll  these  men remained in  o f f i c e  because  
the N ational Government supporters were s t i l l  the s tr o n g ­
e s t  party  in  the Commons. They had l o s t  s i x t y  v o te s  in  the  
May 9 d i v i s i o n  which p r e c ip i ta te d  Chamberlain's r e s ig n a t io n .  
They might r e lu c t a n t ly  g iv e  up Chamberlain in  exchange for  
a c o a l i t i o n ,  but they had no in te n t io n  o f  p ro scr ib in g  them­
s e l v e s .  This continued C onservative power in  Parliament 
convinced one shrewd, contemporary observer th a t  C hurch ill  
would be merely a fro n t man for continued Chamberlainite  
dominanc e . ^
The idea  o f  a Chamberlainite f a l l  i s  only one p a r t ly  
in c o r r e c t  element o f  the legend which has grown up about 
t h i s  p er io d . W riters have a lso  crea ted  the im pression th a t  
once Chamberlain l e f t  the Premiership the B r i t i s h  people  
immediately became brave and noble from the in s p ir a t io n  
o f  C h u r c h il l 's  sp eech es . They were f u l l  o f  tough Cockney 
hunour in  the face  o f  the B l i t z .  And they were in  i r r a ­
t i o n a l ly  high s p i r i t s  at the prospect o f  f ig h t in g  H it le r
2Thomas Jones to  V io le t  Markham, July 13, 19^0, 
Thomas Jones, 464-65. In t h i s  l e t t e r  Jones rep orts  h is  
agreement w ith remarks made to  him by David Lloyd George.
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alone. This is partially true; however, it is often for­
gotten that many Britons recognized the desperation of the 
nation's position and that men of all parties now turned in 
fury on those whom they felt were responsible for Britain's 
plight, the leaders of the 1931-40 National Government.
Lord Baldwin spent his last years in misery because of a 
stream of abusive letters and the destruction of property 
on his estate. Chamberlain received similar letters. In 
the press, in periodicals, and in books, angry writers 
criticized the National Government policies. They called 
upon Churchill and the nation to drive its surviving mem­
bers from office.
The critics mainly concentrated on Neville Chamber- 
lain who lived on until November 1940. They could choose 
any number of Chamberlain's actions to criticize, because 
in 1940 it seemed to many that all of Chamberlain's minis­
try had proven a disastrous failure- Chamberlain had 
repeatedly promised the British people invincible military 
power. In 1940 the British Army suffered an ignominious 
defeat, and the R.A.F. had not yet finally proven its
3quality. Chamberlain had tried appeasing Italy and Ire­
land- Italy now entered the war against Britain. The
Irish Government's refusal to modify its neutrality caused
&the death of many British seamen in the U-boat war.
^Cato, 11, 73'
l±Feiling, 309-11; Eden, 68-70; Churchill, 276-78.
il8
No one mentioned at this time the effect of Chamberlain's 
policies on Britain's relations with the U.S.S.R. But some 
hinted that the United States remained neutral because 
Chamberlain's policies had alienated the Americans.̂
Most of the anger centered on Chamberlain's Munich 
policy. More people of all parties were angry about Munich 
than ever before, and the final depth of many Briton's dis­
content with the Agreement came at this time. The accusing 
phrase, "Men of Munich," appeared and passed into general 
use.^ Chamberlain went to his grave haunted by memories
7of Munich, not Dunkirk. There were several reasons for 
this concentration of wrath. As the Germans bombed England 
a number of writers remembered with bitter irony the "fatuous 
complacency" of Chamberlain's promises of "peace with honour"
gand "peace in our time." "Such criminal nonsense," the
historian, D. W. Brogan wrote, now reminded him of "a bucket-
gshop circular boosting a salted gold mine." Too, British
. W, Brogan, "The Policy of Munich," Spectator, 
CLXV (October 4, 1940), ]40.
^The phrase "Men of Munich" was apparently first 
used in Morrell, 28l. This little known work by a Daily 
Express correspondent appeared in March 1939. The phrase 
appears nowhere else until the summer of 1940 when A. L. 
Rowse used it. It then passed into popular usage. A.
L. Rowse, "End of an Epoch," Political Quarterly, XI (July
1940), 260.
nMargot Asquith to Geoffrey Dawson, May 11, 1940, 





writers had been attributing the cause of grievances to 
Munich since shortly after the signing of the Agreement, 
and they continued to do so now. The hesitation of America 
to become a belligerent was seen as the result of Munich 
Writers also saw a connection between the recent debacle 
in France and Munich. Most of the German tanks in France, 
it was reported, were products of the Skoda Munitions Works 
which Germany had taken at Munich.
The sources of British anger over Munich also in­
cluded a belief in British choice at Munich. Appeasement, 
writers now contended, was Chamberlain's personal policy.
It was partly the product of the "extraordinary smugness
12and self-righteousness" of his Non-conformist background.
Too, he approached Hitler in the spirit of a Buchmanite or
Oxford Group follower, "who is guided to eschew cut-throat
competition and come to terms with his business rival what-
13ever his morals or methods." In doing this, Chamberlain 
ignored "his Foreign Secretary, his Under-Secretary and the 
corporate accumulated wisdom of the Foreign O f f i c e . H e
l°Ibid.
^^Cato, 143; Keith, 503. Keith's mention of the 
Skoda Works appeared in an appendix to his work written in 
July 1940.
12Rowse, 266. Another historian to emphasize the 
personal element in Chamberlain'sfbreign policy was a former 
supporter and now critic. Sir Charles Petrie, Twenty Years 
Armistice--and After: British Foreign Policy since Ver­
sailles (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1940), 179-ÔO, 217. 25O.
13Kingsley Martin, "Notes on the Anglo-Saxon Char­
acter," Political Quarterly XI (July 1940), 215.
14Rowse, 256.
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was too great a fool to see Hitler's duplicity. Instead, he
trusted Hitler and "sighed with satisfaction," when he forced
the "distasteful scheme" of Munich on the Czech rulers in
order to please the German d i c t a t o r . T h u s ,  he threw away
the Skoda works, the four Czech armored divisions, an Anglo-
Soviet alliance, and a chance to fight "the present war...
on a smaller scale...for the same cause of world freedom.
The Chamberlainite reaction to such charges was
equally emotional. In September 1940, after D. W. Brogan
commented on the Republican use of Munich against Roosevelt
in the American Presidential campaign, Stanley Reed, a
Conservative M» P., wrote the Spectator and demanded "an
17embargo on cheap sneers against the policy of Munich."
In November when a Spectator contributor wrote a respectful 
obituary of Chamberlain--one which claimed an honored place 
for the ex-Premier in British history and whose only criti­
cism was a comment that Chamberlain was "not... fortunate in 
l8speech" --a reader protested "nauseated disgust" at such
^^Cato, 55.
^^Ernest Woodhead, Letter to the Editor, Spectator, 
CLXV (September 27, 1940), 316. See also Cato, 134; Rowse, 
258; Robert M. Bradbury, Letter to the Editor, Spectator, 
CLXV (November 22, 1940), 52?.
^^Stanley Reed, "The Policy of Munich," Spectator, 
CLXV (September 20, 1940), 292.
18Wilson Harris, "Mr. Chamberlain," Spectator, CLXV 
(November 22, 1940), 257.
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19"vitriolic criticism of Mr. Chamberlain." The content 
of the Chamberlainite protests at this time was slight.
They justified Munich as a breathing space for British 
rearmament. They attributed the origins of the crisis 
to the foolish French policy of East European guarantees.
The Wartime Pamphlets 
After 1940, Britain's fortunes improved greatly.
In June 19^1, the Soviet Union was drawn into the war against 
Germany. In December of that year, the United States inter­
vened as well. The entry of these two powers into the anti- 
Nazi alliance seemed to assure ultimate triumph, and vic­
tory in Europe did finally come in May 1945. Shortly after­
wards, even before the surrender of Japan, Britain held her 
first General Election in ten years.
During the years from the formation of the Coalition 
Government to the General Election most of the traditional 
forms of British political activity stopped. Under the 
Coalition agreement there were to be no contested bye- 
elections; the party which had held a seat nominated a 
successor candidate who ran unopposed. Both Parliamentary 
debates and Question Time became less crucial. Collective 
Cabinet responsibility for all Coalition decisions, the in­
terests of security, and the public veneration for Churchill 
discouraged any meaningful discussion of current policies on
19J. Horatio Fraser, Letter to the Editor, Spectator, 
CLXV (November 22, 1940), 52?.
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party lines. However, partisan feelings did exist. Labour­
ites and Conservatives disagreed on such war questions as 
the opening of a second front in France and the ethics of 
strategic bombing in Germany. Labourites continued to re­
sent the presence of Chamberlainites in the Government; as 
late as January 19^2 a group of Labour M. P.'s demanded that
Churchill fire all Ministers who had voted for the Munich 
20Agreement. Probably most important, many Labourites be­
lieved that the Conservatives were exploiting the Coalition
~  21 for their own electoral benefit.
In the atmosphere of frustrated partisanship--and
with wartime affairs ruled out as a debate topic--first
Labourites and then Conservatives took to writing polemical
pamphlets on British foreign policy in the years before the
Coalition. The pamphlet writing began in the summer of
1940. Then three Labourites wrote the first and best known
of the pamphlets. Guilty Men in a vain attempt to have the
22Chamberlainites purged from the Coalition. Through the
years after 1940, Labourites continued to write about pre-
Coalition times. They increasingly did so looking for
2 3ammunition for a postwar general election. A number of
^Oparl. Deb., CCCLXXVII (1942), 6o4-5; Churchill, 
The Second World War, Vol II: Their Finest Hour (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 10.
21William John Brown, So Far (London: G. Allen and
Unwin, 1943), 243-55- 
2^Cato, 144.
2 3A partial bibliography of Labour pamphlets in­
cludes Cassius /Michael Foot7, The Trial of Mussolini
12 3
Conservative writers accepted the Labourites assumption that
24prewar foreign policy would one day be an election issue.
As the end of the European war drew closer, the pamphlet 
movement gained momentum. The largest volume of pamphlets, 
as distinct from local election addresses and party central 
office handouts, appeared in connection with the 1945 Gen­
eral Election itself. By this time normal political life 
had resumed. But apparently five years of charge and counter­
charge had convinced both Conservative and Labourite writers
(London: Gollancz, 1943); Brendan and Beverly, An Extra­
vaganza by Cassius (London: Gollancz, 19^4); Cato; Diplo-
maticus /Zbni Zillicaus7. Can the Tories Win the Peace?
And How They Lost the last one (London: Gollancz, 19^5);
Tiberius Gracchus /pseud^ Your M.P. (London: Gollancz,
1944); Geoffrey Mander, We Were not all Wrong (London: 
Gollancz, 1941). Biographies, memoirs, and academic studies 
by both anti-Chamberlain Conservatives and Labourites share 
the Labourite pamphleteers' point of view on Munich. See 
Viscount Cecil, A Great Experiment (London: Cape, 1941);
Geoffrey Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International 
Affairs, 1920-1939 (3rd revised ed.; London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 19^2); G. P. Gooch, Studies in Diplomacy
and Statecraft (London: Longmans, 1942); Stuart Hodgson,
Lord Halifax, An Appreciation (London: Christophers, 194l);
Alan Campbell Johnson, Viscount Halifax (New York: Ives
Washburn, 1941); Seton-Watson, History of the Czechs and 
Slovaks (London: Hutchinson, 1943); Seton-Watson, Twenty-
five Years of Czechoslovakia (London: The New Europe
Publishing Company, 1945).
24A partial_bibliography of Conservative pamphlets 
includes Candidas ^Herbert SidebothamZ, Labour's Great Lie 
(London: Hutchinson, 1945); Dexter 7pseud^%. Will You Be
Left (London: Hutchinson, 1945); Cedric Garth, The Party
that Runs Away (London: Hutchinson, 1945); Hadley, Quintin
Hogg, The Left Was~Nèver Right (London: Faber and Faber,
1945); Viscount Maugham, The Truth about the Munich Crisis 
(London: Heinemann, 1944T; E. D. 0'Brien, Big 3 or 2%? The
Choice in Foreign Politics (London: Hutchinson, 1945);
Talus /pseud^ Your Alternative Government (London: Eyre
and Spottiswoodel 19^5); Basil Webb, The House Divided 
(London: Hutchinson, 1945). See also Spender, Between
Two Wears (London: Cassell, 1943) •
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that the Election outcome might well be decided by voters' 
opinions on questions now seven, ten, or, in the case of 
the Manchurian Crisis of 1931, fourteen years distant.
The quality of the pamphlets varied greatly, but 
they all shared a fierce party feeling. "Cato's" Guilty 
Men, once called the "most famous British political pam­
phlet of the twentieth century," was a polished, bitterly
25humourous performance. It held Chamberlainites who were 
still Ministers of the Crown up to such ridicule that sev­
eral of the nation's booksellers refused to stock it.^^
W. W. Hadley's work included a survey of press reactions
to Munich which is still of great interests to students of 
27the Crisis. However, one of the later pamphlets was re-
28searched and written in thirty-six hours. Many of the 
others revealed a similar lack of care. They were often 
simply collections of prewar statements showing opponents 
off to great disadvantage in the light of subsequent events. 
The partisanship of the pamphlets often produced a great 
lack of taste. In a work published just before the Gen­
eral Election, Quintin Hogg compared the war records of
Labour and Conservative M.P's and concluded that Labourites 
29were cowards. Hogg's violent partisanship extended back





28 terary Supplement, June I6 , 1945, 277.
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to the events of the 1930's and was common with both Labour
and Conservative pamphlet writers. Commenting on this, The
Times Literary Supplement complained that the pamphlets
seemed to call for a "smelling out of traitors" rather than
30a peaceful British General Election.
Although the preoccupations of the pamphleteers were 
not completely uniform, Munich was generally the most im­
portant theme for both Labourites and Conservatives. One 
Labour M. P. seemed mainly concerned with the damage done
31by the National Government's policy over Manchuria in 1931.
Another emphasized Tory duplicity in the Abyssinian crisis
32and the Spanish Civil War. Most Conservative writers in­
cluded a general condemnation of Labour pacifism in the 
1930's. Just before the General Election, they also con­
centrated on the bleak, socialist prison a Labour Govern-
ut .3 3ment would make of England. However, Munich stands o
It is the only foreign policy event discussed by "Cato.
Koni Zilliacus, writing under the pseudonym "Diploraaticus,"
33called Munich the "crowning betrayal" of the 1930's.
30Times Literary Supplement, June I6 , 1945, 277. 
^^Mander, 1-111.
^^Cassius, 59-70.
^^Hadley, I6-I7, 27-43; Hogg, 43; Candidus, 1.
^^Cato, 46-65.
^^Diplomaticus /Koni Zilliacus7, 88.
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The three principal Conservative pamphleteers, Hogg, Hadley, 
and Lord Maugham, all treated Munich as an important and un­
just cause for the downfall of a Prime Minister whom they 
admired g r e a t l y . A l s o ,  all three feared that widespread 
acceptance of the Labour version of Munich would do the 
Conservatives great electoral harm:
If there be such a thing as a High Command 
among the Left, it is evident that the order 
has gone forth that the word "Munich" should 
become a legend...or scalping knife for Tories 
....All such as are not particularly attracted 
by the ordinary watchwords like "Nationali­
sation, " "Socialism," "public ownership,"... 
are to be swept along to the poles and by 
one magic word made to vote... against the 
party to which Churchill and Eden have been 
loyal throughout....If the people do not want 
Socialism they must be misled into voting 
Socialist by a side-issue.... All else is to be 
forgotten, long lives given in the.service of 
the country, decorations on the field....To 
be a member of the party of Churchill and Eden 
is to be a Man of Munich and to be a Man of 
Munich is to commit political suicide....Its 
success depends on the belief that you can 
fool all the people some of the time.37
Maugham, Lord Chancellor at the time of Munich, 
was and remained a fervant admirer of Chamberlain. He and 
his brother, Somerset Maugham, the novelist, apparently 
quit speaking to each other as a result of their quarrels 
over Munich. Hadley, as editor of Lord Kemsley's Sunday 
Times, helped carry out the Kemsley chain's support of 
appeasement. During the course of his activities, he came 
to know and admire Chamberlain. Hogg first entered Parlia­
ment as a Chamberlainite after an October 1938 Oxford City 
bye-election in which Munich was an important issue. Hogg 
finally did vote against Chamberlain in the May 9, 1940 
division. However, he apparently did so quite literally 
in tears. Lockhard, Comes the Reckoning (London: Putnam,
1947) 76-77; Hadley, 27-28.
3?Hogg, 183.
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The Labour pamphleteers were also defensive about
parts of their party's record in the 1930's, and consequently
neither Labour nor Conservative writers were particularly
candid. Labour writers ignored the deep ambivalence of
Labour thinking on the German problem in the late 1930's.
They deplored the strategic impact of Munich. They did not
mention that in the House of Commons debate following Munich
the Labour leader, Clement Attlee, proposed more, not fewer,
38territorial concessions to Nazi Germany. The Conservative 
pamphleteers were even less frank. None of them recalled 
Chamberlain's September 27, 1938 description of Czechoslo­
vakia as "a far away country...people of whom we know 
39nothing." Only Hogg discussed Chamberlain's other famous
k ogaffe: that Munich had given Britain "peace in our time."
Hogg concluded that only the most tasteless partisan would 
jeer at the irony of the remark. Also, all the Conservative 
pamphleteers claimed that Chamberlain alone saved the British 
Empire at Munich. He gained a year’s grace for the comple­
tion of rearmament. At the same time they wished to refute 
any charge of cowardice against Chamberlain. Therefore, 
they emphasized that Chamberlain would have gone to war 
after Godesberg if the French, whom they insisted, the Prime
^^Parl. Deb., CCCXXXIX (1937-38), 65-66. 
^^The Times (London), September 28, 1938.
^°Hogg, 198.
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Minister made no attempt to influence, had decided that
honor demanded the fulfillment of their obligations to the
. 4l Czechs.
Although the Labourite and Conservative equivoca­
tion was partly the product of their fears of losing votes, 
it was also probably caused by honest confusion. Britain 
lost 350,000 military dead during the course of the war. 
Civilians endured the Blitz and then V-bombs. Under such 
circumstances, it was apparently difficult for either 
Chamberlainites or Labourites to remember that they had 
ever accepted the morality of claims of "self-determination" 
for the Sudeten Germans. This was especially so, because 
such Czech sufferings as the Lidice massacre were well pub­
licized in Britain. President Benes was one of the most 
highly respected of the leaders of the numerous governments-
in-exile in London. Further, the Czech units serving in
42the British Army fought gallantly. Similarly, the Soviets 
were immensely popular in wartime Britain. Their forces 
received credit for destroying much of Hitler's Army and
^^Hadley, l4?; Hogg, 193, 207-08; Maugham, 26-7, 35- 
42Lockhart, 92, 110, ll4, 115. The admiration the 
Czechs won was not in itself enough to secure a British 
repudiation of Munich. The final decision on repudiation 
only came after a much-publicized Soviet repudiation; the 
Soviets had not been among the original signers of Munich, 
but had acceded to it at the time of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. 
The British Government announced itself no longer bound 
by the terms of the Munich Agreement on August 5, 1942. 
Lockhart, 113-4, 187; kheeler-Bennett, Munich, 429-37-
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they were not uncomfortably present in Britain as were the 
Americans. Knowing the wartime contribution of the Czechs 
and the Soviets, Britons might easily find it incredible 
that they could ever have questioned their value as British 
allies. This was particularly true if one remembered Bri­
tain's brush with destruction in 1940.
Such thinking influenced the writing of the best 
known of the Labourite pamphleteers in the 1945 Election 
campaign, Koni Zilliacus. Zilliacus set out to prove that 
the Chamberlain Government had had a clear choice of policies 
in 1938. The wrong choice had brought disaster to Britain.
In asserting British choice at Munich, Zilliacus described 
repeated Soviet offers of alliance with Britain. He implied 
that a Soviet pact would have been as valuable in 1938 as
it had been since 1941. He also noted the availability of
4tthe Czech Army which he estimated at 2,000,000 men. The
British rejection of the Soviets and desertion of the Czechs
made Dunkirk. The Germans would have fallen without a fight
in 1938. When they took Czechoslovakia, Zilliacus wrote,
they gained 15,000,000 rifles, 43,000 machine guns, 1,500
planes, and 500 anti-aircraft guns. They also took 469
tanks--more than Britain produced before Dunkirk--and the




plus the thirty German divisions released from the former 
Czech-German frontier, Hitler attacked the British and French 
in 1940.^5
Zilliacus insisted that the reasons behind Chamber­
lain's decision disqualified all Conservatives from public 
office. He ignored the possible influence of revisionism. 
Rather, he insisted that Chamberlain conspired with and 
encouraged the Nazis because he wanted to turn Hitler east 
against the Soviets. Chamberlain was not pro-Nazi. He 
simply equated the cause of capitalism with the British 
national interest. All Conservatives, he went on, thought 
this way. The Chamberlainites and such "balance of power" 
Conservatives as Churchill and Anthony Eden differed only
46in their techniques for defending Tory money interests.
The leadership of either clique, Zilliacus concluded, would
make possible a postwar alliance with the Soviets--the
necessary corner-stone to British foreign policy.
Zilliacus's explanation of Munich disagreed with
that of such earlier Labour pamphleteers as the pseudonymous
"Cato." "Cato" wanted only the resignation of the holdover
Chamberlainite Ministers. He presented Munich as a personal





His emphasis on a collective Conservative guilt for Munich 
complemented his desire for the electoral defeat of the 
whole Conservative party.
Electoral considerations influenced the Conserva­
tive pamphleteers, though at the same time they shared part 
of Labour's point of view on 1938. They charged Labour
with a large measure of the responsibility for the admitted
48"humiliating reverse" at Munich. Labour pacifism, they 
claimed, caused the British unpreparedness which made Munich 
necessary. However, they had some of the same values as 
the Labourites. The Conservatives also professed an unqual­
ified hostility to Germany dating back to 1938 and before. 
They also expressed affection for the Soviets. Chamberlain, 
they contended, had not invited the Soviets to Munich be­
cause of the press of events. The Soviets might well resent 
this exclusion, but the British had earnestly tried to get 
an Anglo-Soviet alliance after Prague. It failed because
the Soviets decided that they needed time for rearmament.
4qThey made their "Munich" in the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Further,
Conservatives claimed a retroactive friendship with the 
Czechs. The Czechs were a "gallant race."^^ The Versailles 
Treaty was just. The 1938 complaints of the Sudeten Germans
48Hogg, 193* See also Maugham, 56.
^^Hogg, 208-9; Hadley, 143. See also Garth, 42. 
^^Maugham, 9«
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51were "grossly exaggerated." They emphasized that the 
Anschluss made Czechoslovakia indefensible against German 
might. Neither the still unprepared British and Russians 
nor the decadent French could have saved the Czechs in 1938.
In elaborating their theme of British military 
unpreparedness, the Conservatives presented the British 
war experience in a different light than the Labourites. 
Whereas the Labourites contended that Munich made Dunkirk, 
the Conservatives claimed that without Munich Dunkirk would 
have been much worse. They insisted that war had been the 
alternative to Munich. A war in 1938 would have proceeded 
along much the same lines as the war in 1939-40. The Ger­
mans would have quickly beaten the Czechs. The British and 
French armies would have been defeated in the field. Geo­
graphy and arms weakness would have kept the Soviets from 
helping much; they would have had no way of passing through 
Poland and Rumania to the battlefield., A catastrophe would 
have come. Britain, the pamphleteers emphasized, would 
have nad neither the plans nor the trained airmen to win 
the Battle of Britain. "The consequences," Lord Maugham
wrote, would "have been events which we hardly dare to 
52contemplate."
Despite their concern over the possibilities of 
Labour's success with Munich, the Conservative pamphleteers
^^Hadley, 56.
^^Maugham, 63» See also Hogg, 207-8.
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were not willing to sacrifice Chamberlain's posthumous 
reputation for votes. Perhaps the two were inseparable, 
but in any event the Conservatives showed the same strong 
personal devotion to Chamberlain as some Chamberlainite 
writers in 1940. The pamphleteers expressed their loyalty 
by stressing Chamberlain's noble aim to obtain peace by 
"every honorable means :" "we have had years of war since 
^Munich7, who doubts that ^ e a c e 7  was...worth almost any 
price short of dishonour. The patience and persistence 
with which the policy was pursued was not weakness but
5 3strength. At the same time the pamphleteers somewhat 
inconsistently maintained that Chamberlain's public opti­
mism about Hitler in the months after Munich did not reveal 
gullibility or stupidity. Rather, the arms situation was 
desperate. The truth could not be told. All the Chamber­
lainite defenses showed much maudlin sentiment. Hogg's
epitaph for Chamberlain was, "in death, if not in life,
54may Neville Chamberlain have peace with honour."
Despite their emotionalism, the Conservative and 
Labourite pamphleteers apparently did not succeed in making 
Munich an important election issue. References to local 




55election addresses in some constituencies. Commenting 
on the radio talks of Eden and Ernest Bevin on foreign 
policy, the Manchester Guardian on May 21, 19^5 declared 
that the Conservative speech did not break sharply enough 
with the discredited tradition of M u n i c h . H o w e v e r ,  
neither the leaders nor the central offices of the parties 
emphasized Munich. Labour stressed its programs for Bri­
tain's future. Conservatives tried to trade on Churchill's 
prestige. Also, the numerous, much more obvious and direct 
reasons for the Conservative defeat make it unlikely that a 
prewar foreign policy decision was a significant factor.
This conclusion is strengthened by the absence of any posi­
tive correlation between support for Munich and loss of a 
seat in Parliament. Leo Amery, the Coalition Secretary of 
State for India and a prominent 1938 critic of Munich, lost 
his Birmingham seat. Hogg, who had entered the Commons in
October 1938 Oxford City bye-election in which Munich was
5 7almost the only issue, was returned to Parliament.
The emotionalism created by the wartime pamphleteering 
did affect Keith Feiling who wrote the official biography of 
Chamberlain during this time.^^ Failing's work was and
55R. B. McCallum and Allison Headman, The British 
General Election of 1945 (London: Oxford University Press,
1947), 102-3.
^^Manchester Guardian, May 21, 1945.
5 7McCallum and Readman, I6O-I.
q O
Failing, vi. A note in the introduction tells 
that the work was completed in November 1944. Publication
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remains an indispensable primary source for Munich study.
Feiling was the only historian ever to have access to
Chamberlain's private papers and letters, and he included
long extracts from these in the book. Feiling was a great
admirer of Chamberlain. Like the Conservative pamphleteers,
he was stung by the charges of the opposition. Consequently,
Feiling too was defensive,and his prose was as maudlin as
that of Hadley, Hogg, or Maugham. These characteristics of
his writing have made some later historians question the
59honesty of his scholarship. Feiling could in some meas­
ure refute such charges. Unlike the Conservative pamphle­
teers, he did not try to ignore Chamberlain's numerous, 
unfortunate public statements.
In at least one known instance, however, Feiling did 
distort the meaning of an incident. Like the Conservative 
pamphleteers, Feiling wanted to show that despite Chamber­
lain's public remarks the Prime Minister was not fooled by
was probably delayed until after the Election. Earlier bio­
graphies of Chamberlain include Stuart Hodgson, The Man Who 
Made the Peace, Neville Chamberlain (New York: E. P. Dutton,
193Ü); Sir Charles Petrie, The Chamberlain Tradition (New 
York: Frederick A. Stokes, 193Ô); Duncan Keith-Shaw, Neville
Chamberlain (Wells and Gardner, 1939)j Derek Walker-Smith, 
Neville Chamberlain, Man of Peace (London: Robert Hale, 1939)
None of these earlier works nor the I96I biography of Ian 
McLeod contain primary source materials. Ian McLeod, Neville 
Chamberlain (London: Frederick Mueller, I96I). A collection
of Chamberlain's 1937-9 speeches is found Neville Chamberlain, 
In Search of Peace (New York: G. P. Putnam;s Sons, 1939).
59For a discussion of the criticism of Feiling, see 
Taylor, Politics in Wartime and other Essays (London: Hamish
Hamilton! 19^4), 190-5.
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Hitler at Munich. He tried to do this when he reported 
Chamberlain's observation to Halifax as the two drove back 
to London from the Croydon air field on September 30, 1938. 
"No, he was not deceived, neither by Hitler's moods nor by 
the exultant relief of London; 'all this will be over in 
three months,' he said as their car struggled through the 
c r o w d . W h e n  Churchill wrote his memoirs, he included 
Feiling's quotation and suggested that Chamberlain had de­
liberately lied to the British people after M u n i c h . L a t e r ,  
Halifax wrote his own autobiography. He accused Churchill 
of impugning Chamberlain's character by distorting the 
statement. Chamberlain's remark, Halifax claimed, did not 
refer to Hitler at all; Chamberlain was only talking about 
the London crowd's enthusias m . H a l i f a x ' s  annoyance with 
Churchill was misplaced. Feiling was responsible for the 
distortion. Halifax had told him the story. Feiling's re­
counting of it made Churchill's interpretation a natural 
one. His use of evidence in this instance lends substance 
to the reservations of other historians about the candor of 
his work, for it suggests that he may also have presented 
in a misleading light some of the material to which he alone 
had access.
^^Feiling, 282, Italics mine. 
^^Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 318.
G^Halifax, 198-99.
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The pamphlets and other public discussion of Munich 
in the years 1940-5 had other more general effects on the 
historiography of the crisis. The most crucial was the con­
tinuation of one element of British emotionalism about the 
Agreement: Munich as the source of subsequent British dif­
ficulties. If the pamphleteers and other writers had not 
constantly emphasized Munich's impact on the present, the 
crisis might well have seemed remote in the war years. The 
traditions of British writing helped create the wartime pre­
occupation with the Agreement. From the months just after 
the signing of the Agreement through the "Phoney War,"
British historians had been attributing the origin of current 
problems to Munich. Thus, the pamphleteers were continuing 
an intellectual custom. Chance also had a role. The reports 
of Skoda Works tanks in France reinforced the habit of re­
lating Munich to the present. Another important factor was 
the continuation of the Chamberlainites in office. The 
Cabinet Ministers who were held responsible for Dunkirk 
had also been in office in 1938* Because of this, writers 
were more likely to see a continuity of cause and effect 
between the actions of 1938 and the events of 1940. Thus, 
anger over Dunkirk became in part anger over Munich.
The wartime polemics also perpetuated the other 
element of British emotionalism over the Agreement: the
idea that Britain had a choice at Munich. This notion con­
tinued because the perspective on the various aspects of 
the 1938 decision changed, and historical writers tend to
138
judge past decisions by current values. The Soviets and the 
Czechs-in-exile made valuable contributions to the Allied 
war effort. Statistics were produced which showed that the 
Czech Army in 1938 was strong in the weapon the Allies so 
conspicuously lacked in 1940--tanks. Also, it was appar­
ently difficult for writers to recall that morality ever 
seemed to be on the side of the enemy, Nazi Germany, and 
not the friend, Czechoslovakia. Part of this wartime per­
spective on Munich decision-making continued into the post­
war era.
The wartime writing had two other incidental effects. 
The controversy crystallized the strong Chamberlainite affec­
tion for their fallen leader. These emotions too endured 
in the years after 19^5* Lastly, the wartime debate in­
fluenced one group which did not take part in it, the former 
Tory Rebels. In 19^0-5 these men made their peace with the 
Chamberlainites. Their renewed party loyalty did not affect 
their judgment of Munich when they wrote about it after the 
war; they remained bitterly critical. But at the same time 
part of their reason for writing was resentment at the Labour 
pamphleteers attempt to use Munich as an election issue in
1945.
CHAPTER VI
THE DOMINATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE 
CRITICS: 1945-61
The years from 1945 to I96I were momentous ones for 
Britain in foreign affairs. Within less than two years of 
the Nuremberg trials of major German war criminals, which 
opened the period, the Royal Air Force and the United States 
Air Force were flying food, not bombs, to blockaded West 
Berlin to save that city from Soviet control. They were 
also beginning the ritual of the "Cold War" confrontation 
which was to be the main feature of European affairs through 
1962. The British Labour Government took the lead early 
in such nascent Cold War policies as assistance to Greece 
and Turkey, but as the crisis in Soviet-Western relations 
continued, the control of Western policy passed increas­
ingly to the United States. Although one British histor­
ian remarked in 1948 that Britain had become a "pensioner" 
of the United States,^ British policy makers did not rec­
ognize until 1956 the extent to which Britain's financial
^Taylor, "Munich Ten Years After," New Statesman, 
XXXVI (October 2, 1948), 2?8.
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dependence on America had limited her independence in for­
eign policy. That year in the Suez Crisis, the United 
States swiftly and with humiliating ease used financial 
pressure to stop Britain's last attempt to act as an inde­
pendent world power.
During these years, many British politicians, 
diplomats, journalists, and historians, continued to be 
preoccupied with Munich. In 19^8 alone, two major works 
on the crisis appeared, and that fall the British Broad­
casting Corporation produced nine "Third Programme" talks 
2on Munich. For the period as a whole, Munich figured 
prominently in the writings of six former parliamentary
3opponents of Chamberlain. The three surviving members 
of the Foreign Policy Committee of the 1938 Cabinet wrote
Sir Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 279- 
339; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, 3-199; Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, 
"The Personal Story of the Runeiman Mission, " Listener,
XL (October 21, 1948), 595-97; Cooper, "A Cynical Act of 
Cold-Blooded Butchery," 757-88; Captain Cyril Falls, 
"Should the Democracies Have Fought in 1938?" Listener,
XL (November 11, 1948), 717-18; Agnes Headlam-Morley,
"Was Neville Chamberlain's Policy Wrong?" Listener, XL 
(October l4, 1948), 551-53; Lockhart, "September Crisis 
and After," 635-37; Namier, "Munich Survey," Listener,
XL (December 2, 1948), 835-36; Nicolson, "The Commons 
and the 1938 Crisis," Listener, XL (November 25, 1948), 
795-6; Templewood, "The Lessons of Munich," Listener,
XL (December 9, 1948) 879-80; Vansittart, 675-77.
^Amery, 229-95; Sir Robert Boothby (afterwards 
Lord Boothby), I Fight to Live (London: Gollancz, 1947),
172-229; Churchill; Cooper, "A Cynical Act of Cold- 
Blooded Butchery," Cooper, Old Men Forget (New York:
E. P. Dutton, 1954) 224-42; Hugh Dalton, Memoirs ;
Vol. II: The Fateful Years, Memoirs, 1931-45 (London;
Frederick Muller, 1957) 192-207; Nicolson.
l4l
ktheir memoirs. Four highly placed British diplomats wrote 
of their parts in the crisis.^ Also, nine of Britain's 
best known historians wrote on Munich.^ Miscellaneous 
works, in which Munich was discussed at length, included
7a biography of Hitler, a two volume summary of the research
8 9on Munich, a history of Soviet Foreign policy, a history
^Halifax, 192-207; Simon, 238-54; Templewood, "The 
Lessons of Munich;" Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London: 
Collins, 1954), 285-326, 372-82. Keith Felling's valuable, 
though much criticized, biography of Neville Chamberlain, 
which was written in 1944, was also published in this period. 
Feiling.
^Ashton-Gwatkin; Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle 
(London: Macmillan, 1959), 110-34; Lord Strang (formerly
Sir William Strang), At Home and Abroad (London: Deutsch,
1956), 121-55; Strang, Britain in World Affairs (New York: 
Praeger, I961), 285-330; Vansittart.
^Carr, International Relations between the Two World 
Wars (3rd ed. rev.; London: Macmillan, 1947), 206-73; M. R.
D . Foot, British Foreign Policy since I898 (London: Hutchin­
son, I956II 124-39 ; C. L. Mowat, Britain between the Wars 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 4 l4 ,  5&9-93,
605-16, 625-31 ; Namier, "Munich Survey;" Namier, Europe in 
Decay, A Study in Disintegration (London: Macmillan, 1950),
171-204; Namier, In the Nazi Era, 148-67; P. A. Reynolds, 
British Foreign Affairs in the Inter-War Years (London: 
Hutchinson, 1954) , 130-50; ÂI Ï7I Rowse, All Souls and Appease­
ment (London: Macmillan, I961), 57-90; Taylor, "Munich Ten
Years After ;" Taylor, "Munich Twenty Years After," Manchester 
Guardian Weekly LXXIV (October 2, 1958), 7 ; Taylor, "Ancient 
Lights," New Statesman LVI (October 4, 1958), 456-7; Taylor, 
From Napoleon to Stalin, Comments on European History (Lon- 
don: Hamish Hamilton, 1950), I3O-8 ; Taylor, Rumours of Wars 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952), 184-203; Taylor, The Trouble­
makers , 167-200; Sir Charles Webster, "Munich Reconsidered:
A Survey of British Policy," International Affairs XXXVII 
(April 1961), 137-53; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich ; Wheeler- 
Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, 395-426.
7Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny (London: 
Odhams Press, 1952), 33^-9, 397-434.
8 r . G. D. Laffan, et al.. Survey of International 
Affairs, 1938, II-III (London: Oxford University Press for 
the Royal Institute of International Affaird, 1951-3).
qMax Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia,
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of The Times ( L o n d o n ) , a  biography of the 1938 editor of
n  12The Times, and a British Marxist history of Munich.
The unity of this great volume of work derived from 
the dominance of the conclusions of former Conservative 
opponents of Chamberlain. This group included principally 
Sir Winston Churchill, Sir Lewis Namier, and Sir John Wheeler- 
Bennett. It also included Leo Amery, Sir Robert Boothby (now 
Lord Boothby), Bruce Lockhart, Sir Harold Nicolson, Lord Nor­
wich (formerly Duff Cooper), and Lord Vansittart (formerly 
Sir Robert Vansittart). The career backgrounds of these men 
academic life, diplomacy, and politics were various, and they 
did not always agree among themselves. But they shared Con­
servative political opinions, a long standing dislike of the 
Munich Agreement, opposition to postwar Soviet expansion, and 
a lack of recognition of the reduction of British power, either 
in 1938 or in the postwar era. In the years 1945-61 their 
conclusions were virtually unchallenged. The few refutations 
were mainly guarded, for the dominance of the Conservative 
critics was the result of more than their eloquence and cogency. 
It was also sustained in large measure by the veneration for 
Churchill among all classes and, to a lesser extent, the spec­
ial esteem for Namier among historians.
1929-41 II (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal
Institute Affairs, 1949), 120-66.
^^Editors of The Times (London), History of The 
Times Vol. IV, pt. 2 (London: The Times, 1952), 912-50.
l^Wrench, 365-82.
12Andrew Rothstein. The Munich Conspiracy (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), 25-309-
143
Before 1945, the last Conservative politician's
criticism of Munich had been Sir Harold Nicolson's Why
13Britain Is at War, which was written and published in 
November, 1939* The reason for the long lapse and then the 
sudden renewal of writing lay in the wartime changes in Brit­
ish politics. After Chamberlain's fall in 1940, several of 
the Prime Minister's Conservative opponents moved into high 
positions in the Coalition Government and in the Tory Party 
itself. The responsibilities of office and a desire not to 
antagonize the remaining supporters of Chamberlain kept 
these men from writing about Munich. Similar discretion 
and other responsibilities kept silent those previously 
dissident Conservatives who did not reach high office. The 
coming of peace and the 1945 General Election gave many 
Conservatives the enforced leisure for contemplation.
After the General Election, although their new 
respectability in the Tory Party prevented them from writ­
ing on some aspects of Munich, the Conservative critics had 
several reasons for concerning themselves with the crisis. 
Neither Churchill, who was leader of the Conservative Oppo­
sition during the years when he was writing The Gathering 
Storm, nor Amery and Norwich, who both retired from active 
politics in 1945, chose to discuss their parts in the post- 
Munich discussions with Labour on forming an anti-Chamberlain
13Nicolson, Why Britain Is at War (Hardmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1939)•
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l4coalition. However, Czechlosovakia's fall to the Soviets 
in 1948 and the connection of its conquest with Munich pro­
vided a motivation for writing. Too, the critics had a 
lingering dislike for the wartime attempt of Labour pam­
phleteers to make Munich an election issue. The revelations 
at Nuremberg, the publication of the British diplomatic docu­
ments, and the apparent parallels between the expansionist 
policies of Nazi Germany and post-war Soviet Russia were 
also important. Transcending all these motives was the 
emotional recollection of Munich itself. To the dissenting 
Conservatives, Munich was one of the most important exper­
iences in their lives. For some their subsequent careers 
had been disappointing, but for all, even Churchill, bitter­
ness over Munich remained strong. This emotion expressed
15itself in such phrases as a "morally indefensible argument,"
"a cynical act of cold blooded b u t c h e r y , a n d  "the agree­
ment reached by friends holding down the victim for the 
17executioner." Such feelings guaranteed that the Munich 
debate would continue against a background of emotionalism.
The Conservative critics' works which dominated 
interpretation contained two paradoxes. They led in the
l4Information of these negotiations was only made 
public when High Dalton, a Labour participant in the talks, 
revealed them in his memoirs. Dalton, 198-203-
^^Vansittart, 675-
^^Cooper, "A Cynical Act of Cold-Blooded Butchery,"
757-
^^Namier, "Munich Survey," 835-
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interpretation of the large number of documents relating to
1ÔMunich that appeared after the war. Yet, they used the
new material to confirm old opinions: Hitler was bent on 
destroying Czechoslovakia from the beginning of the Munich 
crisis, Britain had a choice of alternative policies in 1938 
as a result of stategic advantage, and Chamberlain freely 
made the wrong decision at Munich out of ignorance, pacifism, 
and vanity. Also, paradoxically, the Conservative critics 
created the essential "Munich Legend" by writing of the 
analogies between the Munich and postwar periods. The ap­
parent parallels greatly influenced British and American 
foreign policy makers. Yet, the Conservative critics wrote 
of the parallels because Munich was more important to them 
than the Cold War.
Most of the work of the Conservative critics was done 
in the years 1945-9, but their conclusion dominated the en­
tire 1945-61 period. In the years 1945-9 theirs was nearly
1 ftInternational Military Tribune, Trial of the Major 
War Criminals before the International Military Tribune, 42 
vols. (Nuremberg: International Military Tribune, 19^7)
(referred to hereafter as I.M.T.); United States, Nazi Con­
spiracy and Aggression, A Collection of Documentary and 
Guide Materials Prepared by the American and British Staffs 
for the International Military Tribune 8 vols, 2 supps 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946-
7) (referred to hereafter as N.C.A.); D.B.F.P. Also appear­
ing in this period but much less frequently used by British 
historians because of duplications with earlier collections 
or lack of important contents were Czechoslovakia, New Docu­
ments on the History of Munich (Prague: Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, 1958) ; Union of Soviet Socialists Republics.) Docu­
ments and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World
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the only work done in Britain on Munich, and it was accepted
almost uncritically. From 19^9 to I96I, most historians
continued to agree with their interpretations and to share
many of their feelings, adding only an awareness of Britain's
decline. Those who did not agree with them wrote in order
to rebut the Conservative critics' arguments. Such writers
fell mainly into two classes. Some felt that Britain had
no choice in foreign policy in 1938. Necessity not ignor-
19ance or vanity, forced Chamberlain to go to Munich.
However, these apologists of Munich mainly favored opposi­
tion to the Soviet Union. They helped justify their con­
tention that Britain had no alternative to Munich by pointing 
out that in the light of subsequent events the Soviet Union 
could not be considered a reliable ally against Germany in
the Czech Crisis. Other writers disagreed with the policies
20suggested by the "Munich Legend." This latter group of
War 2 vols. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1948-9); United States, James Sontag, ut a^. (ed.) Docu­
ments of German Foreign Policy, 1919-4$, Series D, I-II 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949).
^^Headlam-Morley; Halifax, 193-200; Kirkpatrick, 
110-34; Simon, 238-54; Strang At Home and Abroad, 121-55; 
Strang, Britain in World Affairs, 285-330 ; Templewood, "The 
Lessons of Munich;" Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, 285-382; 
Wrench, 365-92; A. L. Kennedy, "Munich: The Disintegration 
of British Policy," Quarterly Review, CCLXXXVI (October 1948), 
425-44; Robert Sencourt, "The Foreign Policy of Neville 
Chamberlain," Quarterly Review, CCLXXXXII (April 1954), l4l- 
55; Sencourt, "How Neville Chamberlain Fought Hitler," 
Quarterly Review, CCLXXXXII (October 1954), 4l4-25.
20_Rothstein, 40-309; Taylor, "Munich Ten Years 
After ;" ^anon^7, "Falling Dominoes," Spectator CCI (Septem­
ber 12, 1958), 374; ^anon^y, "Munich: The Fallacy of Slogans," 
Spectator, CCI (October 3, 1958), 424; Alex Comfort, Letter 
to the Editor, Listener, XL (October 21, 1948), 607.
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writers disliked the Munich Agreement. They also disliked 
Britain's opposition to the Soviet Union, or, subsequently, 
British armed intervention in the Middle East. Neither of 
the two classes of writers challenged the Conservative 
critics' contention, based on their reading of the docu­
ments of the Nuremberg trials, that Hitler was resolved to 
destroy Czechoslovakia in 1938.
The Postwar Document Publications 
The Nuremberg Trials provided the first postwar 
documents on Munich. The major German war criminals' trials 
before an American, British, French, and Soviet tribunal 
lasted from September 1945 to October 1946. The trial rec­
ords ran to forty-two volumes, and were published in early 
1947. The documentary and guide materials of the British 
and American prosecution staffs, which comprised eight vol­
umes and two supplements, appeared in 1946-47. The Conser­
vative critics considered three parts of these collections 
to have special relevance to the interpretation of Munich: 
the publication of the "Hossbach Memorandum," the revelation 
of the 1938 German "Generals' Plot," and the evidence of 
German military unpreparedness. The Hossbach Memorandum, 
they believed, was the final documentary proof of Hitler's 
planning both the Munich Crisis and the Second World War.
The generals' conspiracy and the testimony on German arms 
weakness strengthened their conviction that British leaders 
had a military advantage over Germany in 1938. Both of
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these conclusions, the Conservative critics considered, 
put the 1938 decisions of the British policy makers in a 
very unfavorable light.
The historian. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, first 
examined the Hossbach Memorandum in relation to Munich.
The Memorandum--the title comes from the name of the German 
officer who copied it originally--was introduced by the pros­
ecution at Nuremberg as evidence of the complicity in Hitler's 
aggression of Konstantin von Neurath, until February 1938 
German Minister for Foreign Affairs. The prosecution claimed 
that it was an accurate, though only partial, record of a 
November 5, 1937 meeting at the Reich-Chancellery between 
Hitler, von Neurath, and Germany's military chiefs. At this 
gathering, according to the surviving fragment, Hitler gave 
what he said was his last will and testament and his future 
plans for Germany. Germany, Hitler is quoted as saying, 
must have living space in Europe, and she must ultimately 
be prepared to fight for it. The first blocks to such ex­
pansion were the independent states of Austria and Czecho­
slovakia. Therefore, Germany must look for opportunities 
to subjugate these states. Hitler went on to discuss three 
contingencies, each involving the distraction of France 
from Central European affairs, in which Germany could move 
against Austria and Czechoslovakia. The record ends here, 
but a note in the Memorandum states that the meeting con­
tinued with a discussion of plans for rearmament. To
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Wheeler-Bennett, the Memorandum revealed Hitler's intention
to conquer the world by force and to destroy Austria and
Czechoslovakia by force in I938. It settled once and for
all the question of German bad faith in the Czech crisis.
It implicitly confirmed Chamberlain's ignorance, Wheeler-
Bennett pointed out. Within two weeks of the meeting at
the Reich-Chancellery, Chamberlain sent Halifax to see
Hitler with an offer of British help in revising Europe to
21Germany's satisfaction.
The public disclosure of the German generals' con­
spiracy of 1938 came mainly from the interrogation of Franz 
Haider, former German Army Chief of Staff and the one sur­
viving principal participant in the plot. The conspiracy's 
leader, Haider stated, was Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, 
until August 27 , 1938 Chief of the Army General Staff. Beck 
was already angry at Hitler for his past humiliations of 
the army. He believed that the execution of "Case Green" 
the operations plan for invading Czechoslovakia prepared 
for Hitler by the defense department staff in the summer of 
1938, would precipitate a general European war with Czecho­
slovakia, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Beck was 
unable to make his views prevail through regular channels.
21Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, ll-l4, 18-21; IMT XXV, 
Doc 386-PS, p. 409. An account of the November 19, 1937 
meeting between Halifax, then Lord President of the Coun­
cil, and Hitler is found in Documents of German Foreign 
Policy, Ser. D, I, 55-67.
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Therefore, he recruited strategically placed younger officers, 
and plotted to prevent weir with the already dissident leaders 
of the Abwehr, or counter-intelligence service. When the 
inevitable war seemed about to break out, two of the con­
spirators, the Police-President of Berlin and the Commander 
of the Potsdam garrison, were to use their troops to surround 
the Reich-Chancellery and the Berlin Government quarter.
They would capture Hitler and have him declared insane. The 
plotters would then set up a provisional government which 
would call off all military preparations. The coup never 
took place. Explaining the failure, Haider claimed that 
the two prerequisites for action, the imminence of war and
Hitler's presence in Berlin, were never achieved in conjunc-
22tion. Consequently, the conspirators could not act.
The Daily Herald and The Daily Worker gave wide 
publicity to Haider's story in 1945,^^ but Churchill was 
the first writer to examine the conspiracy in some detail. 
Churchill emphasized that, although the German generals had 
a poor record as conspirators, their 1938 plan had a good 
chance of success. Churchill, like Wheeler-Bennett in 
treating the Hossbach Memorandum, did not suggest that 
Chamberlain could have known of the generals' plans, but 
the implication of bungling was clear. If Chamberlain had
22*N.C.A., Supp. B 1547-75.
^^Daily Herald, September 11, 1945; Daily Worker, 
September 12-13, 1945.
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not visited Hitler bent on appeasement, Churchill wrote,
the generals might well have succeeded,and the whole course
of European history might have been different. Of more
tangible importance, Churchill noted, was the result of the
generals' failure and Hitler's triumph. The generals lost
faith in themselves and ceased to resist Hitler's plans for
24conquest. Thus, Munich made war certain.
Churchill used other parts of Haider's testimony, 
as well as that of other German generals, and material from 
French memoirs to give his conclusions on the strategic 
situation in September 1938 as compared with that of a year 
later. This was a crucial question. Since Hitler's occu­
pation of Prague in March 1939, two important criteria for 
judging Munich had been: did Chamberlain have any choice
of policies in 1938, and did Britain benefit from postponing 
her confrontation with Germany? After March 1939, though 
not before, defenders of Munich insisted that Chamberlain 
had no choice at Munich and that he saved Britain by ob­
taining peace at Munich. Hitler's subsequent military 
successes, the indefensibility of Czechoslovakia after the 
Anschluss, the cowardice of the French, the weakness of 
Britain in necessary radar and fighter aircraft, the de­
fenders maintained, all proved the necessity and the wis­
dom of Chamberlain's decision. Critics of Munich up to 
Churchill's time had mainly regretted the loss of Czech
24Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 310-13, 319-
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and Soviet assistance as a result of Munich. Relying mainly 
on German and French testimony, Churchill argued that the 
strategic situation favored Britain in 1938 and gave her a 
choice of policies. The situation greatly deteriorated by 
1939.25
The German generals, Churchill contended, had no 
hope of victory in 1938, but in 1939 Germany was greatly 
strengthened. The generals knew that the German army was 
unprepared to fight Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, and 
the Soviet Union at the same time. The troops and forti­
fications in the West were inadequate to prevent a French 
breakthrough. The Czechs’ prepared mountain positions, 
Churchill quoted the generals as saying, were amazingly 
strong. Even the hastily constructed defenses on the for­
mer Czech-Austrian frontier were good. In any event, poor 
lines of communication between Germany and that part of 
Austria prevented the area from being an active front. The 
French, Churchill went on, were eager for an offensive in 
1938. The Soviets were faithful. Even if Soviet assis­
tance were limited to air support, the combined Czech 
and Soviet air forces could stand off the Luftwaffe. Bri­
tain had no anti-aircraft defenses and no modern fighters. 
However, in 1938 Germany lacked bases in the Low Countries
2SIbid., 279-339. Churchill's conclusions were drawn 
from he interrogations of the German generals, Haider, Jodi, 
and Keitel and the memoirs of the 1938 French Chief of Staff, 
General Gamelin. NCA, Supp. B, 1547-75; IMT, XV, 356-67; X, 
509-22; Maurice Gamelin, Servir ; v. II: Le Prologue du
Drame: 1930-Août 1939 (Paris; Pion, 1947), 324-57*
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with which to exploit the British weakness. Therefore, in 
September 1938 Germany's opponents had a choice of policies 
as a result of a great military advantage. A year later, 
Churchill concluded, a still unprepared Britain and a badly 
demoralized France alone faced a triumphant Germany.
The publication of the British foreign policy docu­
ments in 1949, the year after Churchill's The Gathering 
Storm appeared, somewhat substantiated Churchill's conten­
tions on strategy. Letters were printed which showed that 
in the summer of 1938 Sir Nevile Henderson, the British
Ambassador to Berlin, believed that the military situation
27favored Britain. The documents also added a new dimension 
to the problem of evaluating the generals' conspiracy. They 
revealed that the British Government had known of the gen­
erals' plan to overthrow Hitler. An emissary of the gen­
erals', Major Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, who, like most of 
the 1938 conspirators, was to be executed for his part in 
the July 1944 attempt to kill Hitler, came to London August 
18-23, 1938. Von Kleist talked to Lord Lloyd, Vansittart, 
and Churchill. He informed them of Hitler's determination 
on war and of the generals' plan to depose Hitler. He urged 
that the British Government aid in speeding up the generals' 
plan by publicly threatening Hitler with war if he attacked 
Czechoslovakia. Von Kleist made a favorable impression.
^^Churchill, 279-339»
27Henderson in Namier, In the Nazi Era, I38.
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Vansittart, then diplomatic adviser to the Cabinet, rec-
<S*
ommended that the Government carry out his request. Chamber- 
lain rejected his advice. He wrote to Halifax that von 
Kleist's story reminded him of the "Jacobites at the Court
28of France in King William's time." Von Kleist returned
to Germany with only a letter from Churchill. On August
27th, Chamberlain had Sir John Simon reaffirm the March
24, 1938 formula of conditional British involvement in a
29speech at Lanark.
Churchill never wrote his opinion of the Govern­
ment's action. The Official Secrets Act had prevented him 
from discussing it in The Gathering Storm. However, a veiled 
reference in his October 5» 1938 speech in the House of
Commons debate on Munich shows that he disapproved Chamber- 
30Iain's action. Other writers after 1949, notably Amery,
31Norwich, and Rowse, criticized Chamberlain heavily.
Amery had also known of the conspiracy in 1938. In his 
memoirs he regretted that apparently the only effect of von 
Kleist's visit was further to convince Chamberlain of the 
necessity of seeing Hitler personally. Rowse maintained 
that if Chamberlain had been wise enough to follow von 
Kleist and Vansittart's advice, the generals would have
28Unofficial German Approaches, DBFP, 3rd Ser, 11, 686.
29lbid., 683-92.
^°Parl. Deb., CCCXXXIX (1937-38), 363.
^^Amery, 275, 288-90; Cooper, "A Cynical Act of Cold- 
Blooded Butchery," 758; Cooper Old Men Forget, 244; Rowse,
7-8 , 79, 81-82.
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succeeded. The resulting military government would have
barred the Soviets from Central Europe.
Supporters of Munich rejected or ignored such con- 
52elusions. Surprisingly two of the Conservative critics 
also disagreed. Namier wrote that the generals' record of
ineptness at conspiracy precluded belief in the potential
3 3success of their efforts in 1958. In the most detailed 
examination of the conspiracy written in English, Wheeler- 
Bennett agreed with Namier. The conspirators, Wheeler- 
Bennett wrote, were too rigid of mind to take the daring 
chances required of a successful revolt. Also internal 
evidence showed that they failed from lack of nerve. The 
conspirators insisted that only the absence of threat of 
imminent war and Hitler's absence from Berlin held them 
back. Actually for several days in September, from after 
Godesberg until Chamberlain's acceptance of Hitler's in­
vitation to Munich, both their stated preconditions were 
present. Hitler was in Berlin; and war did seem likely.
Part of the explanation for Neimier and Wheeler- 
Bennett's views was a desire for historical accuracy.
They were also motivated by a strong dislike for the con­
clusions drawn by German writers from the story of the
^^Kirkpatrick, 152-4; Sencourt, "The Foreign Policy 
of Neville Chamberlain," l49.
^^Namier, "Munich Survey," 856.
34Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, 595-426.
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generals' plot, conclusions which apparently did not so
seriously disturb other critics of Munich. Hitler, German
writers claimed, was the only German who wanted war. Since
Chamberlain's action alone prevented the good Germans from
acting to stop Hitler, the sole responsibility for Munich
and the war belonged to Hitler and to Western statesmen.
Much as Namier and Wheeler-Bennett disliked Chamberlain,
they disliked the Germans even more. They were infuriated
by any line of reasoning which seemes to absolve the exe-
35cutors of Nazi aggression from war guilt.
Except for their disagreement over the generals' 
conspiracy, the reaction of the Conservative critics to 
the great amount of material in the published British for­
eign policy documents was uniformly one of anger at Chamber- 
lain. The selections in the documents on the events leading 
up to Munich ran to two volumes of 1,348 pages with 1,2 31 
pieces of correspondence and memoranda and nine appendices 
of irregular communications. The editors conformed to an 
existing British practice of examining the Munich crisis 
apart from other problems by inserting in chronological 
order only material on the Czech crisis. They were only 
allowed to include such papers as were in the Foreign Office 
archives. The result was a detailed picture of British
^^Ibid.; Namier, In the Nazi Era, 3-108.
^GpBFP, 3rd Ser., I-II.
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diplomatic correspondence and of British meetings with French 
and German leaders. Namier examined these documents more 
closely than any other writer of the time. The record of 
Chamberlain^s optimism about Hitler's intentions and the 
prospects of Anglo-German agreement and his refusal to in­
volve Britain with Czechoslovakia led him angrily to write :
^Chamberlain7 firmly believed in the possibility 
of a comprehensive agreement with the dictators, 
and thought himself called upon to achieve it....
He was unversed in foreign politics, unimagina­
tive, unconscious of his own limitations, rigid 
and doctrinaire. His reference...to the "quarrel 
in a far away country"... truly expressed his own 
feelings. He knew little about Austria, Czecho­
slovakia, or Danzig, and cared even less....They 
were to him tiresome side-issues which could be 
easily settled by "peaceful evolution" once 
confidence was re-established between...Britain 
and Germany. Even at Berchtesgaden he thought 
he would be able to begin "conversations with a 
general consideration of Anglo-German relations."
He had made himself a conception of Hitler, of 
his schemes and intentions; and he adhered to it 
whatever the evidence against it. For a long 
time he refused to believe that Hitler meant 
to destroy Czechoslovakia; and_when told by him 
at Berchtesgaden...that after^Hitlerrand others 
had obtained the territories they claimed what 
was left of that country "would be so small that 
he would not bother his head about it". Chamber- 
lain accepted his word as security for the 
nation which was being destroyed. At Munich 
Hitler's proposals agreeably surprised him.37
Namier's findings were the culmination of a post­
war trend to credit Chamberlain's dominance of both British 
policy and events, without, at the same time, accusing him 
of treasonable collusion with Hitler. Before and during 
the war, most critics of Chamberlain had thought, because
^^Namier, In the Nazi Era, 159 ■
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of the obvious inadequacy of British civil defense measures 
in the September crisis and Chamberlain's gift for fatuous 
phrases, that Chamberlain simply wandered into the Munich 
Agreement from lack of courage, knowledge, or planning.
After the war, Churchill credited Chamberlain with a "narrow 
sharp-edged efficiency within the limits of the policy in
o o
which he believed." After reading the British documents,
Namier concluded that Chamberlain was strong, rather than
weak-willed in the Czech Crisis. Both Chamberlain and Hit-
391er ruthlessly pursued their aims. Each, Namier believed,
got exactly what he wanted at Munich, although the result
was a "solution so grotesque and so revolting that no one
L qwould have dared openly to suggest it at the outset."
Several writers challenged Namier's views. Chamber-
41laih's former colleagues, Halifax, Simon, and Templewood, 
maintained that Chamberlain had no other choice than to go 
to Munich. The state of Britain's air defenses, the paci­
fism of the Dominions, the weakness of the French, the 
duplicity of the Soviets, and the indefensibility of Czecho­
slovakia eliminated any alternative course for British policy.
^^Churchill, 222.
^^Namier, In the Nazi Era, 149-6?.
4ôIbid., 152.
^^Halifax, 193-200; Simon, 238-54; Templewood, Nine 
Troubled Years, 285-326, 372-82. See also Headlam-Morley.
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Chamberlain, they further agreed, was neither ignorant nor 
domineering. He was a forceful and dynamic leader. He 
acted only according to the best advice of military and 
foreign affairs experts and after fully consulting his Cab­
inet. He was not fooled by Hitler ; he hoped that Munich 
would change him. Halifax and Templewood did concede that 
the critics could easily get a misleading impression of 
Chamberlain's abilities from such unfortunate phrases as 
"peace in our time." Another even more ardent Conservative 
admirer of Chamberlain, Robert Sencourt, wrote that Chamber- 
lain not only saw through Hitler but anticipated the Cold 
War as well. His wisdom led him to try to turn Hitler east 
against Stalin. He did not want to depend on help against 
Hitler from Russia and America, who between them had man-
42aged to ruin Europe.
Neither Sencourt, who deplored the efforts of "Sir
Winston and all his henchmen" to blacken Chamberlain's 
43name, nor Chamberlain's former colleagues challenged 
Wheeler-Bennett's evidence of Hitler's bad faith. Most 
British writers also accepted the conclusions of Churchill
44and Namier. This meant widespread acceptance of traditional
Ilo Sencourt, "The Foreign Policy of Neville Chamber- 
lain," 141-555 Sencourt, "How Neville Chamberlain Fought 
Hitler," 414-25. 
43Sencourt, "The Foreign Policy of Neville Chamber- 
lain," 149.
^^Amery, 288-95, 292, 303, 304-5, 398; Dalton, 175-76, 
183, 203-06; Foot, 124-29, 132-3 ; Mowat, 4l4, 592-93, 605,
l60
critical views of Munich on a new basis of documentary proof» 
For Churchill had maintained as early as October 1938 that 
Hitler aimed to destroy Czechoslovakia, and that Chamberlain 
had a choice which he used badly. Thus the result of the 
Conservative critics lead in the researches into the mass 
of newly available documents was, paradoxically, to confirm 
old views of Munich.
The Cold War and Britain's Decline 
The Conservative critics' writings in the late 1940's 
were influenced by the Cold War as well as by the documents 
and their continued strong feelings about Munich. When they 
came to write, the major problem of British foreign policy 
had become Soviet expansion and much of their writing was 
done during the Soviet blockade of West Berlin from June 
1948 to September 19^9» The conservative critics were dis­
satisfied with both the British and American responses to 
this expansion. They were anxious about the pro-Soviet 
criticism of the Labour Government policies from within the 
Labour Party itself. They were exasperated at what they 
considered the slowness of America in taking an active part 
in resistance. Consequently, they went beyond discussing 
Munich as a specific problem of the 1930's. Munich, they
615-17) 625-32; Cooper, "A Cynical Act of Cold-Blooded 
Butchery," 757-58; Cooper, Old Men Forget, 220-21, 244; 
Reynolds, 129, 139-40, 148-49; Rowse, 7-8, 57, 63, 67, 79, 
81-83, 87; Webster, I38, l4l, 145, 149-53.
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wrote, was also a case study in the relations between democ­
racies and totalitarian dictatorships. Democratic peoples 
loved peace and hated the expense of armaments. They and 
their leaders were apt not to see the indivisibility of 
peace. Instead, they tried to buy off dictators with con­
cessions in distant lands. By such actions they encouraged 
the rapacity of dictators who always interpreted concilia­
tion as weakness. They could not buy peace. They could
only make war inevitable. Worst of all, they sacrificed
45"honour" and "principle." These generalizations, the
Conservative critics claimed, described the West's policy
towards the Soviet Union since 19^5 as well as Munich.
The parallel and lesson were clear. The West must rearm
and stand up to the Soviets or there would be more Muniehs 
46and more wars. The Conservative critics’ analogies
45Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 320-1; Cooper, "A 
Cynical Act of Cold-Blooded Butchery," 758; Wheeler-Bennett, 
Munich, 3-4, ?.
46Boothby, 9-10; Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 
iv-v, 210-1, 2551 320-1; Cooper "A Cynical Act of Cold- 
Blooded Butchery," 757-58; Namier, "Munich Survey," 836; 
Vansittart, 67-5-7. The question has arisen in another 
context as to whether Churchill did in fact aim to use 
Munich as an argument in favor of resisting Russia. Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr., in refuting Secretary of State Rusk's 
frequent reference to Munich as a justification for the 
present American policy in Southeast Asia, has suggested 
that Churchill disclaimed any parallel between Munich and 
the Cold War (speech of Schlesinger, Stephens College, 
Columbia, Mo., February 22, I966). And Schlesinger quotes 
Churchill to that effect: "no case of this kind can be
judged apart from its circumstances. The facts be unknown 
at the time, and estimates of them must be largely guesswork
162
created the "Munich Legend," the idea that the lessons of 
Munich were a guide for all future Western foreign policy.
One of the Conservative critics, Vansittart, con­
tended that subsequent events showed that the Soviets would
have been a poor ally in 1938--though their defection would
h:7not have eliminated Britain's miliary advantage --but Van­
sittart 's was the only such revision. Churchill and the 
others still credited the sincerity and value of the Soviet
coloured by the general feelings and aims of who is trying
to pronounce." (Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 319-20).
Knowing Churchill's preoccupation with the Soviet 
problem from at least the time of his "Iron Curtain" speech 
in March, 1946, it would be surprising if he did not write
of Munich with the Soviet expansion in mind. In actual fact
he did. The then historical uniqueness of such generaliza­
tions taken with the following quotations strongly suggests 
that Churchill did mean for his conclusions on what should 
have been done at Munich to point to what should be done 
with the Soviet Union:
It is my earnest hope that pondering upon the 
past may give guidance in days to come, enable 
a new generation to... govern...the awful un­
folding future. (Ibid., v).
(after quoting an address made in the 1930's 
in which he had claimed that collective security 
could stop Germany without war) If we add the 
United States to Britain and France; if we 
change the name of the potential aggressor, if 
we substitute the United Nations Organization 
for the League of Nations...the argument is not 
necessarily without its application today.
(Ibid." 255• Italics mine).
If only the British people could have known... 
that...we were now disengaging ourselves... 
from the two might nations whose extreme efforts 
were needed to save our lives and their own....
Now ten years later, let the lessons of the past 
be a guide. (Ibid.̂  255• Italics mine).
However, Schlesinger's point is well taken in that 
Churchill, because of his confined strong feelings about Munich, 
regarded the crisis as much more than a guide for present ef­
fort. For Churchill and for all the Conservative critics, 
Munich was unique in their own lives and in Britain's na­
tional experience.
47 , ,Vansittart, 676-7.
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cooperation in 1938 and 1939 as an important ingredient to
the superiority over Hitler. They blamed Chamberlain for
48failing to secure agreement on both occasions. Namier
rejected the contention of one British military writer that
continued appeasement would have turned Hitler east to fight 
4QStalin. Also, although both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union were Communist states and therefore enemies, several
of the Conservative critics wondered if the Soviet bloc's
present hostility were not at least partly the last bitter
legacy of Chamberlain's p o l i c y . T h e  Conservative critics
showed no interest in the revisionary works of the Americans
Langer and Gleason, who attributed most of the responsibility
for World War II to the Soviets, nor in the products of the
51American war of incriminating documents with the Soviets.
The use of Munich as a model for present action 
had several paradoxes. It was a guide for British action
48Amery, 288-95; Churchill, The Gathering Storm,
363, 365, 391 ; Cooper, "A Cynical Act of Cold-Blooded 
Butchery," 758; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, I06.
^^Namier, "Munich Survey," 836; Falls, 71?. See 
also General J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, I789-I96I 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, I961).
^*^Lockhart, 637; Cooper, "A Cynical Act of Cold- 
Blooded Butchery," 758; Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, 437»
51William S. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The 
Challenge to Isolation, 1937-40 (New York: Harper and
Bros., 1952), 105, 109-11, 113-21, 170-74, 176-83; U.S.S.R., 
Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second 
World War; United States, James Sontag and J. L. Biddle 
(ed.), Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41 (Washington: Depart­
ment of State, 1948).
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against the Soviets, but one element of the legend was 
Soviet fidelity to Britain. Equally, the Conservative 
critics did not revise their conclusions about the origins 
of the war as did the American revisionists. However, their 
efforts greatly influenced British and American policy, 
while those of the American revisionists did not. The 
explanation for these incongruities is the most basic par­
adox of the "Munich Legend." The Conservative critics, by 
writing of parallels and not revising their conclusions, 
greatly influenced Western Cold War policy. Yet, they 
wrote only of parallels because Munich was more important 
to them than the Cold War.
Thus, the explanation for the creation of the "Munich 
Legend" lies not in any accident of availability of docu­
ments but in the emotions of the Conservative critics. They 
did not write about Munich in the years 1945-8 simply be­
cause proofs of Soviet perfidy were hidden. The two his­
torians, Namier and Wheeler-Bennett showed no interest 
as such proofs appeared, but they devoted much attention 
to documents on the 1938 confrontation between Britain 
and Germany. Similarly, when Amery and Norwich wrote 
their memoirs in the 1950's, they showed no interest in 
the parallels between Munich and the Cold War. The drama 
of the Berlin Blockade, when most of the writing creating 
the legend had been done, was past. In fact they showed 
no interest in the Cold War at all. But they still felt
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52strongly about Munich. To them and all the Conservative
critics Munich was a much more important emotional experience
than the Cold war. Some, though not all, evaluated the Cold
War in terms of Munich. But to revise Munich in the light
of the Cold War would have implied that the Cold War was
the more important event. For the Conservative critics as
well as for a number of other British writers, this was
simply not true. "The British people," Lord Norwich wrote,
"have not forgotten the anxieties and the humiliations
5 3of that fateful month of September."
The reaction of other British writers to the Cold 
War and Conservative critics' "Munich Legend" were various. 
Several writers, mainly those who had either supported Munich 
or found themselves identified with it, suggested that the 
knowledge of Russia's postwar behavior proved the impossibil­
ity of an Anglo-Soviet pact in either 1938 or 1939» Thus,
5^Britain had no alternative to Munich. At least one of 
these writers, Lord Templewood, was at the same time en­
thusiastic about the "Munich Legend" as a call to action
55against the Soviets. Other British historians, who
^^Amery, 259-95, Cooper, Old Men Forget, 224-42. 
^^Cooper, Old Men Forget, 224,
5 4Sencourt, "The Foreign Policy of Neville Chamber- 
lain," 141-55; Sencourt, "How Neville Chamberlain Fought 
Hitler," 4l4-25; Strang, At Home and Abroad, 149, 153, 198; 
Strang, Britain in World Affairs, 319? Templewood, Nine 
Troubled Years, 341-52. See also Beloff, 120-66.
^^Templewood, "The Lessons of Munich," 880.
l6 6
disapproved of both Munich and Soviet expansion, accepted
the validity of the parallel between the 1930's and the
postwar period. Speaking at Chatham House shortly after
the Labour Party I96O Conference at Scarborough, Sir Charles
Webster stated that Munich showed the dangers of "unilater-
alism" in the face of the dictators. However, some Britons
disliked the "Munich Legend's" implications. If there were
any lesson at all to Munich, A. J. P. Taylor wrote, it was
of the permanence of the German menace to Europe and the
necessity of Anglo-Soviet cooperation in controlling Ger- 
57many. The British Communist writer, Andrew Rothstein, 
maintained that Munich showed British leaders conspiring 
against their own people and the Soviet Union, however 
much they might doctor documents to prove otherwise. The 
lesson of Munich, Rothstein wrote, was that the British 
people had to throw out their leaders if peaceful coexis-
g fttence was to be possible.
A number of British politicians were impressed with 
the parallel between Munich and not only the Soviet prob­
lem but also the autocratic regimes of the Middle East.
Many of these politicians were also slow in recognizing 
Britain's inability to play an independent part in world
^^Webster, 153» See also Reynolds, I50, I67.
57Taylor, "Munich Ten Years After," I78. See also 
Comfort, 607 •
^®Rothstein, 208-20, 265-90, 308-9.
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politics. Both of these ways of thinking influenced British 
policy in the Suez crisis of 1956. The debates of August 2, 
1956 in the House of Commons and the Prime Minister's subse­
quent apologia for the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt both
revealed great anxiety to avoid another "Munich" in dealing 
59with Nasser. Even after the embarrassment of Spez, British 
politicians justified Anglo-American intervention in Lebanon 
and Jordan by the lessons of Munich. Such talk led a Spec­
tator writer to complain that British statesmen had a "Munich 
c o m p l e x . A f t e r  1958, Munich was still talked about as a 
guide for action. As Britain's loss of autonomy in foreign 
affairs became increasingly obvious, it also was a subject 
of recrimination as a cause for Britain's reduced state. 
Chamberlain and the other "men of Munich," A. L. Rowse 
wrote in I96O, "ruined their c o u n t r y . " T h e  real deci­
sions" now, he concluded, "are made elsewhere.
At the same time Rowse's book All Soul's and 
Appeasement appeared in April, I96I, another work, A. J.
P. Taylor's The Origins of the Second World War, was also 
p u b l i s h e d , a n d  Taylor's work was destined to end the 
domination of Munich historiography by the Conservative
59parl. Deb., DLVII (1955-56), l602-l?22. Eden,
The Full Circle (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, I960), 467-653'
60^
'Ibid., 4.
^^/^anon^/, "Munich: The Fallacy of Slogans," 424.
'■Rowse, 56, 87-8.
62,
6 TA. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World 
War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 196I), 7-278.
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critics. However, the contribution of the Conservative 
critics was in the 1945-61 period, and is still today, 
immense. During the 1945-61 period their domination was 
complete. Most historians accepted their conclusions; 
those who did not wrote to refute them. Their work in the 
interpretation of the masses of new documents, Wheeler- 
Bennett and Churchill with the Nuremberg documents, Namier 
with the Documents of British Foreign Policy, confirmed 
old opinions with new material. In the first years of the 
Cold War, they created the "Munich Legend" by writing of 
the parallels between Munich and the postwar period. The 
parallels influenced the Cold War policies of both Britain 
and the United States, but the Conservative critics wrote 
in terms of analogies because Munich was more important 
to them than the Cold War.
CHAPTER VII
A.J.P. TAYLOR. A MUNICH REVISION 
AND ITS IMPACT: I96I-65
The word "revision," when applied to the twentieth 
century study of war origins, means a shift in interpreta­
tion away from belief in the exclusive war guilt of the 
former opponent. Total or partial revisions of German 
war guilt were written in both Britain and America after 
World War 1 and in America after World War 11. Such revi­
sions were rarely the product of postwar detachment towards 
the past, but rather of a revulsion with the costs and 
results of a conflict. British and American writers after 
1918 compared the casualties with the apparent mockery made 
of the wartime promises of a better world. After 19^51 
many Americans saw Soviet domination of Eastern Europe 
as the only result of their efforts. In such circumstances, 
after both wars, more respectable historians considered 
the wartime views of extremists on the causes of the war.
In England and America after World War 1 revisionist his­
torians accepted the wartime interpretations of the Union 
of Democratic Control pamphleteers.^ They rejected the
^A.J.P. Taylor, The Troublemakers, 132-200.
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war guilt of Germany. Instead, they blamed either blunders 
on both sides or the leaders of the Entente. Similarly, in 
America after World War II, the wartime interpretations of 
extreme isolationists, who blamed President Roosevelt for 
the war, and 194l-4$ opponents of the Soviet alliance, who 
blamed the coming of the war on the Nazi-Soviet Pact, gained 
a wide audience among both historians and the public. After 
both wars, such emotional conclusions also had practical 
implications for current policy. If Germany had no special 
responsibility for World War I or if she were the victim of 
others, then the Versailles punishments should be revoked.
Or, in America after 19^5, the Soviets should be mistrusted, 
or the Americans should keep their presidents out of foreign 
affairs.
After World War II, although the British found them­
selves impoverished by the war, betrayed by the Soviets, 
and faced with nuclear destruction on the decision of others, 
their view of the causes of the war remained for a long 
time essentially what it had been in 1939* All British 
writers agreed on the exclusive war guilt of Germany, and 
the discussion of the war’s origins centered on a debate as 
to whether Britain might better have gone to war with Germany 
earlier. In this debate, the most frequently argued event 
was the Munich crisis of 1938» Critics of prewar British 
policy maintained that the irreconcilable conflict between 
Britain and Germany was obvious in 1938 and that the
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conditions for British resistance were favorable. The weak­
ening the critics saw in Britain's position from 1938 to 
1939> and in the years after, was, they believed, largely 
the result of the government's failure to fight over Czecho­
slovakia. Defenders of the 1938 government agreed with the 
critics' judgment of German intentions. However, they con­
tended that the British government could not have resisted 
Germany in 1938 and gained much by postponing the war for 
a year.
Until 1961 there had been only one revision of Munich, 
at the very beginning of the war, and only two noticeable 
changes of emphasis. During the "Phoney War," E. H. Carr,
Sir Nevile Henderson, and W. N. Medlicott saw only misunder­
standings as causes for a war they hoped would end by nego­
tiation. They viewed Munich as the creator of misconceptions 
on both sides; these brought war a year later. After the 
war, historians increasingly stressed the rigid competence 
of Chamberlain's execution of British policy in the Czech 
crisis. This was in sharp contrast to earlier studies of 
Munich. Then the great majority of historians tended to 
judge the National Government's diplomacy by the blundering 
incompetence of its civil defense preparations in September 
1938. The post-war publication of the British foreign 
policy documents for the Munich period partly explains the 
change. Sir Lewis Namier's interpretation of this written 
record emphasized the continuity of the goals and outlook
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of British diplomats throughout the crisis. The second 
change, a concession to postwar times, was the "Munich 
Legend." This involved no shift in the interpretation of 
the 1938 events. Historians and other writers simply pointed 
out that the mistakes of Munich were an object lesson in the 
proper policy for all dictatorships, particularly that of 
the Soviet Union.
In the light of Britain's dislike of the war's out­
come and with the example of the former British reaction 
to such discontent, it might be expected that the older 
British view would one day be challenged. Not surprisingly, 
the challenger was A. J. P. Taylor. Taylor had the academic 
credentials to question orthodox opinion. A fellow of 
Magdalen College, Oxford, he held until I963 a special 
lecturship at the university. He was the author of a num­
ber of works on nineteenth and twentieth century diplomatic 
history, which according to academic rumour, would have 
earned Taylor the Regius Professorship of history at 
Oxford were it not for his frequent appearances on tele­
vision and his writing for the London tabloid, the Daily 
Express. Further, Taylor disliked Britain's postwar world 
position and the status of British historiography on the 
origins of the war, which he held partly responsible for 
that position. Taylor was a member of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, a critic of Britain's postwar subord­
ination to America, and an advocate of Anglo-Soviet
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reconciliation. Thus, although he had opposed the Munich 
Agreement at the time of its signing, he strongly disapproved 
the "Munich Legend" and its call for Anglo-American opposi­
tion to the Soviets, even at the risk of nuclear war. Also, 
other historians' emphasis on Hitler's planning the war did 
not fit Taylor's belief in the historical importance of the
accidental actions and blunders of statesmen, who were
2neither "heroes" nor "villains." Lastly, Taylor had the 
reputation of enjoying controversy for its own sake. Munich
3was "the most controversial episode in recent history."
This taste often led Taylor into contradicting himself for
the sake of argument:
One don recalled how he had found himself at 
a meeting of a Peace Congress behind the Iron 
Curtain and, glancing at the roster of speakers, 
had discovered Taylor's name there. 'In the 
first place...it was astonishing that Taylor 
should be there at all--it was a very Party- 
line conference. Then, that he should be 
speaking! But the miracle was the speech he 
gave, to a dumb stony house--it was dyed-in- 
the-wool conservative. And then he had the
gall to come over to me and whisper in my
ear, "I've been dreaming of giving a speech 
like that since God knows when!" In Oxford 
he would have delivered a stinging Left Wing 
harangue.'^
Whether jokijig or not, Taylor's revision, which 
was recognized as such in I96I, was controversial.^ It
was most so on the point upon which all British writers
2Taylor, Origins, 1?.
^Taylor, "Ancient Lights," 456.
4Ved Mehta, Fly and the Fly Bottle, Encounters with 
British Intellectuals (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1962), 168.
^Taylor, Origins. Subsequent publications in which
174
had come to agree: Hitler's conspiracy to destroy Czecho­
slovakia as part of a blueprint for world conquest. British 
writers on Hitler, Taylor contended, analyzed Hitler's pre­
war foreign policy too much in terms of his later actions. 
They saw him as the creator of all the prewar crises through 
the demonic force of his personality. He was a nihilistic 
madman. Yet, his actions had an intellectual connection, 
the unfolding of a plan for world power. Hitler, Taylor 
admitted, did have the relatively modest goals of an eastern 
empire and peace in the west. Through accidents he got 
neither. The goals were, in any event, largely irrelevant 
to his day to day conduct of foreign policy. Then, Taylor 
insisted, he was a sane and patient man, too absorbed in 
events to plan. Rather, success was hiis plan.^
Although Hitler's actions were important, Taylor 
believed that the inter-war structure of Europe and acci­
dents were more important still in explaining his success. 
Germany was the strongest nation in Europe. Britain and 
France lacked the strength and the will to prevent her
Taylor has restated his thesis include Taylor, "Unlucky Find," 
New Statesman, LXII (December 1, I96I) 833-4; Taylor, "Old
Tunes," New Statesman, LXV (February 15, I963), 238-40; Tay­
lor, "Flickering Figures," New Statesman, LXVI (July I3,
1963), 49; Observer, July 25l 19&5; Taylor, Origins (5th 
printing; London: Hamish Hamilton, I963), "Second Thoughts,"
pages not numbered; Taylor, English History, 4o4-35j Taylor, 
From Sara.jeyo to Potsdam (New York: Hare our t Brace, l966 ) ,
134, 154-7* Excerpts from Taylor's remarks on his thesis 
on television and in private interviews are found in Mehta, 
120-22, 169-84.
^Taylor, Origins, 68-72, 103, IO6 , "Second Thoughts."
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resurgence. This was Hitler's underlying opportunity for 
action. His immediate opportunities were various, but also 
not of his own making. In the Czech crisis, he had avail­
able the genuinely disaffected Sudeten German minority, which 
weakened the Czechs internally and discredited them morally 
with the British. Hitler's personal contribution in all this 
was the shrewdness with which he exploited his chances. He 
did not plan military conquest. At crucial moments, he 
announced that he was dissatisfied, and waited for conces­
sions to be given him. As time went on, he became impatient. 
He took to threatening war, without meaning it, in order to
speed things up. But for the most part, he was, paradox-
7ically, a passive conquerer.
Taylor's description of a passive Hitler waiting 
upon events conformed to Taylor's notions of historical 
development, and it also accounted for a number of discrep­
ancies in previous British accounts. Other writers had 
suggested that Mein Kampf, Hitler's autobiography, was a 
warning of all his prewar conquests and his plans for world 
domination. If so, Taylor contended, why were only seven 
out of 700 pages in Mein Kampf devoted to Lebensraum? Why 
were Austria and Czechoslovakia not mentioned at all? Why 
was a war with the West, the war he fought in 1939, specif-
g
ically rejected? Equally, on the basis of the Nuremberg
7Ibid., 18-39, 68-72, 151-53.
Q
Ibid., 69, 108, "Second Thoughts."
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documents, Sir John Wheeler-Bennett had claimed that the 
Hossbach Memorandum of a November 5, 1937 meeting of Hitler's 
showed him plotting in detail the overthrow of Czechoslovakia
9and Austria and the world. The Hossbach Memorandum, Taylor 
maintained, was worthless as an historical document. It 
had been carelessly handled by the Germans and then probably 
doctored by the American prosecution staff for use in the 
Nuremberg trials. Even if it was authentic, it was no blue­
print for aggression. Hitler mentioned three contingencies 
in which the immediate German occupation of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia might take place. These were hardly a plan 
as none of the contingencies were realized. Hitler, Taylor 
admitted, did mention a major war in the future to speed up 
German expansion, but he expected it for 19^3-5i if at all, 
not in 1939.^°
Similarly, British historians had been puzzled after 
the war to find no evidence of a German plan to attack Czecho­
slovakia in May 1938. Nearly everyone in Britain, including 
the Prime Minister, had thought so at the time. Critics of 
the British Government after Munich had claimed that the May 
crisis had proved that Hitler was bent on aggression but 
could be stopped by show of force. Most postwar historians 
were either ignorant of the new evidence or ignored it.
9Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, 11-14.
^^Taylor, Origins, 131-4, "Second Thoughts."
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Wheeler-Bennett who dealt with this explained the discrepancy 
between the opinion of the time and the postwar evidence.
He proposed that Hitler's denials of German complicity were 
the "wrath of a man accused of a crime which he intends to 
commit but has not yet had the opportunity to carry out. 
Taylor insisted that Hitler's denials were genuine. Until 
the May crisis, he had no criminal scheme nor indeed any 
clear plan at all for eliminating the Czech threat to Ger­
many. It was only after the May crisis that he made his 
plans for military action, in revenge for his humiliating 
treatment in the British press. Even his military directives 
in May and June, Taylor pointed out, and historians had not 
before emphasized, were contingent on British and French 
non-intervention. This qualification suggested to Taylor
12that the only war Hitler planned to fight was one of nerves.
It followed logically from Taylor's picture of 
Hitler that British policy was also quite different than 
previously imagined. If Hitler were sane and waiting upon 
events, Taylor wrote, then Chamberlain was neither stupid 
nor vain in thinking he could deal with him. If Hitler 
did not aim to conquer the West, then Chamberlain was 
neither insular nor ignorant in hesitating to resist him.
Nor was he cowardly, Taylor believed. Britain and France
^^Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, 60. 
^^Taylor, Origins, 163-67*
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simply lacked the power to stop Hitler in the East. Indeed, 
Chamberlain was none of the things his critics had claimed. 
Intelligent, well-informed people had supported his policies 
of appeasement. His courage, not his cowardice, were the 
undoing of the Czechs. For, if Hitler was passive in the 
Czech crisis, it was Chamberlain who must surely have set 
in motion the events which ended in the Munich Agreement. 
Chamberlain, Taylor declared, was determined never again to 
be surprised by developments in Central Europe after the 
Anschluss ; he did not realize that Hitler had been as sur­
prised as he by the conquest of Austria. He wanted peace 
and an understanding with Hitler, both for its own sake and 
to stop the wasteful expenditure on armaments. Prompt 
concession would achieve his aims. Drift was contrary to 
his nature and seemed impossible anyway. Therefore, ac­
cording to Taylor, Chamberlain, with his characteristic 
energy, set out to speed concessions. He forced the Czechs 
and the French to a course of conciliation. He encouraged 
Hitler to make demands. Hitler had "screwed up the tension"
till then by encouraging the genuinely dissatisfied Sudeten 
13Germans, waiting for something to turn up. Chamberlain's 
opening was Hitler's opportunity. Chamberlain, Taylor wrote,
did not create the Czech problem. He did create the Czech
. . 14crisis.
^^Ibid., 153= l^Tbid., 155=
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Taylor's portrayal of German passivity and British 
energy resulted in a startingly different view of the inter­
action of British and German policy in the crisis of Septem­
ber 1938» All writers since the war had agreed on Hitler's 
initiative. Hitler's September 12th speech at Nuremberg, 
they were sure, was an ultimatum. Some British response 
was necessary. Authors only disagreed on the wisdom of 
the course chosen: Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden
to appease Hitler. In contrast, Taylor pointed out that 
Hitler made no specific demands at Nuremberg. The begin­
ning of German military operations, if indeed Hitler planned 
to use force, was eighteen days away. Hitler merely announced 
that he was dissatisfied and awaited concessions. Chamber- 
lain brought them. Again, in discussing the Chamberlain- 
Hitler meeting of September 22-23 at Godesberg, British 
historians had taken Hitler's refusal to accept Chamberlain's 
offer of the Sudetenland as evidence of his determination 
on war. Taylor insisted that it was not. The pressing of 
the Polish and Hungarian irridentist claims made it seem 
briefly that Czechoslovakia would collapse without war and 
that Hitler would get much more than a linguistic frontier. 
Instead, the Czechs stood firm. Hitler returned to waiting. 
Finally, writers had interpreted Hitler's calling of the 
Munich Conference as a reluctant decision against war, 
brought on by Mussolini's lack of nerve, the German gen­
erals' protest against war, the British mobilization of
l8o
their fleet, and the Berliner pacifism of September 27th.
On the contrary, Taylor contended, Hitler was merely shrewd.
He wanted no war. He had gotten what he wanted. He called
15the conference to write up his victory.
However, Taylor rejected any suggestion that Munich
was simply a product of misplaced British zeal and a German
confidence game. Whatever Munich was for the French, it was
for the British a moral decision. It was:
a triumph for all that was best and most en­
lightened in British life; a triumph for those 
who had preached equal justice between peoples; 
a triumph for those who had courageously de­
nounced the harshness and short-sightedness of 
Versailles.... This was the offense redressed 
at Munich. Idealists could claim that British 
policy had been tardy and hesitant. In 1938 
it atoned for these failings. With skill and 
persistence, Chamberlain brought first the 
French and then the Czechs to follow the moral 
line.l6
Taylor's statement was, he later admitted, partly 
a joke to annoy the orthodox, but not wholly so. It was 
an important part of his criticism that previous British 
writing on Munich had lost touch with the intellectual cli­
mate of the 1930's. At that time, Taylor noted, the 
revisionist historians' ideas of Germany's innocence of 
war guilt and of the wrong done to her at Versailles, ideas 
which had originally been proposed in wartime by the left- 
wing Union for Democratic Control, gained widespread accep­
tance in all parties. Appeasement of Germany was considered
^^Ibid., 17-86. l^Ibid., I89.
l8l
only just. Even Hitler's appearance did not discredit it. 
His barbarism confirmed the need for ending the Versailles 
treaty. The British public and its leaders accepted the 
German occupation of the Rhineland and the Anschluss with 
Austria, because they felt it immoral to oppose them. 
Equally, Chamberlain went to Berchtesgaden to appease 
Hitler because he believed it morally wrong for the Sudeten 
Germans not to be given self-determination. Conversely, 
the successor states like Czechoslovakia had no moral valid­
ity for the British people. The British public rejected as 
cynical the pleas of Churchill to put British security 
ahead of self-determination. Such ideas were the same dis­
credited power politics which had brought World War I.
Aside from Churchill and those around him the only group 
who opposed giving the predominantly German Sudetenland to 
Hitler was part of the Labour party. These men, somewhat
confusedly Taylor thought, admitted the justice of Germany's
17claims, but felt that Hitler had no right to make them.
Taylor further emphasized the importance of the 
intellectual climate by re-evaluating the role of armaments 
in foreign policy decisions. Taylor's argument in this 
area was not entirely consistent. He contradicted himself 
somewhat by admitting that fear of aerial bombing helped 
make British foreign policy timid. At the same time he
^^Ibid., 189-90. See also Taylor, The Troublemakers,
167-200.
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insisted that British policy-makers almost without excep­
tion, ignored considerations of arms strength. Leaders 
made decisions for activity or inactivity, and then justi­
fied them by the state of armaments. The British leaders 
let Germany have her way over Czechoslovakia in 1938 because 
they wanted to. They thought war over the Sudetenland would 
be wrong, but they did not fear losing such a war militarily. 
Rather, they feared the economic cost of victory. They also 
feared victory itself: it would bring the destruction of
the Czechs and Soviet domination of East Europe without
18solving the German problem.
In making their calculations of military victory, 
Taylor noted, the British overrated Germany--German arms 
strength was about one-half what the British thought--but 
they overrated themselves even more. They had exaggerated 
hopes for a blockade like that of World War I. They also 
confused a successful defense with imposing their will on 
Germany. They had sufficient power for a defense of the 
West even in 1940, but they had incompetent generals. They 
never had the power to force Germany to give up her con­
quests in the East.
Taylor also re-evaluated the role of Munich in 
the coming of war. In an important revision of earlier 
studies, Taylor suggested that the Polish crisis was a much 
more important event than Munich. Previously, wartime and
18Taylor, Origins, 6O-6I, 77, 115-20.
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postwar British writers, though with some reluctance among 
Chamberlain supporters, had treated Munich as the main 
prewar drama. All the elements of conflict had been pres­
ent; clear German intent on world conquest, the challenge 
to a basic British interest, British recognition of the 
challenge, and, critics maintained, the resources at hand 
for meeting it. From this perspective, the Polish crisis 
was simply an epilogue to Munich with the Government at 
last facing its responsibilities. Taylor did not agree 
with this view. Hitler, he believed, was not set on world 
conquest either in 1938 or 1939. The war was the result 
of blunders on both sides in 1939. The progression of events 
was complex, but the essential blunder was Hitler's "launch­
ing on 29 August ^193^7 a diplomatic manoeuvre which he
ought to have launched on 28 A u g u s t . T h u s ,  by Taylor's
reasoning, the main concentration of the revised study of
the origins of World War II should be August 1939, just as
20that of World War I was August 1914.
However, Taylor pointed out, Munich did have an im­
portant secondary interest; the emotions it created deter­
mined in part the blunders of 1939. Hitler, logically 
enough Taylor thought, came away from the Munich Confer­
ence convinced that Britain had given him a free hand in 
Eastern Europe. Equally, his success at Munich was a blow 
to his old patience in achieving his ends. He thought
^^Ibid., 278. ^°Ibid., 187-247.
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afterwards that he could get what he wanted much more
quickly than in the past simply by threatening the "little
21worms" whom he had met at Munich. What Hitler wanted re­
mained unclear: he occupied Prague only to check Hungarian
expansion, and his demands towards Poland began as a desire 
to tie up loose ends in relations as a prelude to alliance. 
His impatient bluffing and his inability to avoid bragging 
on Munich as a victory for the German force made his actual 
goals irrelevant. For, contrary to what Hitler thought, 
the British had in the course of the Munich crisis, through 
the guarantee to rump-Czechoslovakia given to calm the 
French on September l8th, committed themselves to the status 
quo in Eastern Europe. ~ '
Because of Munich the British Government was finally 
forced to fight for this status quo. When the exaggerated 
hopes for "peace for our time" seemed to be destroyed by 
the occupation of Prague, an "underground explosion" of 
British public opinion demanded that the government stand 
firm against further German expansion. The people now saw 
Hitler as immoral and out to conquer the world. The leaders 
themselves, Taylor thought, did not change much; the public
had to push them into war. But "with the narrow moralism
2 3of a reformed drunkard," the leaders refused to urge upon
91 99Ibid., 219. ‘̂Ibid., 177.
^^Ibid., 226.
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the Poles concessions which they had demanded of the Czechs 
and which would have saved peace. Moreover, Taylor pointed 
out, the needed concessions were ones that the thinking of 
the times counted just. They were ones the British could 
not keep Germany from taking by force. The Poles them­
selves played out their part in the light of their reading 
of Munich. In addition to the characteristic Polish delu­
sion of Great Power status. Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign 
Minister, had the unfortunate example of President Benes of
Czechoslovakia to keep him from making any concession to 
2^German demands.
The British reaction to Taylor's analysis of the 
Polish crisis, Munich, and the coming of the war was vari­
ous, but on the whole highly unfavorable. Taylor's The
Origins of the Second World War received a very complimen-
25tary notice in the Times Literary Supplement. A New
Statesman reviewer wrote that Taylor was "the only English
historian writing who can bend the bow of Gibbon or
Macauley."^^ However, Elizabeth Wiskemann, the historian
or the Hitler-Mussolini alliance, wondered if the work were
27not another of Taylor's jokes. If so, most British
p IIT̂bid., 204, 215-78.
2 RTimes Literary Supplement, April 21, I96I, 244.
^^David Marquand, "The Taylor Doctrine," New 
Statesman, LXI (April 21, I96I), 627.
^^Elizabeth Wiskemann, Listener, LXV (April 21,
1961), 707.
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historians were not amused. In criticizing the book, P. A. 
Reynolds argued that Hitler did have clear plans in foreign 
policy and recognized that he could not achieve them without 
war. Reynolds particularly disliked Taylor's contention 
that Henlein's Sudeten German Party had genuine grievances
28and was not under Hitler's complete control. A number of 
other historians wrote critical letters to the Times Literary 
Supplement. Many of the writers limited themselves to point­
ing out contradictions in Taylor's descriptions of events 
in the 1920's and early 1930's, but the emotionalism of 
their letters derived mainly from anger at Taylor's comments
on Hitler and Munich. Such work, some writers claimed, en-
29couraged neo-Nazi movements by absolving Hitler. A. L. 
Rowse complained that Taylor's "astonishing and deplorable 
reconstruction" took "pains to whittle down moral consider­
ations .
The most lengthy and most highly critical review of 
Taylor's The Origins of the Second World War was by Hugh 
Trevor-Roper, the Regius Professor of history at Oxford. In 
an exchange with Taylor in Encounter and in a television
28P. A. Reynolds, "Hitler's Weir," History, XLVI 
(October I96I), 212-17*
29Times Literary Supplement, May 5, 1961; May 21, 
1961; May 26, 1961; June 2, I96I, 277, 325, 341, 357* The 
writers included Isaac Deutscher, W. N. Medlicott, A. L. 
Rowse, David Thomson, Hugh Trevor-Roper, and Elizabeth 
Wiskemann.
30 'Times Literary Supplement, May 21, I96I, 325.
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0*1debate with him on July 9, 196I, Trevor-Roper criticized 
the effect of Taylor's work, its content, and Taylor's mo­
tives for writing. He repeated the charge that Taylor's 
work encouraged neo-Nazi movements. Taylor, he claimed, 
accomplished this dubious goal by selectively quoting or 
by dismissing as irrelevant material in Mein Kampf and the 
Hossbach Memorandum which refuted his thesis. The proper 
way to study such material, Trevor-Roper suggested, was to 
keep one's own emotions of the 1930's intact. Taylor used 
documents too much, his feelings of the time too little.
Taylor also equated appeasement of Germany with "realism,"
32and equated both with "morality." The result was intol­
erable. Taylor suggested that Churchill's ideas on pro­
tecting Czechoslovakia were cynical, that Munich was a 
"triumph of all that was best...in British life,"^^ and
that Hitler "in principle and doctrine...was no more wicked
34and unscrupulous than many other contemporary statesmen." 
Why did Taylor make such claims? It was partly a joke. It
was partly a "gesture of posthumous defiance of his former
35master. Sir Lewis Namier." On Namier's recommendation.
31Hugh Trevor-Roper, "A.J.P. Taylor, Hitler, and the 
War," Encounter, XVII (July I961), 88-95; Taylor, "How to Quote: 
Exercises for Beginners," Encounter, XVII (September I96I),
73-74; Trevor-Roper, "A Reply," Encounter, XVII (September
1961), 74-75» Because of the British Broadcasting Corpora­
tion rule, whereby television scripts are destroyed three 
years after their use, copies of the Taylor-Trevor debate 
are no longer in print. However, excerpts from the debate 
are quoted in Mehta, 120-22.
3 2Trevor-Roper, "A.J.P. Taylor, Hitler, and the War," 89,
33lbid., 89. ^^Ibid., 92.
^^Ibid., 95.
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Trevor-Roper reported, Taylor had been passed over by Trevor- 
Roper himself to become Regius Professor. Mainly, Trevor- 
Roper thought, Taylor's object was to make a case for the 
appeasement of Soviet Russia in the 1960's. The Soviets, 
he accused Taylor of implying, were ordinary statesmen.
The moral and realistic course for dealing with them was 
unilateral disarmament and large scale concessions.
Many of Trevor-Roper's criticisms were ill-founded, 
for he persistently quoted Taylor out of context. Taylor 
had written that "in principle and doctrine Hitler was no
more wicked and unscrupulous than other contemporary states-
-or ' £
„37
men," but Trevoe-Roper tendentiously omitted Taylo 's
next sentence, "in wicked deeds he outdid them all.
Equally, Taylor did not write that in his own opinion 
Churchill's ideas were cynical or that Munich really was a
o Q"triumph." Rather, he pointed out that the intellectual
climate of the 1930's judged them so. Also, there was no
indication that Taylor himself equated appeasement with
either realism or morality. Trevor-Roper's suggestion that
Taylor's work was a "gesture of posthumous defience" of
39Namier was also wrong. All the controversial elements 




TO Trevor-Roper, "A.J.P. Taylor, Hitler, and the War,"
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years before Namier's death in 1960.^^ Moreover, Namier's
closest colleague, John Brooke, speculated that Namier
might well have agreed with many of Taylor's conclusions,
particularly his description of Hitler's relations with the 
4lGerman people. Whatever support Taylor's conclusions 
might receive in Germany, his work was not an exoneration 
of Hitler or the German people. Taylor did point out that 
Hitler's ideas and tactics were prosaic enough. The suc­
cesses Hitler achieved were disastrous for the world, for
the "terrifying literalism" of Hitler's ideas on the Jews
42were willingly carried out by the German people. In 
reality Taylor's conclusions made a case for collective 
German war guilt. They reflected his feeling that the 
postwar preoccupation with Hitler aimed at letting the West 
Germans assume an undeserved equality among the nations of 
Europe.
Trevor-Roper's charge that Taylor was promoting 
unilateral disarmament and concessions to the Soviet Union 
had more substance. The original motivation for Taylor's 
study was a dislike of the Cold War uses of Munich, and his
40Taylor, "Munich Ten Years After," 278-79; Taylor, 
"Munich Twenty Years After," 7j Taylor, "Ancient Lights," 
456-57; Taylor, The proublemakers, 167-200; Taylor, Rumours 
of Wars, l84-203l 208 ; Taylor, Englishmen and Others 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956), 155, I83, 188.
41John Brooke in Mehta, 225.
42Taylor, Origins, 70.
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conclusions did discredit Munich as a guide for Western
resistance to Soviet Russia. Until 19^8, Taylor had
written bitterly of Munich. After the "Munich Legend" was
created by drawing parallels between his own view of the
1938 events and those of the late 1940's, Taylor complained
that such "twaddling scraps of history" were preventing
43conciliation with the Soviet Union, He also began to 
look critically at his own former judgments. The Origins 
of the Second World War was the product of this reexamination. 
Whatever his original motive for writing, Taylor's approach 
was a legitimate one, probably more so than Trevor-Roper's 
encouragement of retrospective emotions. Taylor set out to 
show that Munich was an historical event, the product of 
a unique point of view. The intellectual climate of the 
1930's produced a morality which favored Germany. Fear of 
the effects of conventional bombing and other aspects of 
the arms situation in 1938 made war with Germany at the time 
seem fruitless. Further, the Hitler of 1938 was not the 
Hitler of wartime. He was sane. He did not aim at con­
quering Britain. Therefore, negotiating with him in 1938
Taylor, "Munich Ten Years After," 279. See also 
Taylor, Rumours of Wars, ?6, 276-75 Taylor, The Trouble­
makers , 19-20; Taylor, "Munich Twenty Years After," 7.
For Taylor's views on Munich before the appearance of the 
"Munich Legend," see extracts from a note written to Duff 
Cooper in 1938 congratulating Cooper for resigning as First 
Lord of the Admiralty in protest over Munich in Martin Gil­
bert, Britain and Germany between the Wars (London: Longmans, 
1964), 118. See also, Taylor, The Course of German History 
(reprint 1946 edition with new preface; New York: Capricorn
Books, 1961), 220.
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was not as foolish as it might seem in retrospect. These 
and Taylor's other contentions suggested extraordinarily 
complex events, which could not provide easy guides to 
present policy.
However, Taylor did implicitly propose two general­
izations of his own from Munich. He emphasized that war at 
the time of Munich, or by implication at any time, was not 
a solution to national problems. All the government's fears 
about fighting in 1938 were realized. After 19^5 Britain 
was impoverished. The Soviet Union gained control of 
Eastern Europe, and Western Europe still faced the German 
problem. The difference was that the Poles rather than the 
Czechs were exterminated to save British honor. The fear
of bombing, which had been illusory in 1938, had become
k kterrifyingly real. Also, Taylor implied that negotia­
tions with dictatorships were not as dangerous as the 
"Munich Legend" suggested. The only misfortunes that 
Britain suffered from dealing with Hitler at Munich came 
from mutual misinterpretations of intentions afterwards.
The only thing wrong with making concessions to Hitler 
was that he was a German. Non-German dictators, he hinted, 
were like the Hitler of 1938, but could safely be negotiated 
with. Certainly his portrait of Hitler in 1938, the
ZiZiTaylor, Origins, 16-17; Taylor "Old Tunes," 238; 
Taylor in Mehta, l6o-bl, 173»
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dictator with limited aims waiting upon events, resembled 
his description of Stalin in the early 1950’s.
Were Taylor's conclusions then simply the dis­
creditable product of his biases as Trevor-Roper suggested? 
Or, were they "objective" as Taylor himself claimed on 
several occasions? The answer seems to be that Taylor 
wanted to discredit the "Munich Legend," and that he found 
what he wanted to find. However, he did so, at least in 
the case of his Munich discussion, by consistent use of the 
available documents. The very process of selection and ex­
clusion, the essence of historical analysis, is highly sub­
jective. Taylor selected material which emphasized the 
historical uniqueness of Munich. By contrast, the Conser­
vative critics selected material which emphasized the common 
elements of Munich with a later period. There is no gen­
eral agreement among historians on the "objective" validity 
of either approach. Similarly, Taylor assumed an emotional 
connection between Hitler's actions, greediness for success. 
He selected material which emphasized the contrast between 
his personality and aims in 1938 and those of wartime. Pre­
vious historians started with an assumption of an intellec­
tual connection, the unfolding of a plan. They had selected 
material which minimized the difference between Hitler's 
personality in 1938 and that of wartime. Again, there is 
no objective way of determining the relation of intellect 
or emotions to a series of foreign policy decisions. One
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cannot measure Hitler's personality changes from 1938 to 
1943. With these factors in mind, Taylor's description of 
Munich can be classified as a "rival dogma," as Taylor him-
45self called it on another occasion. It does not settle 
Munich but it provides an alternative w a y of looking at the 
event.
Nevertheless Trevor-Roper's charge was invalid. It 
is doubtful that any careful reader would support appease­
ment of the Soviet Union on the basis of Taylor's work.
For Taylor was also extremely critical of Munich. All 
British policy after 1935, he noted, was based on exped­
iency. Whatever appeasement's moral basis, it meant in 
practice, "endorsing the claims of the stronger and then
46making out that these claims were just." At one point,
Taylor did write that British and French pressure on the
47Czechs forced them to "follow the moral line." He also 
wrote that the pressure was a "demand that Benes commit 
suicide in order to secure /British and Frenc^peace of
48minds." This action was made all the worse by the Czechs 
probable ability alone to defeat the Germans in 1938. Such 
cant, Taylor pointed out, would have been impossible without 
the corruption of international life brought by the dictator's
^^Taylor, Origins, 216.




lies and the connivance of Western statesmen in the lies.
Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary in a better 
time, would never have signed the Munich Agreement. The
49British and French motives for this "shameful transaction," 
Taylor went on, were fear of war and fear of admitting that 
they were no longer Great Powers. Benes had turned the 
moral question in his own favor by the time of the Munich 
crisis. Chamberlain went to Berchtesgaden because the 
French nerve had collapsed. After Godesberg, he was willing 
to hand over the Czechs--even give up Britain's claim to Great 
Power status--simply in order to avoid war. The British 
people themselves appeared to accept Munich in order to 
keep themselves from being bombed.
These contradictions in Taylor's work suggest that 
Munich was important to him for more than one reason. The 
original motivation behind Taylor's work seems to have been 
to debunk the conclusions about Munich on which the "Munich 
Legend" was based. Apparently other, much older emotions 
got in the way. Why should the feeling of nearly twenty- 
five years before interfere with discrediting a present day 
policy which he strongly disapproved? The answer is that 
his feelings about Munich had a special significance. Munich 
was, as Taylor pointed out, the last time England and the
49?Ibid., 179.
^^Taylor, English History, 430-31.
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other European powers "seemed the centre of the world.
It was "the prelude to a fierce conflict which ended...
52centuries of world dominance." It was also the last
5 3time that Britain had any real choice in foreign policy. 
Taylor's writings in the past had shown that he--like many
others--felt that later misfortunes had come from the wrong
5kchoice at Munich. His present statements showed that he 
also believed that in her last leading part Britain had 
played an ignoble role. Thus, for Taylor Munich had a 
double and contradictory meaning: it was the source of the 
"Munich Legend," and it was the last occasion when Britain 
as an independent Great Power had freedom to choose her own 
fate •
Taylor's British critics largely ignored these 
particular contradictions. They attacked his work for 
what the tone of the criticism indicated were emotional as 
much as scholarly reasons. They did not do so because of 
his work's implications for present policy towards Russia. 
Trevor-Roper was the only British writer to mention this.
As Taylor himself pointed out, American reviewers appeared
5 5to dislike the book for only this reason. British
^^Taylor, "Munich Ten Years After," 2?8.
52Taylor, "Munich Twenty Years After," ?•
5 3Taylor, Rumours of Wars, ?6 .
54Taylor, "Munich Ten Years After," 278-79*
55 Trevor-Roper, "A.J.P. Taylor, Hitler, and the War," 
96; Taylor in Mehta, 171*
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writers criticized the work because it seemed to mock the 
feelings they themselves had about Munich and Nazi Germany. 
Thus, paradoxically, they attacked Taylor for belittling 
emotions which he shared with them and which caused his 
work to fail in its original purpose.
Except for Taylor's contradictory feelings, the 
relationship of his revision to that of the "Phoney War" 
apologists might well have been the same as that of the 
post-World War I revisionists to the U.D.C. pamphleteers.^^ 
Taylor, like the revisionists after I918, aimed to suggest 
a new policy by discrediting an accepted interpretation of 
the causes of a war. To do so, he drew heavily on the 
interpretations of a wartime dissenting minority, although 
Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott, unlike the U.D.C. pamphle­
teers, were eminently respectable, and their views may well 
have represented those of many of the officials actually 
running the "Phoney War." Certainly, Taylor did compli­
ment the 1939-40 works of Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott, 
an almost unprecedented act among British historians. Many 
of his conclusions resembled theirs. Like Medlicott, Taylor 
eliminated the assumption of an intellectual connection-- 
the unfolding of a closely reasoned plan--for Hitler's
Carr, Britain, 172-6; Henderson, Failure of a 
Mission, 129-88; Medlicott, British Foreign Policy, 22-52, 
302; Medlicott, The Origins of the Second Great War 
(London: Bell and Sons for the Historical Association,
1940), 1-23.
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actions, and substituted an accidental and emotional one.
To Taylor, success was Hitler’s plan. To Medlicott, Hitler
aimed for "some half-mystical, ill-defined stroke of politics
57which could produce glory for Germany and her Führer."
They further agreed that Hitler’s writings were no guide 
to his prewar foreign policy. Both also emphasized the 
emotional significance of Munich", Munich’s failure confirmed 
an incorrect impression that Hitler meant to conquer Western 
Europe. Both further pointed out that Hitler started the 
war as a result of misreading post-Munich British opinion, 
not as part of a plan for aggression. Taylor and Medlicott 
along with Carr and Henderson as well interpreted the May
c O
crisis and its impact alike.
Yet the effect of Taylor’s mixed emotions about 
Munich was to make his work quite different in several ways 
from those of Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott. These men 
had written before any real fighting had taken place. Munich 
meant little to them, except for its part in causing an 
unnecessary, though mercifully inactive war. The passing 
of Britain's role as a Great Power seemed a small price for 
peace. Taylor disliked the "Munich Legend." However, he 
despised the Germans for their wartime atrocities. Also,
^^Medlicott, The Origins of the Second Great War, 23.
^^Taylor, Origins, 165-7 5 Carr, Britain, 170; Hen­
derson, 143; Medlicott, The Origins of the Second Great 
War, 12.
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the loss of Britain's Great Power status, which Munich had 
marked for him as it did for his critics, seemed to have 
brought many misfortunes without even the compensation of 
peace. For this reason, Taylor's picture of the inter­
action of British and German policy was much like that of 
R. W. Seton-Watson, the friend of Masaryk and Benes. Taylor 
attributed a wider range of motives to British policy. His 
picture of German policy was clearer, and more damaging to 
Chamberlain. But both Taylor and Seton-Watson agreed that 
British actions alone moved the Czech crisis along. They 
agreed that Chamberlain deliberately played on British fears 
in the Commons on September 28th to insure support for what 
he already knew would be another trip to Germany. Taylor 
wrote, and Seton-Watson implied, that without Chamberlain 
there would have been no Munich. Thus, Taylor's work act­
ually continued the postwar trend begun by the Conservative
Critics of using documentation to make Chamberlain's actions
59seem more culpable than before.
The feelings of Taylor's critics prevented the re­
visionary part of his work from gaining the wide acceptance 
for the 1939-40 views of Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott that 
the post-World War I revisionists had obtained for those of 
the U.D.C. pamphleteers. In fact, Medlicott wrote a rebut­
tal to Taylor in I963. Medlicott then wrote that his former
59Seton-Watson, Munich and the Dictators, 23-179*
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conclusions and those of Taylor were wrong. Hitler, Medli­
cott had come to feel sure, did have plans for aggression. 
Chamberlain had a rational policy as well. Expert opinion 
told him that Britain could only resist Germany after March 
1939*^^ In a preface to a reprinting of his 19%8 work, 
Vïheeler-Bennett declared that nothing in Taylor’s argument 
had changed his mind about the significance of the Hossbach 
Memorandum for Hitler’s future a c t i o n s . I n  a revised 
edition of his biography of Hitler, Alan Bullock described 
the Hossbach Memorandum as showing Hitler's "thoughts” on 
Czechoslovakia rather than his "intentions" towards her,^^ 
but Bullock specifically rejected Taylor's conclusions. In 
a 1963 work, Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, both former 
pupils of Taylor’s, described Taylor as "seldom wrong when 
dealing with British p o l i c y , b u t  themselves described 
Munich in a quite different way. A number of other writers 
did so as well in what continued to be a large volume of
Medlicott, "The Coming of the War in 1939,”
From Metternich to Hitler, Aspects of British Foreign 
Policy, 1ü i 4-1939, ed. W. N. Medlicott (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1963), 231-56.
^^Wheeler-Bennett, Munich (2nd ed. with new preface: 
London: Macmillan, I963), x.
^^Bullock, Hitler, 336; Bullock, Hitler (2nd ed. 
revised; Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd.,
1962), 367.
^^Gilbert and Gott, 421.
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publication on MunichJG4 Leader -writers continued to look 
at the Cold War in terms of the "Munich L e g e n d . I n  his 
biography of Chamberlain published seven months after Tay­
lor's The Origins of the Second World War, Ian McLeod chose 
not to justify Chamberlain's foreign policy with the damning 
apologies of Taylor.
However, the revisionary part of Taylor's work did 
have some favorable reaction. After Taylor amplified his 
criticism of the Hossbach Memorandum in a I963 reprinting 
of The Origins of the Second World War, Richard Gott agreed 
somewhat reluctantly that Taylor's interpretation of the 
document was the correct one.^^ E. M. Robertson, who was
Eden, The Reckoning, 8-3O; Earl Birkenhead, Hali­
fax (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965)5 38l-4l6; Martin Gilbert, 
The European Powers, 1900-1945 (New York; New American Lib­
rary^ 1965) 211-20; Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (Lon­
don: Weidenfield and Nicolson 1966), 179-&9; Ian Colvin, 
Vansittart in Office (London: Gollancz, I965), 199-286;
Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change (New York: Heir per and Row, 
1966), 460-530; William McElwee, Britain's Locust Years 
(London: Faber and Faber, I962), 208-19 ; 228, 231-42, 257-58 ; 
David Thomson, England in the Twentieth Century, 1914-63 
(Baltimore: Pelican Books, I965), 173-85 Francis Williams,
A Pattern of Rulers (London: Longmans, I965), 135-94; Martin, 
"British Foreign Policy in the Thirties," New Statesman, LXVI 
(August 26, 1963), 632-33; Sir Douglas Savory,"Chamberlain, 
McLeod and the Facts," Contemporary Review, CCI (March I962), 
142-51; D.CoWatt, "Sir Neville Henderson Reappraised," Con­
temporary Review, CCI (March I962), 151-54.
^^Times Literary Supplement, December 1, I96I, 857- 
58; (anon.Tl "Then and Now," Spectator, CCVII (December 1, 
1961), 807-08; Brian Inglis, "Faraway Country Revisited," 
Spectator, CCVII (December 1, I96I), 811-13; Richard Gott, 
"Last Lessons," Spectator, CCXI (September 20, I963), 356.
^^Mcleod, 221-76.
^^Gott, "Last Lessons," 356.
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also a former pupil of Taylor's, had published in 1963 a 
study of Hitler's military planning which partly substan­
tiated Taylor's contentions that Hitler planned no wars
6 8in the West, and only blundered into such a war in 1939.
D« C . Watt, a lecturer in International history at the Uni­
versity of London, was impressed with some of Taylor's 
readings of German documents as well as with Taylor's 
suggestions of motives other than cowardice and ignorance 
in British policy. After reading Taylor, Watt noted Chamber­
lain’s policy resembled the "containment" of the postwar
69period. Watt also believed that Taylor's emphasis on a
gap between British will and resources in the 1930's had
"the ring of truth" to historians "who live in the last
70stages of the contraction of British world power."
Equally, Watt, along with Hugh Thomas, a young diplomat 
and historian, was stimulated by Taylor's provocative con­
clusions about the importance of the August 1939 crisis in 
explaining the coming of the war. They did not entirely 
agree with this part of Taylor's analysis, but they were
M. Robertson, Hitler's Prewar Policy (London: 
Longmans, I963).
69B.C. Watt, "Appeasement: The Rise of a Revision­
ist School?" Political Quarterly, XXXVI (April I965), 211. 
See also Watt, Personalities and Policies, Studies in the 
Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth 
Century (London : Longmans, I965) 159-?4.
70Watt, "Appeasement: The Rise of a Revision­
ist School?" 209-
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71even more critical of traditional accounts. Thus, it is 
possible that in the future the Polish crisis may be treated 
as more than an epilogue to Munich.
Even if such study does develop, a de-emphasis of 
Munich seems unlikely. To British historians, British 
policy in the Polish crisis has always had a frustrating 
air of inevitability which even Taylor's work does not dis­
pel. Historians have seen British policy then and after as 
having no choice. In contrast, Munich remains "the last 
occasion on which Britain conducted grand policy on her
own, perhaps the last ever in the history of the United 
72Kingdom." Taylor's writing, just as that of his critics, 
reflected this intrinsic political importance of Munich.
The emotion in Taylor's writing and that of his critics, both 
reflected the belief that in this last exercise of indepen­
dent power Britain cut a poor figure and that Britain's loss 
of power and choice after Munich resulted from the wrong 
decision made then. Taylor could not escape this emotional 
attachment to Munich. Nor could others. Watt, like Taylor, 
revised some of his views of Munich, but Munich was still 
"shameful but inevitable. After I96I, other writers
71Ibid., 2 0 0 - 1 ;  Hugh Thomas, "Controversy Reexamined: 
Taylor and Trevor-Roper," Spectator, OCX (june 7, 1963)î
728-29.
^^Colvin, 16.
73Watt, "Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist
School?" 212 .
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continued to describe "pangs of hurt pride" and "a humilia-
7ktion and disgrace to our country." Even such young 
writers as Gilbert and Gott, the latter of whom had not 
been born when the Munich Agreement was signed, have res­
ponded to this f e e l i n g . T h u s ,  whereas in I961 Hugh Thomas 
could quite successfully challenge a traditional view of 
the Spanish Civil War--an event which some historians have 
seen as arousing contemporary opinion much more than Munich--
Taylor’s qualified, even contradictory revision of Munich
76brought a storm of protest.' This contrast confirms the 
existence of a special British feeling for Munich. It makes 
it probable that the emotional British debate on Munich will 
continue.
^^Times Literary Supplement, December 1, I96I, 857- 
88; Savory, "Chamberlain, Mccleod and the Facts," 145.
T^Gilbert and Gott, 49-185.
^^Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (London: Eyre
and Spottiswoode, I96I). See R. H. S. Crossman, "Spain 
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